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not required to give advance notice pursuant to Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.1 and what is now Rule 31.5(B) (formerly Rule 31.4), and relied upon the holding in Abernathy v. State, 265 Ga. 754, 462 S.E.2d 615 (1995).” Contrary to trial court’s ruling, Abernathy isn’t limited to “the context of an insanity defense pursued in the penalty phase of a death penalty case.” Nahmias, joined by Blackwell, concurs specially to urge that Rule 31.1 and 31.5 “ need to be revised,” either to limit the holding of Abernathy and require notice to the State of insanity defenses in this context, or to put courts and counsel on notice that the rules don’t require advance notice in this situation. Martin v. State, 298 Ga. 259, 779 S.E.2d 342 (November 2, 2015). Capital murder and related convictions affirmed; 1. no plain error in giving of pattern jury charge on verdict of guilty but mentally ill. Although additional language was added in 2015 to prevent the charge from being “misleading in a death penalty case,” no plain error where the trial court failed to anticipate and use that language at defendant’s 2009 trial. 2. Prosecutor’s closing argument was improper, but defendant failed to preserve the error. “Martin argues that the prosecutor’s closing argument repeatedly misled the jury regarding the effect of a sentence of guilty but mentally ill. While it was not improper for the prosecutor to state that it would not be justice for the jury to impose a sentence of guilty but mentally ill if it was not supported by the evidence, we agree that it was improper to refer to such a verdict using the phrases, ‘a break’ and ‘a pass,’ and by making similar arguments. We note, however, that such language would have been permissible in the sentencing phase where, regardless of whether the jury had found Martin guilty or guilty but mentally ill, the jury would be choosing between imposing a death sentence or granting mercy. See Lewis v. State, 279 Ga. 756, 764(12), 620 S.E.2d 778 (2005) (holding that ‘the statute that provides for a verdict of guilty but mentally ill does not preclude a death sentence as the result of such a verdict’).” Brower v. State, 334 Ga.App. 262, 779 S.E.2d 32 (October 27, 2015). Kidnapping and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly excluded defendant’s proffered expert testimony on PTSD. Defendant “argued that she was justified in committing the crimes because she suffered from PTSD which negated her intent to commit the charged crimes, essentially asserting a diminished mental capacity defense.” “‘Evidence of a criminal defendant’s mental disability may be presented in support of a defense of insanity or delusional compulsion (see OCGA §§ 16–3–2 and 16–3–3); a claim of incompetency to stand trial (see OCGA § 17–7–130); or, since such pleas were authorized, a plea of guilty but mentally ill or guilty but mentally retarded (see OCGA § 17–7–131)—none of which Appellant raised in this case. For more than 150 years, however, [our Courts have] consistently upheld the exclusion of evidence of a defendant’s diminished mental condition when offered to support other defenses or to negate the intent element of a crime. See, e.g., State v. Abernathy, 289 Ga. 603, 607–608, 715 S.E.2d 48 (2011) (‘“[M]ental abnormality, unless it amounts to insanity, is not a defense to a crime.”’) (quoting Wallace v. State, 248 Ga. 255, 262, 282 S.E.2d 325 (1981)); Paul v. State, 274 Ga. 601, 603, 555 S.E.2d 716 (2001) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that ‘he was entitled to introduce expert evidence of his mental impairment tending to show his lack of intent to kill,’ because ‘the expert evidence was irrelevant to the state of mind necessary to determine guilt in light of the defendant’s refusal to assert an insanity defense or that he was mentally ill at the time of the conduct in question’)[.] Thompson v. State, 295 Ga. 96, 98–99(2), 757 S.E.2d 846 (2014).” “‘[I]t has not yet been determined whether post traumatic stress disorder ... [is an] admissible scientific principle[ ] in Georgia.’ Prickett v. State, 220 Ga.App. 244, 247(3), 469 S.E.2d 371 (1996), overruled in part on other grounds, State v. Belt, 269 Ga. 763, 764, n. 1, 505 S.E.2d 1 (1998). See Carter v. Glenn, 243 Ga.App. 544, 549 n. 2, 533 S.E.2d 109 (2000).” Norred v. State, 297 Ga. 234, 773 S.E.2d 234 (June 1, 2015). Evidence supported verdicts of guilty but mentally ill on malice murder and related offenses. Contrary to defendant, evidence didn’t require finding of not guilty by reason of insanity. “[Defendant’s expert] Dr. Gunnin testified that appellant knew right from wrong and that his Asperger's disorder did not impact his ability to discern right from wrong. Although [court’s expert] opined that appellant was delusional, appellant presented no evidence that he was suffering from a delusion that ‘if it had been true, would have justified [his] actions,’” quoting Avelo v. State, 290 Ga. 609(3) (724 S.E.2d 377) (2012). “As an example of appellant's knowing right from wrong, Dr. Gunnin noted that appellant told her he locked the house doors in the aftermath of the incident because he believed the police would be coming, indicating he understood the wrongfulness of his actions. She also opined that the fact that appellant resisted shooting the infant indicated he was not suffering from any delusion that overmastered his will.” Perkins v. State, 328 Ga.App. 508, 759 S.E.2d 626 (June 24, 2014). Aggravated child molestation and related convictions affirmed; trial court wasn’t required to sua sponte investigate whether defendant had an insanity defense. “Where evidence of a defendant's incompetency comes to the trial court's attention, the court is required to conduct a sua sponte investigation into the defendant's competency to stand trial ( Jackson v. State, 294 Ga. 431, 434, 754 S.E.2d 322 (2014)),