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medical defense through expert testimony based upon her pre-trial discussions with Coats's wife and her review of the medical records, but chose not to present the defense for two reasons. First, trial counsel believed that the medical defense would have been an affirmative defense requiring Coats to admit to the underlying criminal conduct alleged in the indictment. … Despite the fact that she had explained to Coats how affirmative defenses worked, Coats gave conflicting stories about what had occurred and on several occasions told her ‘he didn't do it.’ Having concluded that Coats was not prepared to admit that he committed the acts alleged, trial counsel chose not to enter a special plea of insanity or involuntary intoxication. Second, trial counsel had reviewed the case file pertaining to the prior difficulty between Coats and his wife and knew that Coats's sentence had been reduced in mitigation in that case due to his misuse of a prescription medication. Given that there had been a prior altercation between Coats and his wife involving his misuse of a prescription medication, trial counsel believed that the jury likely would reject any medical defense she might present as nothing more than ‘a pattern of conduct’ by Coats. We conclude that trial counsel's decision not to pursue a medical defense through expert testimony was a reasonable strategic one, and, therefore, did not constitute deficient performance.” “Furthermore, the effectiveness of trial counsel's strategic decision to defend on the alternative ground that Coats did not commit the alleged criminal acts is demonstrated by the fact that the jury acquitted Coats of several of the charged offenses. See Young v. State, 213 Ga.App. 278, 280(3) (444 S.E.2d 598) (1994) (noting that the ‘strongest evidence of trial counsel's effectiveness’ was the defendant's acquittal on one of the charges). was a reasonable strategic one, and, therefore, did not constitute deficient performance.” Harrison v. State, 298 Ga.App. 870, 681 S.E.2d 252 (July 9, 2009). No presumption of ineffectiveness despite defendant’s claim of “strained relationships among counsel, Harrison, and the trial court. He does not elaborate on this, other than to say it was ‘evident.’ … We have reviewed the entire record, and, if there was any strain among counsel, his client, and the court, it was not evident. The record reveals that counsel thoroughly cross-examined each of the witnesses against Harrison, made appropriate objections, and attempted to keep similar transaction and pretrial identification evidence from the jury. Further, Harrison was acquitted of two of the crimes charged: aggravated assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime.” Branton v. State, 258 Ga.App. 221, 573 S.E.2d 475 (October 31, 2002). Defendant was convicted of DUI, but acquitted of driving on suspended license. Fact that trial counsel obtained an acquittal on one of the charges against the defendant “strongly supports the conclusion that the assistance rendered by the attorney fell within that broad range of reasonably effective assistance which members of the bar in good standing are presumed to render.” Accord, Carter v. State , 265 Ga.App. 44, 593 S.E.2d 69 (January 7, 2004) (defendant acquitted of murder and aggravated assault, convicted of voluntary manslaughter); Powell v. State , 272 Ga.App. 628, 612 S.E.2d 916 (March 31, 2005) (defendant convicted of rape but acquitted of robbery and aggravated sodomy); Grier v. State , 276 Ga.App. 655, 624 S.E.2d 149 (October 20, 2005) (convicted on several counts, acquitted on several equally-serious counts); McGruder v. State , 279 Ga.App. 851, 632 S.E.2d 730 (June 16, 2006) (two child molestation convictions, one statutory rape acquittal); Ellison v. State , 296 Ga.App. 752, 675 S.E.2d 613 (March 19, 2009) (convicted on one count of aggravated sexual battery, acquitted on the other); Williams v. State , 304 Ga.App. 592, 696 S.E.2d 512 (June 25, 2010) (convicted of rape and incest, acquitted of family violence battery); Goss v. State , 305 Ga.App. 497, 699 S.E.2d 819 (August 3, 2010) (convicted of child molestation, acquitted of aggravated sexual battery); Wilson v. State , 306 Ga.App. 827, 703 S.E.2d 400 (November 17, 2010) (convicted of armed robbery, burglary and aggravated assault, but acquitted of murder); Kerdpoka v. State , 314 Ga.App. 400, 724 S.E.2d 419 (February 28, 2012) (conviction on child molestation, acquittal on incest, aggravated child molestation, other offenses); Fitzpatrick v. State , 317 Ga.App. 873, 733 S.E.2d 46 (October 11, 2012) (directed verdict on one of four counts suggests counsel was not ineffective); Crumity v. State , 321 Ga.App. 768, 743 S.E.2d 455 (May 16, 2013) (acquitted on one count of aggravated assault, convicted on another and other offenses). 4. ADVICE ON COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF PLEA, See also subheadings ADVICE ON IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES and PLEA DEAL, FAILURE TO NEGOTIATE/ADVISE, both below Seminal cases: Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985); Lloyd v. State , 258 Ga. 645, 373 S.E.2d 1 (1988) (“Objective professional standards dictate that a defendant, absent extenuating circumstances, is entitled to be told that an offer to plead guilty has been made and to be advised of the consequences of the choices confronting him.”); Alexander (May 11, 2015), below. Alexander v. State, 297 Ga. 59, 772 S.E.2d 655 (May 11, 2015). Reversing 328 Ga.App. 300, 761 S.E.2d 844 (2014) and overruling Williams v. Duffy, 270 Ga. 580, 513 S.E.2d 212 (1999). Defendant moved to withdraw guilty pleas to aggravated child molestation and related offenses, alleging that trial counsel failed to correctly advise him about his future