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actually causing the injury or damage and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission. (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Pitts v. State, 253 Ga.App. 373, 374(1) (559 S.E.2d 106) (2002). Accord McGrath, supra (‘as long as the defendant’s negligence proximately caused the injury of another, the crime [of vehicular homicide] has been committed, even if there are other factors which also are proximate causes of the injury’) (citation omitted). … The jury obviously concluded that irrespective of which impact actually caused the blunt force trauma to the decedent’s head, Kirk proximately caused the decedent’s death because his conduct played a substantial part in bringing about or causing the decedent’s death.” Accord, Hartzler v. State , 332 Ga.App. 674, 774 S.E.2d 738 (June 30, 2015) (“a defendant's conduct is a proximate cause of a victim's death if it was a ‘substantial factor’ in causing it and that it was either a direct result or a reasonably probable result of the defendant's conduct.”). Brown v State, 287 Ga.App. 755, 652 S.E.2d 631 (October 9, 2007). Defendant’s conviction for first degree vehicular homicide reversed; trial court erred in not giving defendant’s requested jury charges on second degree vehicular homicide, as evidence supported theories that the collision could have been related to the offense of following too closely or failing to maintain a lane rather than DUI (although defendant admitted he was DUI). “‘A written request to charge a lesser included offense must always be given if there is any evidence that the defendant is guilty of the lesser included offense.’(Punctuation omitted.) Edwards v. State, 264 Ga. 131, 132 (442 S.E.2d 444) (1994). Accordingly, a written request to instruct the jury on second degree vehicular homicide must be given in a case charging first degree vehicular homicide if there is any evidence showing that a less culpable traffic offense caused the fatal collision. Hayles [ v. State, 180 Ga.App. 860, 861-862(3) (350 S.E.2d 793) (1986)]. Specifically, where some evidence shows that the defendant ‘committed an act of following too closely, a traffic violation “other than” the more culpable offense of DUI,’ and that such may have caused the collision and resulting death, the fact that the defendant may have also committed a DUI does not ‘demand a finding that the DUI was the sole proximate cause of the collision and of the victim’s death.’ Id. Indeed, because the State must prove that the more culpable traffic offense caused the death, Henry v. State, 284 Ga.App. 893, 895-897 (645 S.E.2d 32) (2007), a jury could believe that a defendant was guilty of DUI but that the DUI did not cause the particular death. Davis v. State, 245 Ga.App. 402, 403(1) (538 S.E.2d 67) (2000). ‘Instead, a jury might conclude that some other traffic offense caused a particular victim’s death.’ Id. Under such circumstances, there is ‘no evidentiary or legal impediment to the return of a verdict of guilt as to DUI and a verdict of guilt as to second degree vehicular homicide. The trial court err[s] in refusing to give [defendant’s] request to charge on second degree vehicular homicide.’ Hayles, supra, 180 Ga.App. at 862(3). See Lefler v. State, 210 Ga.App. 609, 610- 611(2) (436 S.E.2d 777) (1993) (reversing first degree vehicular homicide conviction where court refused charge on second degree even though some evidence showed collision may have been caused by speeding or failing to obey a traffic signal). Lyons v. State, 248 Ga.App. 59, 59-61(1) (545 S.E.2d 614) (2001), which involved the status offense of being a habitual violator, and Beaman v. State, 161 Ga.App. 129, 131(4) (291 S.E.2d 244) (1982) (physical precedent only), which is non-binding precedent and in which there was no suggestion that any offense other than DUI caused the victim’s death, are distinguishable.” Henry v. State, 284 Ga.App. 893, 645 S.E.2d 32 (March 20, 2007). Unanimous full-court opinion reverses defendant’s conviction for first degree vehicular homicide based on leaving the scene of an accident. “Because the Code defines the offense of first degree vehicular homicide as causing the victim’s death ‘through the violation of’ the specified traffic offenses, the State bears the burden of establishing a causal connection between the defendant’s violation of OCGA §§ 40-6-163, 40-6-270(b), 40-6-390, 40-6-391, or 40-6-395 and the victim’s death. [fn] In other words, the State must prove that the defendant caused the victim’s death by driving in the way prohibited by the predicate driving offense. See Miller v. State, 236 Ga.App. 825, 827-828(1) (513 S.E.2d 27) (1999) (DUI); Watkins v. State, 191 Ga.App. 87, 89-90(3) (381 S.E.2d 45) (1989)(DUI); McNabb v. State, 180 Ga.App. 723, 725(4) (350 S.E.2d 314) (1986) (DUI or reckless driving); Collins v. State, 172 Ga.App. 100, 101(1) (321 S.E.2d 823) (1984) (hit-and-run).” “[A] conviction for first degree vehicular homicide predicated on a hit-and-run requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of all the elements of felony hit-and-run plus the additional element that the defendant’s violation of § 40-6-270(b) was a contributing cause of the victim’s death.” Overrules Klaub v. State , 255 Ga.App. 40, 564 S.E.2d 471 (2002), which held that no such causal connection need be shown. Accord, Klaub v. Battle , 286 Ga. 156, 686 S.E.2d 117 (November 9, 2009); Walker v. State , 293 Ga. 709, 749 S.E.2d 663 (October 7, 2013) ( Overruled on other grounds, State v. Springer , 297 Ga. 376, 774 S.E.2d 106 (June 29, 2015); no evidence that defendant’s failure to stop and render aid caused victim’s death; incident occurred in 2003). Legislatively overruled, Ga. L. 2008, p. 1164, § 2, effective July 1, 2008, amending OCGA § 40-6-393(b). McGrath v. State, 277 Ga.App. 825, 627 S.E.2d 886 (March 1, 2006). 1. Defendant’s reckless driving caused automobile accident. Passing nurse stopped to render aid to the other driver, but was struck and killed by another driver who could not see her in the dark. Defendant was charged with vehicular homicide for causing the nurse’s death by his reckless