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significance, nor rationally aid his attorney in his defense.’ (Citations omitted.) Traylor, supra. In determining whether the trial court received such information, ‘an appellate court focuses on three factors: (1) evidence of the defendant's irrational behavior; (2) the defendant’s demeanor at trial; and (3) prior medical opinion regarding the defendant’s competence to stand trial.’ (Citations omitted.) Flesche v. State, 254 Ga.App. 3, 4-5(1) (561 S.E.2d 160) (2002), citing Johnson v. State, 209 Ga.App. 514, 516(2) (433 S.E.2d 717) (1993). Because none of these factors are shown in the record before us, this enumeration of error fails.” Irrational behavior: defendant communicated with counsel and understood seriousness of charges against him. Demeanor: “‘As a first-hand observer of [Haygood]’s demeanor, the court was well positioned to determine the need for a psychiatric evaluation.’ [Cit.] In ruling on Haygood’s motion for new trial, the trial court specifically found that Haygood ‘did not exhibit incompetence from his demeanor at the trial.’” Prior medical opinion: “[T]he trial court had access to no medical opinion whatsoever indicating Haygood’s incompetence, and certainly not to any prior medical opinion.” Velazquez v. State, 282 Ga. 871, 655 S.E.2d 806 (January 8, 2008). “Velazquez … contends that the trial court erred by not granting him a mistrial or a new trial in that it permitted the State to ask Dr. Salinas questions about facts and issues related to guilt or innocence, which were prejudicial to him and not ‘admissible’ in determining competency. He complains specifically about the State asking Dr. Salinas whether he mentioned a defense, his flight to New York, or his disposal of the knife and his bloody clothes. However, neither a mistrial nor a new trial was warranted on this basis. Evidence is not inadmissible at a competency proceeding simply because it might also be relevant to the issue of guilt; as long as the evidence is sufficiently relevant and material to the issue of mental incompetence, it is properly admitted at a competency trial. Black v. State, 261 Ga. 791, 794(2) (410 S.E.2d 740) (1991). The questions and Dr. Salinas’s responses clearly were relevant to determine Velazquez’s ability to assist his attorney in preparation of his defense.” Jones v. State, 282 Ga. 568, 651 S.E.2d 728 (October 9, 2007). Where no special plea of insanity was filed, trial court did not err in accepting defendant’s plea of guilty despite pendency of an evaluation of competency to stand trial. “The Court of Appeals held in Martin v. State, 147 Ga.App. 173(2), 248 S.E.2d 235 (1978), that a judgment and sentence based on a guilty plea entered while a special plea of insanity made pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-130 is still pending are void. However, Martin v. State, supra, is distinguishable from the present case because Jones entered no special plea of insanity. In the present case, there was only a request for evaluation, with which the trial court complied (see U.S.C.R. 31.4), and no special plea of mental incompetency pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-130(b), which would have triggered a right to a competency hearing prior to acceptance of Jones’s guilty plea. In the absence of such a plea or circumstances raising a question about the defendant’s competence to stand trial, the trial court is not required to try the issue of competency to a special jury. Christenson v. State, 261 Ga. 80(2b), 402 S.E.2d 41 (1991); Callaway v. State, 208 Ga.App. 508(1), 431 S.E.2d 143 (1993). Under those circumstances, the ensuing judgment and sentence were not void.” Biggs v. State, 281 Ga. 627, 642 S.E.2d 74 (February 26, 2007). “[T]he trial court was authorized to find that Biggs failed to meet his burden of proving his incompetency at the time of his 1995 trial. Although there was expert medical testimony that Biggs was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia in 1997 and that the illness did not appear ‘overnight,’ the same medical experts conceded that they were unable to state conclusively whether Biggs was paranoid schizophrenic at the time of trial and admitted that even if he was, he could have been competent to stand trial under the applicable legal standard. One expert further testified that the evidence presented was also consistent with a finding that Biggs had been competent to stand trial and that his condition deteriorated after he was imprisoned. At the same time, the trial court had before it testimony from trial counsel that Biggs showed no signs of mental illness or incompetency during trial and that Biggs was able to understand the proceedings against him, assist with the development and presentation of his defense, and coherently articulate his defense when testifying at trial. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that it was error for the trial court to deny the motion for new trial on this ground. [Cit.]” Accord, Hester v. State , 293 Ga. 367, 659 S.E.2d 600 (March 31, 2008) (defendant has burden of proving incompentency; in light of conflicting evidence, jury could find that defendant failed to carry that burden). Traylor v. State, 280 Ga. 400, 627 S.E.2d 594 (March 13, 2006). 1. Trial court did not err in failing to hold a competency hearing during trial, sua sponte . “[A] trial court is to conduct, sua sponte, a competency hearing when there is information which becomes known to it, prior to or at the time of the trial, sufficient to raise a bona fide doubt regarding the defendant’s competence. Collins v. State, 259 Ga.App. 587(2), 578 S.E.2d 201 (2003). The salient question is whether the trial court received information which, objectively considered, should reasonably have raised a doubt about the defendant’s competency and alerted the trial court to the possibility that the defendant could neither understand the proceedings, appreciate their significance, nor rationally aid his attorney in his defense. Collins v. State,