☢ test - Í

his own behalf, after advising the trial court that he was doing so voluntarily. His testimony, while rambling, was generally responsive to the questions of counsel. When asked if he would like to tell the jury anything about the alleged incident, he stated, ‘I would like to tell them it was not me shoplifting.’ When asked specifically whether he took the hat from the Coca-Cola store, McCrary replied, ‘No, I didn’t.’ When asked if he was at the airport on March 10, 2004, he said, ‘Oh, yes ... [t]hat’s where I got locked up at.’ In response to the question of what he was doing at the airport that day, he responded, ‘I was down there getting a breakfast, morning breakfast, you know.’ While McCrary did digress at a few points during his testimony, his responses to questions from both his counsel and the prosecutor demonstrated that he understood why he was on trial. McCrary consistently stated that he did not steal the hat at issue. There is no evidence that McCrary’s demeanor was unusual or that a prior medical opinion existed about his competency. Nothing in McCrary’s testimony indicates that he was unable to understand the proceedings, appreciate their significance, or aid in his defense. [Cit.] Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to order a competency hearing for McCrary.” 2. Defendant could not demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel’s failure to raise issue of his compentency prior to trial, as “‘the issue of mental competency to stand trial is the same whether raised before, during or subsequent to trial,’” quoting Huzzie v. State , 236 Ga.App. 192, 193, 512 S.E.2d 5 (1999). Sims v. State, 279 Ga. 389, 614 S.E.2d 73 (June 6, 2005). A jury found defendant competent to stand trial, and the Court of Appeals upheld the subsequent conviction. Supreme Court reverses by 4-3 vote, holding that no “rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was incompetent to stand trial.” “‘The threshold for competency is easily met in most cases; it exists so long as a defendant “is capable at the time of the trial of understanding the nature and object of the proceedings going on against him and rightly comprehends his own condition in reference to such proceedings....”’ Lewis v. State, 279 Ga. 69, 70(3), 608 S.E.2d 602 (2005). The factors to consider in determining a defendant’s capability to assist in his defense include whether the defendant can adequately consult with others, knows the names and functions of those involved with the case, and reasonably understands the rules, the specific charges, the penalties and the consequences of the proceedings. Drope v. Missouri, [420 U.S. 162, 171(11), 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975)]. Competency also encompasses the ability ‘to recall and relate facts pertaining to his actions and whereabouts at certain times; whether he is able to assist counsel in locating and examining relevant witnesses; whether he is able to maintain a consistent defense; whether he is able to listen to the testimony of witnesses and inform his lawyer of any distortions or misstatements; whether he has the ability to make simple decisions in response to well-explained alternatives; whether, if necessary to defense strategy, he is capable of testifying in his own defense; and to what extent, if any, his mental condition is apt to deteriorate under the stress of trial. [Cit.]’ State v. Snyder, 750 So.2d 832, 852 (La., 2004). A competency determination should be supported by factual determinations and a low IQ score alone is just one indicia, not a determinative finding, that a defendant is unable to stand trial.” This evidence demands finding of incompetence to stand trial: “Sims has an IQ of 45-46, is considered moderately mentally retarded and although thirty-two years old at the time of trial, his IQ corresponded to a mental age of seven. A mental health expert who had performed over 2700 criminal competency evaluations stated that he was not aware of any person with an IQ as low as 45 who had been found competent to stand trial. He testified regarding Sims’ ability to function within the legal system and concluded that it was ninety-nine percent probable that Sims was not competent to stand trial. The court-appointed forensic psychologist who performed a Competency Assessment to Stand Trial (CAST) evaluation on Sims testified that whereas Sims was competent in the area of knowledge of the charges against him, that he could apprise the roles of defense counsel, the prosecuting attorney, the judge and the jury and could refrain from irrational and unmanageable behavior, Sims was not competent to give cogent testimony, to withstand cross-examination without incriminating himself, to be able to remember facts clearly, to understand the proceedings, or to be able to participate or assist in his own defense by making a decision after receiving advice. The forensic psychiatrist who testified on behalf of the State stated that although Sims would not necessarily understand the contents of the trial and that he would be susceptible to giving incorrect answers to the prosecutor, Sims nevertheless ‘minimally’ met the competence requirement to stand trial primarily because Sims was aware of the charges against him, understood the consequences if convicted, and had the capacity to work with his attorney on his defense.” Overrules Stowe v. State , 272 Ga. 866(2), 536 S.E.2d 506 (2000) and Pope v. State , 184 Ga.App. 547(1), 362 S.E.2d 123 (1987) and any other case holding that the standard of review on appeal of a finding of incompetence is “whether ‘any evidence’ existed to support the competency verdict.” Three justices dissent, pointing out that “the capacity to testify if necessary to defense strategy is only one of many factors in determining a defendant’s ability to assist in his defense,” and that “‘the trier of fact is not necessarily bound by any one factor.’ [Cit.]” “The majority simply substitutes its finding of incompetency for the contrary finding reached by the jury,” says the dissent. Accord, Slaughter v. State , 292 Ga. 573, 740 S.E.2d 119 (March 18, 2013).