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Odum v. State, 255 Ga.App. 70, 564 S.E.2d 490 (April 15, 2002). Defendant challenged the foundation laid by the State to prove his speed based on laser. “OCGA § 40-14-17 pertinently requires that the State introduce a certified copy of the DPS’s list of approved laser speed detection devices. Given this foundation alone, independent of those required under OCGA § 40-14-4 as to speed determined by radar detection devices, evidence of speed measured by an ‘approved’ laser speed detection device is admissible.” Accord, In re: B.D.S., 269 Ga.App. 89, 603 S.E.2d 488 (August 11, 2004); In re: J.D.S., 273 Ga.App. 576, 615 S.E.2d 627 (June 8, 2005) (laser results should have been excluded due to failure to tender approved list into evidence, but officer’s estimate that speed exceeded speed limit still sufficed for conviction); Chism v. State , 295 Ga.App. 776, 674 S.E.2d 328 (January 28, 2009) (“The only foundation required for the entry of evidence of speed obtained by a laser detection device is the certified copy of the DPS's list of approved laser speed detection devices, which was provided here.”). Van Nort v. State, 250 Ga.App. 7, 550 S.E.2d 111 (June 7, 2001). “OCGA § 40-14-17, effective March 25, 1999…. expressly provides that evidence based on a laser speed detector model approved by the Department of Public Safety is admissible in court” without the necessity of expert testimony as to the reliability of the scientific evidence, contrary to the prior case of Izer v. State , 236 Ga.App. 282, 511 S.E.2d 625 (1999). Foundation requirements for speed-detection devices are waived if objection not timely raised at trial – case holding to contrary, Johnson v. State , 189 Ga.App. 192, 375 S.E.2d 290 (1988), has been overruled. Accord, Odum (April 15, 2002), above; Chism v. State , 295 Ga.App. 776, 674 S.E.2d 328 (January 28, 2009). Gamble v. State, 237 Ga.App. 414, 515 S.E.2d 422 (March 31, 1999). OCGA § 40-14-4 does not require that the State submit evidence of certification of a laser speed detection device for every year since it was put in evidence; rather, “a reasonable reading of the statute requires proof of certification for the pertinent year, thus ensuring the accuracy of the radar reading at issue. Here, the State met the requirements of OCGA § 40-14-4 by producing a copy of the certificate of accuracy dated within one year prior to the use of the radar in this case,” citing Nairon v. State, 215 Ga.App. 76, 449 S.E.2d 634 (1994). 34. VEHICULAR HOMICIDE (SERIOUS BODILY INJURY BY VEHICLE) Otuwa v. State, 319 Ga.App. 339, 734 S.E.2d 273 (November 16, 2012). Convictions for first-degree vehicular homicide and related charges affirmed; trial court properly declined to charge jury on second-degree vehicular homicide, based on speeding, as a lesser-included offense to first-degree vehicular homicide, based on DUI. State v. Ogilvie, 292 Ga. 6, 734 S.E.2d 50 (November 5, 2012). Reversing 313 Ga.App. 305, 721 S.E.2d 549 (November 9, 2011), and reinstating convictions for vehicular homicide, second degree, and failure to yield to pedestrian. Trial court properly declined to charge jury on defense of accident. 1. Contrary to Court of Appeals, “‘strict liability’ traffic offenses are not offenses with no criminal intent element. They do not require the specific intent or wrongful purpose that is an element of other crimes, but they do require the defendant to have voluntarily committed the act that the statute prohibits, which typically involves driving at a particular time and place (e.g., through a red light, see OCGA § 40–6–20(a)) or in a particular way (e.g., too fast, see OCGA § 40–6–181).” 2. Defense of accident may apply in strict liability offenses “only where there is evidence, however slight, that the defendant did not voluntarily commit the prohibited act. Contrary to Ogilvie's assertion, this does not eliminate the accident defense in traffic offense cases. The defense must be based, however, on evidence that the prohibited act was committed involuntarily, for example, because of an unforseeable physical ailment or external force. Cf. Smith v. State, 250 Ga.App. 532, 536–537 (552 S.E.2d 499) (2007) (holding that a justification instruction was required on a failure to maintain lane charge based on evidence that the defendant accelerated and hit a utility pole to avoid an armed attack); Sapp v. State, 179 Ga.App. 614, 615 (347 S.E.2d 354) (1986) (holding that a charge on accident was required in a prosecution for obstructing a police officer based on the defendant's testimony that she obstructed the officer when she fell due to illness).” Thus, on the failure to yield to a pedestrian charge here, for example, “[a] charge on accident is appropriate for this crime only when there is evidence that the defendant did not voluntarily drive into the crosswalk.” 3. Defendant’s claim that child suddenly ran in front of her did not state a defense of accident. “If Ogilvie had been indicted for a crime that required her to have intentionally or maliciously hit the child, like murder, see OCGA § 16–5–1, this evidence would have supported an accident instruction, because it would tend to show that she did not act with the requisite “criminal ... intention.” OCGA § 16–2–2. As explained above, however, that was not the type of intent required to commit a strict liability traffic offense.” Rather, the defense raises an issue of proximate cause with regard to the vehicular homicide charge. “In the language of § 40–6–393(c), the evidence raised the issue of whether Ogilvie's alleged violation of § 40–6–91 was ‘the cause of [the child's] death.’ The trial court committed no error in this regard, however, giving the jury a full charge on proximate cause, in addition to charging the relevant language of those two statutes.” “Cause” here means “proximate cause,” citing State v. Jackson, 287