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Ga. 646 (697 S.E.2d 757) (2010). Nelson v. State, 317 Ga.App. 527, 731 S.E.2d 770 (August 30, 2012). In prosecution for vehicular homicide (second degree), trial court properly denied plea in bar based on double jeopardy. 1. “‘[T]he grant of a new trial by the trial court on the discretionary ground that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is not a finding by the trial court that the evidence is legally insufficient so as to bar a second trial under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Federal Constitution.’ (Punctuation omitted.),” quoting Ricketts v. Williams, 242 Ga. 303 (248 S.E.2d 673) (1978). 2. Evidence supported conviction for vehicular homicide where defendant, a pedestrian, attempted to cross a busy highway with her small child, at night, not at a crosswalk, resulting in the child being struck and killed by a car. Smith v. State, 285 Ga. 725, 681 S.E.2d 161 (July 9, 2009). 1. Evidence supported defendant’s vehicular homicide conviction where officer struck and killed another motorist as defendant was fleeing and eluding. 2. Vehicular homicide statute was not unconstitutionally vague as applied under these facts; “[t]here is nothing in the statute that would have prevented Smith, or any person of ordinary intelligence, from understanding that actions taken to elude police that result in the death of another person could lead to a prosecution and conviction for first degree homicide by vehicle.” Dunagan v. State, 283 Ga. 501, 661 S.E.2d 525 (May 19, 2008). Reversing 286 Ga.App. 668, 649 S.E.2d 765 (July 3, 2007). In defendant’s trial for vehicular homicide, trial court abused its discretion in excluding defendant’s proffered evidence of dangerous design of intersection which allegedly resulted in numerous prior accidents. “Dunagan’s claim regarding the inherent dangerousness of the intersection plainly included much more than the request to admit into evidence a history of prior mishaps at the scene. He sought to introduce documentary and testimonial evidence, allegedly illustrating the hazardous design and consequent malfunctioning of the intersection during the time in question, and evidence of corrective masures taken since the collision which he hoped would demonstrate the intersection’s known design defects contributing to the collision.” “[Defendant] sought to argue that the design flaws, and consequent known inherent dangers, in the intersection negated the elements of criminal negligence and proximate cause in regard to the reckless driving charge and his claim of accident.” Evidence of a design defect could negate the element of negligence, and could be relevant to the defense of accident as raised by defendant. Further, “any evidence of known design defects in the intersection was relevant on the issue of proximate cause of the collision, and would bear directly upon the ultimate issue of Dunagan’s guilt of the charged crimes.” Citing Gibson v. State , 280 Ga.App. 435, 634 S.E.2d 204 (2006) (Defendant’s convictions for homicide by vehicle and related charges reversed based on ineffective assistance; counsel were ineffective for failing to investigate history of traffic light malfunctions at intersection where collision occurred). Also, “evidence of subsequent modifications to the intersection … was admissible not only to attempt to show that there were known flaws in the intersection, and hence known dangers, at the time of the collision but also that the Department of Transportation was the responsible party. [fn: This is in contrast to the general rule in negligence actions that evidence of subsequent remedial measures is inadmissible. Brooks v. Cellin Mfg. Co., Inc ., 251 Ga. 395, 397 (306 S.E.2d 657) (1983). The exclusion of this kind of evidence in civil actions is grounded in the public policy that parties should be encouraged to make needed repairs without fear of admission of liability. Department of Transp. v. Cannady , 270 Ga. 427, 428 (1) (511 S.E.2d 173) (1999). Thus, the propriety of the admission of the evidence of post-collision remedial measures in the present criminal case does not affect the principles and policies governing the admission of such evidence in civil cases. ] This is so because ‘[g]enerally, evidence implicating another named [party] as the actual perpetrator of the crime is relevant and admissible as tending to exonerate the defendant.’ Azizi v. State , 270 Ga. 709, 714 (6) (512 S.E.2d 622) (1999).” Kirk v. State, 289 Ga.App. 125, 656 S.E.2d 251 (January 8, 2008). Evidence supported finding of causation in defendant’s second-degree vehicular homicide conviction, although expert could not determine which of several impacts caused death. “In vehicular homicide cases involving intervening causes, the inability to specify which of the intervening causes proximately caused the injury or death is not determinative of the defendant’s guilt. See McGrath v. State, 277 Ga.App. 825, 829(1) (627 S.E.2d 866) (2006) (jury rejected intervening proximate causes, finding the defendant guilty of vehicular homicide); Ponder v. State, 274 Ga.App. 93, 95-96(1) (616 S.E.2d 857) (2005) (defendant guilty of vehicular homicide where decedent was struck and killed by oncoming car after attempting an evasive maneuver to avoid colliding with the defendant); Davis v. State, 245 Ga.App. 402, 403(1) (538 S.E.2d 67) (2001) (second degree vehicular homicide conviction affirmed where driver crashed into a tree and a fire started in the vehicle, where evidence was undisputed that victims did not die from the impact but from the fire). To support a conviction for vehicular homicide, the jury must conclude, as they did here, that ‘the defendant’s conduct was the ‘legal’ or ‘proximate’ cause, as well as the cause in fact, of the death. An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or a failure to act whenever it appears from the evidence in the case that the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or