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vehicular homicide must have caused the death. [Cit.]” Cromartie v. State, 275 Ga.App. 209, 620 S.E.2d 413 (August 11, 2005). “Cromartie … argues that even if she was guilty of DUI and reckless driving, she did not proximately cause the pedestrian’s death, since he died of a heart attack a few days after the collision. Again, although there was evidence from the doctor performing the autopsy that the pedestrian suffered from a serious heart condition, the same doctor also testified that the collision ‘directly and materially contributed’ to his death from the heart attack. There was therefore evidence to support the jury’s implicit finding that Cromartie’s reckless driving was the proximate cause of the pedestrian’s death. See Hood v. State, 193 Ga.App. 701, 702- 703(1) (389 S.E.2d 264) (1989) (affirming vehicular homicide conviction when jury’s verdict resolved conflicts in evidence as to proximate cause of victim’s death).” Harris v. State, 272 Ga.App. 366, 612 S.E.2d 557 (March 22, 2005). Five counts of serious injury by vehicle, with five different victims, did not merge with one conviction for vehicular homicide against different victim. Distinguished from Kirkland v. State , 206 Ga.App. 27, 424 S.E.2d 638 (1992) (two counts of serious injury by vehicle, both against same victim arising from same incident, should have merged). Crowe v. State, 277 Ga. 513, 591 S.E.2d 829 (January 12, 2004). Reversing 259 Ga.App. 780, 578 S.E.2d 134 (2003). “In a vehicular homicide case, the conduct of all drivers involved in the accident is relevant to the extent it may impact the jury’s determination of which driver’s actions caused the injury, or whether the injury resulted from an unavoidable accident.” Trial court therefore erred in excluding evidence of victim-driver’s chemical test results, which were positive for THC. “The urinalysis evidence indisputably goes to the question of whether [victim] was impaired and whether that impairment contributed to the accident. [Cit.] Because the record reveals the factual possibility that [victim] was impaired at the time of the crash, and that her impairment may have contributed to the accident, the trial court erred when it prohibited Crowe from presenting the urinalysis evidence or cross-examining [victim] about her marijuana use prior to the crash.” King v. State, 262 Ga.App. 37, 584 S.E.2d 652 (June 27, 2003). In vehicular homicide case, trial court was not required to charge on causation or proximate cause. “Unlike in the civil context, in the criminal context it simply is not relevant that the victim was negligent unless the defendant’s conduct did not substantially contribute to the cause of the injury.” State v. Perkins, 276 Ga. 621, 580 S.E.2d 523 (May 5, 2003). Per OCGA § 40-6-376(d), probate court (and by extension, state court) had no jurisdiction over reckless driving charge where defendant also had pending felony vehicular homicide charge arising from same incident. Defendant was “charged” when citation was issued, notwithstanding that defendant must later be indicted to be tried on the felony vehicular homicide charge. Thus, plea to reckless driving in probate court was void, and superior court prosecution for vehicular homicide and reckless driving was not barred by double jeopardy. Moore v. State, 258 Ga.App. 293, 574 S.E.2d 372 (November 7, 2002). “Moore contends that the trial court erred in refusing to allow him to show that, because the [victim’s] truck had broken down earlier in the day and had not been taken to a mechanic, its driver was violating federal motor carrier safety regulations by operating it on the interstate at the time of the collision. The court ruled that mechanical difficulties experienced by the truck prior to the collision were too remote to be relevant…. [A]ny violation of the federal regulation was not the proximate cause of the collision. … Therefore, on grounds of both irrelevance and immateriality, the court did not err in refusing to allow Moore to present evidence of the trucker’s violation of federal regulations.” (Footnotes omitted.) Pecina v. State, 274 Ga. 416, 554 S.E.2d 167 (October 22, 2001). The serious injury statute, OCGA § 40-6-394, is not unconstitutionally vague in every instance and is to be applied to the facts of each particular case. Davis v. State, 245 Ga.App. 402, 538 S.E.2d 67 (July 28, 2000). The jury’s finding that the defendant committed second degree vehicular homicide did not exclude his conviction for first degree vehicular homicide, since he committed traffic offenses, in addition to reckless driving, that could have caused the victim’s death. Harridge v. State , 243 Ga.App. 658, 534 S.E.2d 113 (April 18, 2000). Vehicular homicide and related convictions reversed based on Brady violation. State failed “to inform [defendant] before the trial that preliminary state crime laboratory test results of [other driver] Smith's urine showed the presence of cocaine and marijuana.” “A defendant proves a Brady violation by showing that (1) the state possessed evidence favorable to the defense, (2) the accused did not possess the evidence and could not have obtained it through reasonable diligence, (3) the state suppressed the favorable