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parole eligibility. Trial court denied the motion, relying on Williams’s holding that parol eligibility is a collateral consequence of sentencing, and thus failure to advise on the subject cannot constitute ineffective assistance. 1. As shown in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010), Smith v. State, 287 Ga. 391, 697 S.E.2d 177 (2010), and Taylor v. State, 304 Ga.App. 878, 698 S.E.2d 384 (2010), Williams was mistaken in its analysis of ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the context of advice regarding the consequences of guilty pleas. The Williams distinction of direct and collateral consequences is discarded in favor of standard Strickland v. Washington ineffective assistance analysis. “We hasten to add that counsel's failure to offer advice concerning a collateral consequence will not rise to the level of constitutional deficiency in every instance. Rather, our courts should weigh a deficient performance claim ‘by looking to the practice and expectations of the legal community: “The proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” [Strickland.] We long have recognized that “[p]revailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards and the like ... are guides to determining what is reasonable ...” [Cits.] Although they are “only guides,” [Cit.] and not “inexorable commands,” [Cit.], these standards may be valuable measures of the prevailing professional norms of effective representation ...’ Padilla, supra at 366–367. In addition to professional guidelines, our courts can look to these factors when weighing advice concerning a collateral consequence: (1) whether the collateral consequence is intimately related to the criminal process and is “nearly an automatic result” flowing from the conviction; (2) whether the consequence is a ‘drastic measure’ or a penalty with harsh ramifications for the client; and (3) whether the law imposing the consequence is ‘succinct, clear and explicit.’ Padilla, supra at 365–369; Taylor v. State, supra at 882, 698 S.E.2d 384.” 2. “ When it comes to parole eligibility, we conclude that an attorney's failure to inform his or her client that he or she would be ineligible for parole as a recidivist for the entirety of a lengthy prison sentence is constitutionally deficient performance. We reach this conclusion for several reasons. First, we note that the recidivist statute is, and has been, a prominent feature of our criminal justice system—anyone who is subject to it should be informed accurately about its consequences. … Moreover, the statute in question, OCGA § 1710–7(c), is ‘succinct, clear and explicit’ and it applies automatically upon an offender's conviction as a recidivist. Finally, parole ineligibility is a drastic penalty enacted to insure that a criminal offender serves his or her entire sentence behind bars.” “When he entered his plea, appellant was faced with the possibility of imprisonment for many years, and he was faced with the potential that he would be sentenced as a recidivist and made ineligible for parole for the entirety of his long sentences. In these circumstances, we hold that appellant was entitled to advice from his lawyer about parole ineligibility.” Remanded to consider whether defendant can show prejudice as a result. “To meet the prejudice prong in the guilty plea context, appellant must demonstrate there is a reasonable probability that, assuming counsel failed to inform him he would be ineligible for parole, he would not have entered a guilty plea and would have insisted on going to trial.” Cox v. Howerton, 290 Ga. 693, 723 S.E.2d 891 (March 19, 2012). Habeas court properly denied petition following conviction for aggravated child molestation and related offenses. Both trial counsel and trial court erroneously told defendant she’d be eligible for parole after 10 years upon entering her guilty plea; in fact, defendant wasn’t eligible for parole for 30 years. Record supports habeas court’s finding that defendant failed to “show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, [s]he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial,” quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (106 S.Ct. 366, 106 L.Ed.2d 366) (1985). “The habeas court acknowledged that Cox's concern with her parole eligibility was reflected in the plea transcript—in the specific advice trial counsel gave her and the detailed discussion of parole eligibility in the plea colloquy—but found that Cox did not place ‘particular emphasis’ on parole concerns and that there was no ‘special circumstance,’ i.e., no fact peculiar to Cox or her case that caused her to place particular emphasis on parole eligibility. The habeas court also determined there was overwhelming evidence of Cox's guilt of aggravated child molestation and opined that Cox's defense of diminished culpability as a result of coercion by her husband/codefendant ‘almost certainly would have been to no avail.’ The habeas court ruled that Cox assumed the risk of receiving a sentence of extended duration when she entered a guilty plea without an agreement of a sentence to be recommended by the State.” Accord, Davis v. State , 317 Ga.App. 157, 730 S.E.2d 30 (June 27, 2012) (motion to withdraw guilty plea properly denied, as “Davis gave no testimony indicating that, but for counsel's misrepresentations about his parole eligibility, he would not have pled guilty” to aggravated battery and related charges). James v. State, 309 Ga.App. 721, 710 S.E.2d 905 (June 1, 2011). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to withdraw guilty plea to false imprisonment and simple assault as lesser offenses to rape and kidnapping. Even assuming deficient representation based on failure to accurately advise about parole eligibility, “the trial court was authorized to conclude that James failed to establish the element of prejudice, requiring a showing that he would not have pled guilty absent the alleged misrepresentation. Significantly, at the motion hearing, James testified that he did not like the composition of the potential jurors and wanted to put off the trial. In addition to the false imprisonment charge, James was