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Lewis v. State, 279 Ga. 69, 608 S.E.2d 602 (February 7, 2005). Trial court did not err in failing to inquire, sua sponte , into 14-year old defendant’s compentency to stand trial for murder as an adult. Defendant “points to his below- average IQ rating and school records, which he claims indicate developmental delay, as evidence of his incompetence. In the face of evidence that [defendant] comprehended the nature of and participated in the trial court proceedings, however, these two factors do not, standing alone, establish incompetence.” “A defendant bears the burden of establishing incompetency to stand trial by a preponderance of the evidence, and this burden is consistent with principles of due process. Buttrum v. Black, 721 F.Supp. 1268, 1294 (N.D.Ga. 1989), aff'd 908 F.2d 695 (11 th Cir., 1990). The threshold for competency is easily met in most cases; it exists so long as a defendant ‘is capable at the time of the trial of understanding the nature and object of the proceedings going on against him and rightly comprehends his own condition in reference to such proceedings, and is capable of rendering his attorneys such assistance as a proper defense to the indictment preferred against him demands.’ Crawford v. State, 240 Ga. 321, 326 (240 S.E.2d 824) (1977). A trial court has a sua sponte duty to inquire into a defendant’s competence only when the evidence raises ‘a bona fide doubt’ as to the defendant’s competence. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815) (1966).” See also Traylor (March 13, 2006), above. “[W]e decline [defendant’s] request that we adopt a rule mandating competency hearings for children under seventeen who face trial in superior court under OCGA § 15-11-28(b)(2)(B),” although “[a]s a cautionary matter, it may be prudent for trial courts to hold competency evaluations for such juveniles.” Accord, Brinkley v. State , 320 Ga.App. 275, 739 S.E.2d 703 (March 11, 2013). Perry v. State, 269 Ga.App. 178, 603 S.E.2d 526 (August 18, 2004). “‘In Georgia, a person is not legally insane simply because [h]e suffers from schizophrenia or a psychosis. Rather, a defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity if, at the time of the criminal act, the defendant did not have the mental capacity to distinguish between right and wrong in relation to such act or a mental disease caused a delusional compulsion that overmastered h[is] will to resist committing the crime. A defendant who is not insane may nonetheless be found guilty but mentally ill if, at the time of the crime, the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] committed the crime and had a disorder of thought or mood which significantly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of life.’ Boswell v. State, 275 Ga. 689, 690(1) (572 S.E.2d 565) (2002) (footnotes and punctuation omitted). ‘ A plea of mental incompetency to stand trial raises a set of issues different from those raised by a defense of legal insanity at the time of the offense. Echols v. State, 149 Ga.App. 620(2) (255 S.E.2d 92) (1979). The former plea raises questions of whether the defendant is capable, at the time of the trial, of understanding the nature and object of the proceedings against him, rightly comprehends his own condition in reference to such proceedings, and is capable of rendering his attorneys such assistance as would be necessary for a proper defense.’ Id. ” “A trial court must conduct, sua sponte, a competency hearing when the information known to the trial court at the time of the trial or plea bargain is sufficient to raise a bona fide doubt regarding the defendant’s competence. The question is: Did the trial judge receive information which, objectively considered, should reasonably have raised a doubt about defendant’s competency and alerted him to the possibility that the defendant could neither understand the proceedings or appreciate their significance, nor rationally aid his attorney in his defense? To answer this question, an appellate court focuses on three factors: (1) evidence of the defendant’s irrational behavior; (2) the defendant’s demeanor at trial; and (3) prior medical opinion regarding the defendant’s competence to stand trial. The defendant bears the burden of proving incompetency by a preponderance of the evidence.’ [Cit.] Collins v. State, 259 Ga.App. 587 (578 S.E.2d 201) (2003).” None of the factors appeared here. Accord, Adams v. State , 316 Ga.App. 161, 728 S.E.2d 711 (May 21, 2012) (trial court had no duty to conduct a competency hearing sua sponte where nothing before the court brought defendant’s competency into question). Sims v. State, 267 Ga.App. 572, 600 S.E.2d 613 (May 11, 2004). “A competency trial is in the nature of a civil proceeding, and the defendant bears the burden of proving incompetency by a preponderance of the evidence. [Cit.] ‘A criminal defendant is competent to stand trial if he is capable of understanding the nature and object of the proceedings and is capable of assisting his attorney with his defense,’” quoting Stowe v. State, 272 Ga. 866, 536 S.E.2d 506 (2000). Reversed on other grounds, 279 Ga. 389, 614 S.E.2d 73 (June 6, 2005) (standard on appeal should be “whether after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was incompetent to stand trial,” not any evidence. Three justices dissent.). Accord as to burden of proof, Tiegreen v. State , 314 Ga.App. 860, 726 S.E.2d 468 (March 16, 2012). Huzzie v. State, 236 Ga.App. 192, 512 S.E.2d 5 (February 2, 1999). Defendant is entitled to a hearing on competency to stand trial any time during the criminal proceedings – before, during or after trial, according to Baker v. State, 250 Ga. 187, 192-193, 297 S.E.2d 9 (1982). “‘ [T]he issue of mental competency to stand trial is the same whether raised