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counsel were conspiring against him; and two prior psychological reports, one finding that defendant was not competent to stand trial in a previous case. “Phelps's own trial testimony seemed to reflect some level of paranoia.” “Although we recognize a trial court's potential frustration with a criminal defendant who insists on his own sanity and refuses to subject himself to a mental evaluation, the defendant's behavior may itself be a product of mental illness. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384(II) (86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815) (1966) (noting that ‘it is contradictory to argue that a defendant may be incompetent, and yet knowingly or intelligently waive his right to have the court determine his capacity to stand trial’) (punctuation omitted); Lindsey v. State, 252 Ga. 493, 495(I) (314 S.E.2d 881) (1984) (citing expert testimony that the defendant's refusal to cooperate with a psychological evaluation may itself be indicative of the defendant's need for mental help).” “‘Upon remand the burden first falls upon the state to show there is sufficient evidence to make a meaningful determination of competency at the time of trial. If the court rules that a determination of [defendant’s] competency at the time of his trial is not presently possible, then a new trial must be granted. If the court decides such a determination is possible, the issue of competency to stand trial must be tried and the [defendant] shall have the burden to show incompetency by a preponderance of the evidence. The sole issue to be presented to the jury is that of mental competency; evidence as to guilt would be irrelevant. If the jury finds that the [defendant] was not mentally competent at the time of his trial, the verdict in the main case must be set aside. On the other hand, if the [defendant] fails by a preponderance of the evidence to prove incompetence at the time of his trial, the verdict of guilty shall stand.’ (Citation omitted.) Baker, 250 Ga. at 193(1). See Lindsey v. State, 252 Ga. 493, 497(IV) (314 S.E.2d 881) (1984); Brogdon, 220 Ga.App. at 34(1).” Wadley v. State, 295 Ga.App. 556, 672 S.E.2d 504 (January 14, 2009). No error in trial court’s refusal to seek second psych eval for defendant on compentency to stand trial; evidence supported court’s finding that defendant was competent. “ Because Wadley did not file a special plea of incompetence to stand trial pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-130, she waived her right to a special jury trial on the issue of her competency. See Baker v. State, 250 Ga. 187, 189(1), 297 S.E.2d 9 (1982). Even where no special plea is filed, however, where a question about a defendant's competence is raised, the trial court must hold an “adequate hearing” on the issue. Id. at 190(1), 297 S.E.2d 9. If, during that hearing, the trial court ‘receiv[es] information which, objectively considered, should reasonably raise a doubt about the defendant's competence, [it] should conduct a civil proceeding before a special jury, even where state procedures for raising the issue are not followed. [Cit.]’ Brogdon v. State, 220 Ga.App. 31, 33(1), 467 S.E.2d 598 (1996).” Evidence at hearing here supported trial court’s finding of competency: “During her conversation with the trial judge, Wadley stated that, since being jailed, she had felt suicidal, had deliberately cut herself several times on places such as her feet, and had a hard time focusing. Despite her emotional state, however, Wadley knew that she was charged with aggravated assault and was familiar with both the facts alleged in the indictment and the incident that led to that indictment. Wadley also acknowledged that, if convicted, she would be sentenced to prison and that her attorney had advised her that she would probably have to serve at least 90% of any prison sentence imposed. Wadley confirmed that she had discussed her case with her attorney and was helping him to prepare her defense as best she could, despite her problems focusing and gaps in her memory regarding the incident at issue. Wadley explained to the court that the only witness she knew of was the alleged victim, and that she had asked her attorney to speak with him. Wadley knew, however, that the victim was under no obligation to speak with her attorney, and she had been told that the victim would not talk with her lawyer. Demonstrating some knowledge of evidentiary procedure, Wadley asserted to the court that the victim's alleged refusal to speak with defense counsel was merely ‘hearsay,’ because the refusal had been relayed by the victim's niece-no one had been able to speak to the victim directly. The trial court questioned Wadley to make sure that she understood the trial process. During that exchange, Wadley indicated that she understood that the State bore the burden of proof and would present evidence against her, and discussed with the trial court what that evidence might consist of. As part of that discussion, Wadley volunteered to the trial court that she had given police a statement regarding the incident, was able to identify for the trial court the officer who had written her statement for her to sign, and acknowledged her signature on that statement. At the end of the hearing, the trial court asked Wadley if she understood everything that had just been discussed and if she understood that her trial would begin the next day. Wadley responded affirmatively to both questions.” Haygood v. State, 289 Ga.App. 187, 656 S.E.2d 541 (January 16, 2008). Trial court was not required to sua sponte seek evaluation of defendant’s competency to stand trial. “The trial court is required to inquire into a defendant’s competency sua sponte, however, ‘only when information becomes known to it, prior to or at the time of the trial, sufficient to raise a bona fide doubt regarding the defendant’s competence:’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) [ Biggs v. State, 281 Ga. 627, 630(3) (642 S.E.2d 74) (2007)]; accord Traylor v. State, 280 Ga. 400, 404(4)(a) (627 S.E.2d 594) (2006); that is, ‘information which, objectively considered, should reasonably have raised a doubt about the defendant’s competency and alerted the trial court to the possibility that the defendant could neither understand the proceedings, appreciate their