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which the defendant pled guilty. Green, supra at 265, 454 S.E.2d 466.” Evidence from both plea hearing and a prior bond hearing was sufficient to support defendant’s pleas. McFadden v. State , 243 Ga.App. 896, 534 S.E.2d 566 (May 11, 2000). In accepting defendant’s guilty plea to cocaine possession and related offenses, no error in accepting recitation of facts from prosecutor (as opposed to defendant). “That the superior court chose to adduce the factual basis of defendant's plea, in part, through the State's attorney was not error. A trial court may satisfy itself as to the sufficiency of the factual basis of the plea by ‘questioning the defendant, the defense counsel ( Roberts v. Greenway, 233 Ga. 473, 476, 211 S.E.2d 764), or any other legitimate source available to the trial court that can furnish evidence that the constitutional rights of the defendant have been satisfied.’ Germany v. State, 151 Ga.App. 866, 867, 261 S.E.2d 774 (1979), rev'd on other grounds , 245 Ga. 326, 328-329, 265 S.E.2d 13 (1980) (‘[T]here is no procedural requirement that the judge personally make all the inquiries provided that they are made in [his or her] presence.’).” 3. GENERALLY Varner v. State, 303 Ga.App. 138, 693 S.E.2d 135 (March 25, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for armed robbery and related offenses affirmed; no error where trial court refused to accept defendant’s guilty plea, as defendant, on three different occasions, expressed confusion about his rights. “‘[A] defendant has no constitutional right to have his guilty plea accepted by the court.’ (Footnote omitted.) Hicks v. State, 281 Ga.App. 217, 220(3) (635 S.E.2d 830) (2006). Once Varner expressed confusion over whether to plead guilty or go to trial, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit him to enter a guilty plea. See Smith v. State, 289 Ga.App. 742, 747(3) (658 S.E.2d 156) (2008) (not error to reject plea where defendant expressed confusion); Hicks, supra (court was not required to accept plea where defendant showed apparent indecision); Bowen v. State, 191 Ga.App. 760 (382 S.E.2d 694) (1989) (no abuse of discretion where defendant revealed ambivalence concerning change of plea).” Sanders v. State, 280 Ga. 780, 631 S.E.2d 344 (June 12, 2006). “As Sanders acknowledges, a defendant has no constitutional right to enter a guilty plea. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 (n.11) (91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162) (1970); Cornelius v. State, 273 Ga.App. 806, 810(2)( c) (616 S.E.2d 148) (2005); Turley v. State, 265 Ga.App. 385, 387(2) (593 S.E.2d 916) (2004). Nevertheless, a state may by statute or otherwise confer such a right. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 (n.11).” Contrary to defendant’s assertion, no such right is created by OCGA §§ 17-7-93, 17-10- 32.1, or USCR 30.2, 33.1, or 33.10. Accord, Hicks v. State , 281 Ga.App. 217, 635 S.E.2d 830 (August 21, 2006) (rule 33.7 does not require trial court to conduct hearing where defendant expresses desire to plead guilty); Smith v. State , 289 Ga.App. 742, 658 S.E.2d 156 (February 6, 2008); Varner (March 25, 2010), above. Williams v. State, 278 Ga.App. 42, 628 S.E.2d 128 (March 7, 2006). 1. Entry of guilty plea did not require formal withdrawal of prior not guilty plea. 2. “Williams complains that he was not told about any collateral consequences of his guilty plea including the right to bear arms, obtain a professional license, or vote; however, ‘[t]here is no constitutional requirement that a defendant be advised of such collateral consequences in order for his guilty plea to be valid. If a defendant’s actual knowledge of such collateral consequences is not a prerequisite to his entry of a knowing and voluntary guilty plea, his lack of knowledge of those collateral consequences cannot affect the voluntariness of the plea.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Williams v. Duffy, 270 Ga. 580, 581(1) (513 S.E.2d 212) (1999) (finding no error in failure to advise defendant no portion of sentence could be served on parole).” Accord, Smith v. State , 289 Ga.App. 742, 658 S.E.2d 156 (February 6, 2008). Cert. granted on whether Williams v. Duffy is still good law in light of Padilla v. Kentucky (see ATTORNEYS – INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL - ADVICE ON IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES , above), Alexander v. State, case no. S14G1762, September 22, 2014. Watson v. State, 275 Ga.App. 174, 620 S.E.2d 176 (July 27, 2005). “Since the law favors a trial on the merits, proceeding to trial is preferable to a guilty plea where the defendant has shown some confusion. Pass v. State, 227 Ga. 730, 730(2) (182 S.E.2d 779) (1971).” Pitts v. State, 265 Ga.App. 633, 595 S.E.2d 322 (February 5, 2004). “‘[T]he law does not always require that the trial court personally inform a defendant of the elements of the crime to which he is pleading guilty.’ [Cit.]” Trial court was therefore not required “to define ‘intent’ as an element of rape” when considering defendant’s tender of guilty plea. Forrest v. State, 251 Ga.App. 487, 554 S.E.2d 735 (September 7, 2001). Judgment reversed as trial court implicitly rejected Defendant’s nolo plea by stating that it would “accept your guilty plea,” but the court did not explicitly tell Defendant that the court was rejecting her offer to plead nolo contendere and that as a result she could withdraw her