☢ test - Í

driving. Held, evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction. Citing Corbett (January 31, 2006), below. Accord, Kirk (January 8, 2008), above. 2. Trial court did not err in charging the jury on the “rescue doctrine,” a charge previously “applied only in civil cases,” inasmuch as “the specific concept addressed by the rescue doctrine is proximate causation.” Approved charge: “The doctrine of rescue may be stated as follows: If you find that a Defendant’s wrongful act of commission or omission has created a condition or situation which involves urgent and imminent peril and danger to life or property of himself or of others, others in the exercise of ordinary care for their own safety under the circumstances short of rashness and recklessness, may attempt successfully or otherwise to rescue such endangered life or property by any means reasonably appropriate to the purpose and insofar as the proximate cause of any injuries that a rescuer sustains as a result of his or her efforts is concerned, the chain of causation may remain intact since it may be reasonably anticipated that once such peril to life or property is initiated and brought into being by the acts of a defendant, reasonable attempts will be undertaken to alleviate and nullify the consequences of such peril. Whether or not the rescue doctrine applies is an issue for you, the jury, to decide. (Emphasis supplied.)” Corbett v. State, 277 Ga.App. 715, 627 S.E.2d 365 (January 31, 2006). 1. “The vehicular homicide statute requires the State to establish a causal connection between the defendant’s violation of the DUI statute and the victim’s death. It is not required that the defendant actually commit an unsafe act. Miller v. State, 236 Ga.App. 825, 828(1), 513 S.E.2d 27 (1999); Shelton v. State, 214 Ga.App. 166, 168(2), 447 S.E.2d 115 (1994).” 2. “The issue of proximate cause is at issue when considering the conduct of [victim] Hernandez and the resulting accident. ‘If the injury did not flow naturally and directly from the defendant’s wrongful act, or could not reasonably have been expected to result from his wrongful act, or would not have resulted but for the interposition of an independent and unforeseen cause, then the defendant’s wrongful act would not be the proximate cause of the injury. But as long as the defendant’s negligence proximately caused the injury of another, the crime has been committed, even if there are other factors which also are proximate causes of the injury. Unlike the civil context, in the criminal context it simply is not relevant that the victim was negligent unless the defendant’s conduct did not substantially contribute to the cause of the injury.’ (Emphasis supplied.) (Footnotes omitted.) Baysinger v. State, 257 Ga.App. 273(1), 570 S.E.2d 593 (2002).” Evidence here that victim was standing in middle of road at night when struck by defendant’s truck could have supported finding of accident, or of defendant’s guilt; accordingly, conviction affirmed. Analogized to Miller, cited above (victim on bicycle struck from behind by defendant’s vehicle at night; conviction affirmed). Accord, Fletcher v. State , 307 Ga.App. 131, 704 S.E.2d 222 (November 24, 2010) ( trial court properly excluded evidence that victim wasn’t wearing seat belt ); Hartzler v. State , 332 Ga.App. 674, 774 S.E.2d 738 (June 30, 2015) (trial court properly “instructed the jury that any negligence on the part of the victim was irrelevant.”). Cutter v. State, 275 Ga.App. 888, 622 S.E.2d 96 (October 17, 2005). Defendant was convicted of reckless driving and second-degree vehicular homicide. The predicate charge for the vehicular homicide charge was improper lane change. Held, the two charges did not merge, as the reckless driving charge was based on acts other than the improper lane change. Steele v. State, 275 Ga.App. 651, 621 S.E.2d 606 (September 28, 2005). 1. Defendant’s conviction for vehicular homicide (second degree), based on failure to report an accident, was supported by the evidence. “Steele contends the state failed to submit sufficient proof that his failure to report the accident in violation of OCGA § 40-6-273 caused Starr’s death. We disagree. Dr. Cole testified that the delay in Starr’s treatment was ‘terrible’ for him, that it was ‘substantial and medically significant,’ and that Starr would have had a better prognosis if he had been treated earlier. A jury could conclude from Dr. Cole’s testimony that Steele’s failure to report the accident caused Starr’s death. Additionally, the jury could have concluded from Dr. Cole’s testimony that Starr’s death was accelerated by the delay in treatment. Singley v. State, 198 Ga. 212, 214-215(1) (31 S.E.2d 349) (1944) (conduct causing acceleration of death due to a pre-existing condition can be considered the cause of death in a criminal case).” 2. In second degree vehicular homicide prosecution, trial court erred by charging jury that the underlying traffic violation (here, failure to report an accident) need not have caused the death of the victim. ““Where a defendant is charged with first degree vehicular homicide through a violation of the hit and run statute, the state is not required to prove that a defendant’s failure to stop and render assistance, rather than the accident itself, was the cause of the victim’s death. Klaub [ v. State, 255 Ga.App. 40, 46(2) (564 S.E.2d 471) (2002)]. Compare Watkins v. State, 191 Ga.App. 87, 89-90(3) (381 S.E.2d 45) (1989), citing McNabb v. State, 180 Ga.App. 723, 725(4) (350 S.E.2d 314) (1986) (in order to convict defendant of first degree vehicular homicide, causal connection must exist between defendant’s violation of reckless driving statute or DUI statute and victim’s death).Rather, ‘[t]he illegal act involved in [the crime of first degree vehicular homicide as defined by OCGA § 40-6-393(a)] is causing the death or injury by the accident and then failing to stop and render assistance.’ Klaub, supra , at 45(2). Conversely, subsection (b) specifically provides that the violation charged in the crime of second degree