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to jury, showing two dead-docketed charges. No prejudice shown, given that jury acquitted on three of four remaining charges. “There is no showing that the jury would not have convicted appellee of murder had they been unaware of the two extra charges erroneously listed on the face of the indictment.” 3. ACQUITTAL ON SOME CHARGES Gregoire v. State, 309 Ga.App. 309, 711 S.E.2d 306 (March 30, 2011). Child molestation convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance where counsel chose not to object to bolstering of non-testifying victims (ages two and three) by their parents and other witnesses. “Here, trial counsel explained at the motion for new trial hearing that she and her client could never find a reason for these children to present an intentional, malicious lie about their cousin's actions. Because the defense uncovered no plausible explanation for why the children would be angry at the defendant, the defense was built around the theme that very young children were susceptible to telling stories and misconstruing the facts.” Decision not to object was thus strategic. “[T]he strategy must have been at least partially successful, because the jury acquitted Gregoire of the more serious charges of aggravated sexual battery and aggravated child molestation, and only convicted on the three child molestation counts.” Moon v. State, 288 Ga. 508, 705 S.E.2d 649 (February 7, 2011). Convictions for murder and related offenses affirmed; no ineffective assistance based on admission of DVD of custodial statement. “Martin's acquittal on the malice murder charge is a relevant factor which ‘“strongly supports the conclusion that the assistance rendered by the attorney fell within that broad range of reasonably effective assistance....” [Cit.]’ Carter v. State, 265 Ga.App. 44, 50, fn. 25(4)(c) (593 S.E.2d 69) (2004).” Nahmias concurs specially, criticizing the conclusion that acquittal on any charge “strongly supports the conclusion” that there was no ineffective assistance: “in my view, the mere fact that a defendant was acquitted on one or more charges, without more, does not ‘strongly’ support such a conclusion. An acquittal may be strongly relevant where the record reflects that defense counsel overcame what appears to be strong evidence against the defendant, as opposed to reflecting the simple absence of strong proof of the charge.” Nahmias argues that the malice murder acquittal here was to be expected from the nature of the evidence – robbery of a drug dealer gone bad – and didn’t benefit defendants in any way, as they were convicted and sentence on felony murder, anyway. “The majority opinion does not identify any particular strategy that defense counsel used to obtain Martin's acquittal. … Instead, the language seems to have become a mantra quoted by the Court of Appeals whenever an ineffective assistance claim is raised in a case involving an acquittal on any count, however insignificant to the sentence and however unrelated to defense counsel's actual performance. … I believe that we should not encourage the Court of Appeals to continue using the ‘strongly supports the conclusion’ language as a mantra, unrelated to the specific facts regarding an acquittal, in its ineffective assistance cases, and this Court too should use that language only where the conclusion is actually supported by the circumstances of the case.” Accord, Sledge v. State , 312 Ga.App. 97, 717 S.E.2d 682 (October 18, 2011) (“Even though the strategy employed ultimately proved unsuccessful, this does not mean necessarily that Sledge's counsel was ineffective. Counsel pursued a strategy that resulted in Sledge being acquitted of four of the six charges against him.”); Turner v. State , 314 Ga.App. 263, 724 S.E.2d 6 (February 21, 2012); Merritt v. State , 329 Ga.App. 871, 766 S.E.2d 217 (November 20, 2014). Brown v. State, 304 Ga.App. 168, 695 S.E.2d 698 (May 24, 2010). Defendant’s aggravated assault conviction affirmed; no ineffective assistance where trial counsel served writ to produce jailed witness on sheriff, but didn’t also subpoena the witness himself. The witness was released from jail by the sheriff between service of the writ and the trial, two days later, and the witness’s attendance couldn’t be procured despite the efforts1 of counsel and the trial court. “Counsel explained that he did not serve the witness with a subpoena because the witness lacked the ability to come to court on his own while a prisoner in the county jail, [fn] and he saw no reason to do a meaningless act. … [W]here the jury acquitted Brown of burglary and one count of possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony, we cannot say that he was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel on the ground that counsel failed to serve a jailed witness with a subpoena in addition to obtaining a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum.” Coats v. State, 303 Ga.App. 818, 695 S.E.2d 285 (April 22, 2010). At defendant’s trial for aggravated assault and related offenses, no ineffective assistance where trial counsel elected not to pursue a medical defense and instead focus on defendant’s professed innocence. “At the hearing on the motion for new trial, Coats presented expert testimony of an emergency room physician who had examined Coats after sentencing and who had reviewed his medical records, including records from an emergency room visit on July 1, 2008. … The expert testified that … it was his medical opinion that Coats suffered from drug-induced hypoxia (or lack of oxygen) at the time of the crimes, resulting in delirium, confusion, and aggressive conduct. Coats maintained at the hearing that his trial counsel performed deficiently by not presenting such expert testimony at trial.” “[T]rial counsel testified that she was aware of the possibility of presenting a