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but for a defendant competent to stand trial, there is no requirement that the trial court sua sponte investigate or raise the defense of insanity (or other mental incompetency) at the time of the charged offense. Holsey v. State, 322 Ga.App. 425, 428, 746 S.E.2d 133 (2013). Contrary to Perkins's claim, Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985), did not require the trial court to sua sponte investigate or raise an insanity defense on his behalf. … Perkins made no request, motion, or other affirmative attempt to demonstrate to the trial court that he had an insanity defense, and Ake does not establish a requirement for the trial court to act sua sponte under these circumstances. … The trial court did not err by failing to sua sponte order that Perkins submit to a mental health evaluation to determine his sanity, or by failing to instruct the jury that it was entitled to reach a verdict of guilty but mentally ill.” Poole v. State, 326 Ga.App. 243, 756 S.E.2d 322 (March 14, 2014). Following plea of guilty but mentally ill to charges of terroristic threats and stalking, trial court properly denied motion to withdraw pleas. Although the procedural requirements for a plea of guilty but mentally ill under OCGA § 17-7-131(b)(2) weren’t met (in that no one stated a factual basis for finding that defendant was mentally ill), defendant would only be entitled to withdraw his plea “to correct a manifest injustice,” not shown here. “At the hearing on his motion to withdraw his plea, Poole presented no evidence whatsoever that he has been harmed or prejudiced by the entry of his plea of guilty but mentally ill.” Analogizing to motions to withdraw pleas generally under USCR 33. Jackson v. State, 294 Ga. 431, 754 S.E.2d 322 (January 21, 2014). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; no error in denial of “continuance to investigate Jackson's competence. The trial court denied the motion for a number of reasons. First, the trial court noted that, up until the day before trial, defense counsel had never had any reason to ask for a psychiatric evaluation. Second, the trial court spoke with the jail's medical director, who had examined Jackson and determined him to be in good mental health. Third, based on colloquy with Jackson about his odd behavior, the trial court determined that Jackson understood that eating his own feces was improper and had been knowingly done to trigger an evaluation. Finally, the trial court determined that, based on Jackson's familiarity with the justice system, he might be attempting to delay trial. Based on all of these considerations, the trial court did not err in denying the motion for continuance.” Thomas v. State, 320 Ga.App. 101, 739 S.E.2d 417 (March 5, 2013). Kidnapping conviction affirmed; contrary to defendant’s argument, evidence supported finding of intent. Fact that defendant “attempted to flee from [child victim’s] aunt by running away and hiding in some bushes, and his flight from the scene presents evidence of consciousness of guilt.” “Thomas further contends that he lacked the criminal intent to kidnap the victim based on evidence showing that he was suffering from Schizoaffective Disorder and Borderline Intellectual Functioning, and that he had not been taking his medications at the time of the offense. [fn] However, Thomas conceded that the evidence did not support a defense of not guilty by reason of insanity, see OCGA § 16–3–2, and ‘mental abnormality, unless it amounts to insanity, is not a defense to a crime.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) State v. Abernathy, 289 Ga. 603, 607–608(4)(a) (715 S.E.2d 48) (2011); see also Wallin v. State, 285 Ga.App. 377, 383(b) (646 S.E.2d 484) (2007) (noting that ‘a person is not legally insane simply because he suffers from schizophrenia or a psychosis’ ) (citation omitted). There is no medical evidence that Thomas's mental illness prevented him from forming the intent to kidnap. Rather, the forensic psychiatrist who examined Thomas soon after his arrest testified that Thomas was not exhibiting any symptoms consistent with psychosis at the time.” Accord, Young v. State , 332 Ga.App. 361, 772 S.E.2d 807 (May 14, 2015) (“mental abnormality, unless it amounts to insanity, is not a defense to a crime.”). Anthony v. State, 317 Ga.App. 807, 732 S.E.2d 845 (October 4, 2012). Conviction for attempted burglary affirmed. Where defense elected not to pursue insanity defense or claim that he was guilty but mentally ill or mentally retarded, trial court properly prohibited “[defendant’s] mother from testifying that he possessed a mental infirmity, which he contends was relevant to showing that he did not have the requisite criminal intent at the time of the alleged offense.” “‘[M]ental abnormality, unless it amounts to insanity, is not a defense to a crime.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) State v. Abernathy, 289 Ga. 603, 607–608(4)(a) (715 S.E.2d 48) (2011). [fn] See Wallin v. State, 285 Ga.App. 377, 383(b) (646 S.E.2d 484) (2007) (noting that ‘a person is not legally insane simply because he suffers from schizophrenia or a psychosis’) (citation omitted). Given Anthony's failure to raise an insanity defense or to contend that he was guilty but mentally ill or mentally retarded, the trial court acted within its discretion in concluding that the testimony of Anthony's mother was irrelevant to the issue of whether Anthony acted with the criminal intent necessary to determine guilty. See Paul v. State, 274 Ga. 601, 603(2) (555 S.E.2d 716) (2001); Lewandowski v. State, 267 Ga. 831, 832(2) (483 S.E.2d 582) (1997); Selman v. State, 267 Ga. 198, 200(3) (475 S.E.2d 892) (1996); McDowell v. State, 269 Ga.App. 475, 476(1) (604 S.E.2d 575) (2004). Compare Porter v. State, 243 Ga.App. 498, 503–505(5), 506–508 (532