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plea. By pleading guilty, defendant waived every defense to accusation, except defense that accusation did not charge him with a crime. Accord, Beaver v. State , 308 Ga.App. 380, 707 S.E.2d 590 (March 10, 2011). Forrest v. State, 251 Ga.App. 487, 554 S.E.2d 735 (September 7, 2001). Judgment reversed as trial court implicitly rejected Defendant’s nolo plea by stating that it would “accept your guilty plea,” but the court did not explicitly tell Defendant that the court was rejecting her offer to plead nolo contendere and that as a result she could withdraw her negotiated plea as required by State v. Germany , 246 Ga. 455, 456 (1980) and Lawrence v. State , 234 Ga.App. 603, 605 (1998). Additionally, a defendant’s failure to object does not waive the trial court’s failure to comply with the mandates of Germany and Lawrence . The Court further ruled that although Germany and Uniform Superior Court Rule 33.10 and 33.11(A) and (D) refer to “guilty plea,” this analysis should also apply to a nolo contendere plea. Davis v. State, 251 Ga.App. 436, 554 S.E.2d 583 (August 31, 2001). Both the prosecutor and the trial court assured the defendant that, despite his guilty plea, he would be able to appeal his motions on the denial of his rights to a speedy trial. Court of Appeals held, citing Hooten v. State , 212 Ga.App. 770, 775, 442 S.E.2d 836 (1994), that it does not recognize conditional guilty pleas and that all the usual rules of appellate practice, including the waiver of errors by guilty pleas, are applied. The court further stated that if trial courts wish to permit defendants to appeal pre-trial rulings, the procedures in OCGA § 5-6-34(b) (regarding certificates of immediate review) are available. E. GUILTY BUT MENTALLY RETARDED Hampton v. State, 294 Ga.App. 857, 670 S.E.2d 502 (November 25, 2008). Defense of guilty but mentally retarded is declared by filing notice of insanity defense; trial counsel here was not ineffective for failure to file such notice. “Hampton charges his trial attorney with ineffective assistance in failing to file a ‘notice to proceed under OCGA § 17-7- 131.’ There is, however, no such notice. For purposes of OCGA § 17-7-131, there is only a defense of insanity, which may take the form of a plea of guilty but mentally ill, guilty but mentally retarded, or not guilty by reason of insanity. See OCGA § 17-7-131(b). OCGA § 17-7-130.1 and Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.1 provide for the filing of a notice of an insanity defense or of the intention to raise the issue of insanity or mental illness. Testimony given by Hampton's trial attorney at the hearing on his motion for new trial showed that he did not file a plea of guilty but mentally retarded because he believed that would have virtually assured Hampton's conviction and would have resulted in imposition of a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole. Instead, because he thought the victim was a highly impeachable witness, counsel testified that he thought it best to defend the case by challenging her credibility.” Foster v. State, 272 Ga. 69, 525 S.E.2d 78 (January 18, 2000). No reversible error in jury trial on defendant’s mental retardation defense to capital murder charge. “Foster contends the trial court erred by introducing into the proceeding the fact that a crime had been committed when the trial court instructed the jury, inter alia, that Foster had been charged with a crime and that the jurors had not been selected to decide his guilt or innocence. In State v. Patillo, 262 Ga. 259, 417 S.E.2d 139 (1992), we upheld the trial court's ruling that the consequences of the jury's finding on the mental retardation issue should not be disclosed to the jury. Our holding paralleled the exclusion of sentencing issues in trials conducted pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-131(j), under which claims of mental retardation are decided ‘at the guilt phase of the [criminal] trial.’ Patillo, supra. The challenged instructions here, which alerted the jury to the fact that the mental retardation issue in Foster's case arose out of a criminal proceeding, did not in any manner impede the jury from ‘focus[ing] strictly on the mental condition of the defendant and decid[ing] that issue without being concerned about the consequences of its finding.’ Patillo, supra at 260, 417 S.E.2d 139. Accordingly, we find no error in the challenged instructions.” Palmer v. State, 271 Ga. 234, 517 S.E.2d 502 (June 1, 1999). “The procedure and burden of proof for a defendant seeking to prove mental retardation under OCGA § 17-7-131(c)(3), that a defendant alleging mental retardation must prove his mental retardation beyond a reasonable doubt in the guilt-innocence phase, are not unconstitutional. Mosher v. State, 268 Ga. 555, 558-560(4), 491 S.E.2d 348 (1997); Burgess v. State, 264 Ga. 777, 789-790(36), 450 S.E.2d 680 (1994).” F. INSANITY/MENTAL ILLNESS See also SENTENCING – INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT , below Otis v. State, S15A1717, ___ Ga. ___, 782 S.E.2d 654, 2016 WL 462657 (February 8, 2016). Following mistrial in defendant’s murder prosecution, trial court erred by denying plea in bar based on double jeopardy. Trial court erroneously declared mistrial over defense objection after counsel announced in opening statement that the defense would be based on insanity. “Outside the presence of the jury, the State objected to the raising of this defense due to the lack of prior notice. In response, the defense asserted that because Otis would not be calling an expert witness to support the defense, he was