☢ test - Í

Cuzzort v. State, 271 Ga. 464, 519 S.E.2d 687 (September 13, 1999). Trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion challenging the circuit’s method of assigning cases to judges, and calling cases for trial. 1. Case assignment. Circuit’s case assignment method allowing the District Attorney to assign cases, violates USCR 3.1 and due process. “The precise method of assigning and calendaring cases adopted by a multi-judge circuit … must comport with the notion of due process under the State and Federal constitutions, as well as the spirit and purpose of the uniform rules and applicable statutes. [Cit.] The purpose of the assignment system in multi-judge circuits is to ‘prevent any person's choosing the judge to whom an action is to be assigned.’ USCR 3.1. … In the Lookout Mountain Judicial Circuit, however, it is not the chief or other circuit judge who makes case assignments and sets the calendar but the district attorney. Because the district attorney is clearly within the category of persons directed to refrain from affecting case assignments under USCR 3.1, we find the method of case assignment employed in the Lookout Mountain Judicial Circuit violates the clear mandate of that rule.” 2. Selection of cases for trial. “OCGA § 17-8-1 requires that cases on a criminal docket be ‘called in the order in which they stand on the docket unless the defendant is in jail or, otherwise, in the sound discretion of the court.’ Although OCGA § 17-8-1 is a discretionary rule rather than a mandatory one, this discretion lies with the trial judge and not the district attorney. Rosenbrook v. State, 78 Ga. 111(2) (1886); Williams v. State, 188 Ga.App. 496(3), 373 S.E.2d 281 (1988). While a trial judge may in his discretion call cases out of order, under § 17-8-1, the district attorney is without authority to independently calendar and call cases for trial. The judges of the Lookout Mountain Judicial Circuit must take primary responsibility for the order in which criminal cases are called for trial.” Johnson v. State, 271 Ga. 375, 519 S.E.2d 221 (July 6, 1999). Murder and related convictions affirmed. “Johnson wanted to question the district attorney and former district attorney regarding cases in which the district attorney did not seek the death penalty that Johnson alleges were more ‘heinous’ than his case, but the trial court quashed the subpoenas. We find no error. ‘[D]istrict attorneys do not have unfettered discretion to seek the death penalty, and the decision to impose it rests with the jury and cannot be upheld absent a finding of an aggravating circumstance. [Cit.]’ McClain v. State, 267 Ga. 378, 389(12), 477 S.E.2d 814 (1996). ‘[P]olicy considerations ... argue against requiring district attorneys to defend their decisions to seek the death penalty.’ (Footnote omitted.) Perkins v. State, 269 Ga. 791, 794(2), 505 S.E.2d 16 (1998). We note that the trial court allowed Johnson to file a written proffer to support his argument that the district attorney had not sought the death penalty in more ‘heinous’ cases, but he failed to do so.” Benham and Sears concur in judgment only. I. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 1. ACCESS TO COUNSEL Brown v. State, 288 Ga.App. 671, 655 S.E.2d 287 (November 30, 2007). “Brown contends that he ‘was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel by the State’s refusal to allow trial counsel adequate access to him for the purpose of preparing for his testimony and to review the State’s evidence during trial.’ Specifically, he complains that personnel at the county jail where he was being housed refused his attorney’s requests for contact visits (i.e., face-to-face conferences) with him during the trial. Blanket prohibitions on defendants’ communication with their attorneys have been held to violate the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (96 S.Ct. 1330, 47 L.Ed.2d 592) (1976).But there is no claim of any blanket prohibitions imposed upon Brown’s access to his attorney. While ‘[n]ot every restriction on counsel’s time or opportunity to ... consult with his client ... violates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel,’ Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11 (103 S.Ct. 1610, 75 L.Ed.2d 610) (1983); see e.g., Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272 (109 S.Ct. 594, 102 L.Ed.2d 624) (1989), the Supreme Court of Georgia has recognized ‘the basic proposition that [detained defendants] are denied meaningful access to their counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment if, in the facilities provided for attorney-client conferences, conversation is difficult and privacy is impossible.’ Wright v. State, 250 Ga. 570, 572(1) (300 S.E.2d 147) (1983).” Claim here was not raised in trial court, so waived. 2. ACCUSATION/INDICTMENT, REDACTION OF Powell v. State, 297 Ga. 352, 773 S.E.2d 762 (June 15, 2015). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance in seeking redaction of indictment to exclude dismissed charges. “On appeal, [defendant argues] that trial counsel should have allowed the un-redacted indictment to go out with the jurors, as well as make an argument to the jury that, because these two charges were dismissed, the jury should not convict her of the remaining charges. Appellant's argument is unavailing. There is nothing unreasonable about a lawyer's wanting jurors to have an indictment that reflects the current charges pending against his client. Counsel's performance was not deficient in this regard.” O’Donnell v. Smith, 294 Ga. 307, 751 S.E.2d 324 (November 18, 2013). Following defendant’s malice murder conviction, habeas court erred in granting relief; no ineffective assistance based on allowing unredacted indictment to go