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negotiated plea as required by State v. Germany , 246 Ga. 455, 456, 271 S.E.2d 851 (1980) and Lawrence v. State , 234 Ga.App. 603, 605, 507 S.E.2d 490 (1998). Additionally, a defendant’s failure to object does not waive the trial court’s failure to comply with the mandates of Germany and Lawrence . The Court further ruled that although Germany and Uniform Superior Court Rule 33.10 and 33.11(A) and (D) refer to “guilty plea,” this analysis should also apply to a nolo contendere plea. Pike v. State, 245 Ga.App. 518, 538 SE.2d 172 (August 10, 2000). The prosecutor’s misstatement of the maximum sentence during defendant’s guilty plea hearing did not entitle defendant to withdraw his plea. Syms v. State, 240 Ga.App. 440, 523 S.E.2d 42 (September 28, 1999). Defendant wasn’t entitled to out-of-time appeal based on trial court’s failure “to inform him that he had 30 days in which to appeal the entry of his guilty plea.” “The superior court's duty was to ensure that Syms understood the constitutional rights he was waiving by entering a guilty plea and to confirm that he had a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequences. Knight v. Sikes, 269 Ga. 814, 816(1), 504 S.E.2d 686 (1998). We find no case or statutory law imposing upon the superior court a duty to advise a defendant that he may have a right to directly appeal the convictions which result from the entry of his guilty plea. See id.; Uniform Superior Court Rules 33.5, 33.8-33.12.” Accord, Askew v. State , 318 Ga.App. 454, 734 S.E.2d 222 (November 13, 2012). 4. MASS PLEA HEARING Smith v. Magnuson, 297 Ga. 210, 773 S.E.2d 205 (June 1, 2015). Following pleas to enticing a child and related offenses, habeas court properly found that defendant’s pleas were invalid. Trial court accepted defendant’s pleas as part of a group plea in which defendant incorrectly denied that he “had ever been a patient in a mental health facility or under the care of a psychiatrist. … Plea counsel informed the judge prior to acceptance of Magnuson's pleas that Magnuson had in fact been institutionalized and treated for mental health problems but added that he could not say whether psychiatrists had been involved. Counsel then stated that Magnuson had been found competent to stand trial, to which the court responded, ‘he appears as such.’ The court ultimately accepted Magnuson's pleas without making any further inquiry into his mental health history or his then-current mental state.” At habeas hearing, Magnuson presented expert testimony “that due to the circumstances of the group plea, Magnuson's impulse disorder, and the fact that Magnuson is more susceptible to conformity than the typical person, Magnuson would have answered the plea court's questions in conformity with the general affirmative answer of the group without giving any consideration to or having any real understanding of the consequences of his answers.” Defendant’s therapist also testified that Magnuson “did not understand the severity of the charges being brought against him, and he had no comprehension of how long he might spend in jail, believing that he would spend six or eight weeks in jail and then go home.” Held, record evidence supports habeas court’s finding “that the group dynamic and Magnuson's disorder prevented him from making an intelligent and knowing decision to enter his pleas.” “ FN2: Although group plea hearings may not be impermissible per se, see Bullard v. Thomas, 285 Ga. 545, 546 (678 S.E.2d 897) (2009), overruled on other grounds, Lejeune v. McLaughlin, 296 Ga. 291 (766 S.E.2d 803) (2014), a group plea will, in most circumstances, be an inappropriate forum for the acceptance of a defendant's plea to a serious crime. Courts are reminded that when a defendant is charged with a serious crime, and especially where the defendant is known to have a history of mental health disorders, it is imperative for the court to engage the defendant in an individual colloquy both to ensure the constitutional integrity of the plea and to provide appellate courts with a complete record in the event of a future challenge to the validity of the plea.” Bullard v. Thomas, 285 Ga. 545, 678 S.E.2d 897 (June 15, 2009). Habeas court properly found that defendant’s guilty plea was validly entered. “Bullard asserts that plea hearings involving multiple defendants cannot meet Boykin requirements without a one-on-one colloquy. Multiple defendant plea hearing procedures have been criticized. See Cazanas v. State, 270 Ga. 130 (508 S.E.2d 412) (1998) (Sears, J., concurring); Shabazz v. State, 259 Ga.App. 339, 341(2) (577 S.E.2d 45) (2003). But, group plea hearings are not per se impermissible. See Lamb v. State, 278 Ga.App. 97, 100(2) (628 S.E.2d 165) (2006). The question remains whether Bullard's pleas were freely and voluntarily made. See Cazanas, supra at 131; Lamb, supra; Isaac v. State, 237 Ga.App. 723, 726(2) (516 S.E.2d 575) (1999).” Transcript of plea hearing here showed that all Boykin rights were reviewed, noting after each that “(Defendants respond affirmatively).” At one point, the trial court noted that Bullard wasn’t responding and directed him to respond. “This Court will not presume that the transcript is inaccurate, nor did the habeas court so presume.” Overruled on other grounds, Lejeune v. McLaughlin, 296 Ga. 291 (766 S.E.2d 803) (2014). Accord, Smith (June 1, 2015), above. Lamb v. State, 278 Ga.App. 97, 628 S.E.2d 165 (March 7, 2006). “Lamb’s contention that the guilty plea hearing was improper because it involved the trial court accepting guilty pleas from multiple defendants is without merit. Although in