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presumed, so absent evidence of a defendant's incompetency, a trial court need not conduct a competency hearing. Strong v. State, 263 Ga. 587, 590(5) (436 S.E.2d 213) (1993). If the court has sufficient information at the time of trial to raise a bona fide doubt about the defendant's ability to understand the proceedings, appreciate their significance, or assist his lawyer in presenting his defense, the court must conduct a competency hearing. Mitchell v. State, 207 Ga.App. 306, 308(3) (427 S.E.2d 814) (1993); White v. State, 202 Ga.App. 424, 425 (414 S.E.2d 328) (1992). Here, the record contains no evidence that Powers had been behaving irrationally or that medical opinions existed about his competence to stand trial. The trial court found that Powers' demeanor during court proceedings had been appropriate. Accordingly, absent evidence of incompetence, the trial court did not err in denying Powers' motion seeking a continuance so he could be evaluated on his competence to stand trial. Flesche v. State, 254 Ga.App. 3, 4–6(1) (561 S.E.2d 160) (2002).” Page v. State, 313 Ga.App. 691, 722 S.E.2d 408 (January 26, 2012). Public drunkenness conviction affirmed; 1. record supported finding that defendant was competent to stand trial, although he was previously found not competent to stand trial, and again found not competent to stand trial for a different offense the next month. Defendant was found competent in June, 2009; not competent in July, 2009; competent in April, 2010, after treatment at Georgia Regional; tried in the instant case in August, 2010; and found not competent on a subsequent charge in September, 2010. “Contrary to Page's suggestion, there was no presumption that he was incompetent to stand trial in August 2010. Although he was placed in a state mental health facility after a special plea of incompetency was entered, his release from that center and return to the county detention center based on the state psychiatrist's later determination that he was then mentally competent to stand trial cancelled the presumption of incompetency and raised a presumption of competency. OCGA § 17–7–130(f); Newman v. State, 258 Ga 428, 429(1) (369 S.E.2d 902) (1988).” At motion for new trial, trial counsel testified that defendant understood the charges against him and was able to assist them in his defense. “[A] rational trier of fact could have found that Page failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was incompetent to stand trial in the instant case. See Velazquez v. State, 282 Ga. 871, 875(1) (655 S.E.2d 806) (2008).” 2. No due process violation in failure to provide defendant an independent psychiatric examination after state psychiatrists found him competent to stand trial. “An indigent defendant does not … have a constitutional right to ‘choose a psychiatrist of his own liking or to receive funds to hire his own.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Callaway [ v. State, 208 Ga.App. 508, 510-511(1) (431 S.E.2d 143) (1993)]. Here, Page was provided with the assistance of three psychiatrists to address the issue of his competency. His due process rights were not violated because he was not entitled to choose a psychiatrist of his personal liking or to receive funds to hire his own. Callaway, supra, 208 Ga.App. at 510–511(1).” Accord, Lemery v. State , 330 Ga.App. 623, 768 S.E.2d 800 (February 12, 2015) (“‘The grant or denial of a motion for independent psychiatric examination lies within the discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned unless an abuse of discretion is shown.’ (Citation, punctuation, and footnote omitted.) Pullins v. State, 232 Ga.App. 267, 269(2) (501 S.E.2d 612) (1998).”). Sheppard v. State, 297 Ga.App. 806, 678 S.E.2d 509 (May 13, 2009). Kidnapping and related convictions affirmed. Competency to stand trial “is measured under the standard set forth in Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824) (1960) . Under Dusky, a defendant is competent to stand trial if ‘he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding’ and ‘he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Id. at 402.” Defendant here acknowledges his competence to stand trial, but contends trial court erred in allowing him to represent himself; Court of Appeals finds no error. See more at Attorneys – Self-Representation – Competence to Self-Represent, above. Phelps v. State, 296 Ga.App. 362, 674 S.E.2d 620 (March 2, 2009). Trial court erred in failing to hold a pre-trial hearing on defendant’s competence to stand trial; although defendant refused to undergo evaluation and counsel didn’t file a formal plea raising the issue, counsel did bring it to the court’s attention and orally moved for a continuance and an evaluation. “Although counsel's technical failure to file a plea of mental incompetence may waive a defendant's statutory right to a special jury under OCGA § 17-7-130(b), “[t]he constitutional guarantees require the trial court to inquire into competency, even where state procedures for raising competency are not followed, if evidence of incompetence comes to the court's attention.” Baker [ v. State, 250 Ga. 187, 190(1) (297 S.E.2d 9) (1982)]. See Drope [ v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 177-180(III), (IV) (95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103) (1975)]; Traylor v. State, 280 Ga. 400, 404(4)(a) (627 S.E.2d 594) (2006); Brogdon v. State, 220 Ga.App. 31, 33(1) (467 S.E.2d 598) (1996). The factors that must be examined in order to determine whether a criminal defendant's procedural due process rights were violated by a trial court's failure to hold a competency hearing include past evidence of the defendant's irrational behavior, prior medical opinions that may be relevant to the issue of defendant's competency to stand trial, and the defendant's demeanor at trial. See Drope, 420 U.S. at 180(IV); Brogdon, 220 Ga.App. at 33(1).” Trial court here had evidence raising the issue of competence: counsel’s detailed statement that defendant was delusional, didn’t understand the proceedings, and believed that the court and