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unconsciousness or sleep has not committed a voluntary act and is not criminally responsible for the act. Model Penal Code § 2.01(2)(b). Moreover, LaFave notes that sleepwalking qualifies as such a defense. Id. at 33-34. In addition, it appears that the majority of courts that have considered the question have held that unconsciousness disorders, including sleep disorders, constitute a separate defense from insanity, and that people who commit potentially criminal acts because of such disorders should not be criminally responsible because they are not acting voluntarily and with criminal intent. [Cits.] This Court has also stated in dicta that, if a defendant commits an act that would otherwise be a crime while sleepwalking, he would not be criminally responsible because he would not satisfy this State’s requirement that ‘there be a joint operation of act and intent to constitute [a] crime.’ Lewis v. State, 196 Ga. 755, 763 (27 S.E.2d 659) (1943). See OCGA § 16-2-1(a) (a crime occurs when there is a ‘joint operation of an act or omission to act and intention or criminal negligence’). Furthermore, in interpreting the mens rea requirement of a statute to contain only a general intent as opposed to a specific intent requirement, the Supreme Court stated that a general intent requirement would separate wrongful conduct from innocent conduct and would protect ‘the hypothetical person who engages in forceful taking of money while sleepwalking (innocent, if aberrant activity).’ Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 269 (120 S.Ct. 2159, 147 L.Ed.2d 203) (2000).” Johnson v. State, 289 Ga.App. 435, 657 S.E.2d 333 (January 31, 2008). No abuse of discretion in denying defense request for continuance based on “[defendant’s] deteriorating mental health.” “The trial court ‘had ample opportunity to observe defendant’s behavior and demeanor throughout the proceedings before denying the request for a [mental evaluation.]’ Lightsey v. State, 188 Ga.App. 801, 802(1) (374 S.E.2d 335) (1988). As the trial court noted, a court-ordered mental evaluation conducted at Georgia Regional Hospital approximately four months before the trial indicated that Johnson ‘currently [met] the criteria for competency to stand trial. ’ [fn: The evaluation also indicated that Johnson had ‘an established history of psychiatric illness,’ but concluded that ‘despite the likelihood that he experienced symptoms of his mental illness at the time of his arrest, he would not meet criteria for nonresponsibility at the time of his acts.’Indeed, ‘“a mentally ill person can be competent to stand trial.”’ Morrow v. State, 266 Ga. 3 (463 S.E.2d 472) (1995). The test of competency is whether the defendant ‘“is capable of understanding the nature and object of the proceedings and is capable of assisting his attorney with his defense.”’ Adams v. State, 275 Ga. 867, 867-868(3) (572 S.E.2d 545) (2002). ] ‘ Starting from the presumption of mental competency, and drawing all reasonable deductions from the proffer of evidence, we thus further conclude that the trial court did not commit reversible error in denying defendant’s mid[-]trial motion for a [mental] evaluation.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Lightsey, supra; see Jackson v. State, 180 Ga.App. 774-775(1) (350 S.E.2d 484) (1986).” Wallin v. State, 285 Ga.App. 377, 646 S.E.2d 484 (May 14, 2007). In determining whether “at the time of the criminal act, the defendant did not have the mental capacity to distinguish between right and wrong in relation to such act,” the finder of fact may consider evidence of defendant’s flight from the scene “as well as the victim’s testimony that Wallin later attempted to persuade her to lie about what had occurred. See Collins v. State, 283 Ga.App. 188, 191(1)(a) (641 S.E.2d 208) (2007) (flight ‘can serve as evidence of defendant’s consciousness of guilt’); Johnson v. State, 255 Ga.App. 721, 722(2) (566 S.E.2d 440) (2002) (noting that ‘a defendant’s attempt to influence a witness ... is evidence of consciousness of guilt’).” Maddox v. State, 278 Ga.App. 191, 628 S.E.2d 625 (March 13, 2006). Mere fact that defendant took Haldol for six months, some months before trial, was not enough to require trial court to sua sponte order psychiatric evaluation. “There is no evidence in the record about why Haldol was prescribed to Maddox. Nothing in the record indicates that Maddox appeared irrational or incompetent at any time.” Isaac v. State, 275 Ga.App. 254, 620 S.E.2d 483 (August 29, 2005). “Isaac requested a competency hearing. If a defendant challenges his competency, a judge shall have him undergo a psychiatric examination. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 169 (95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103) (1975). ‘A criminal defendant is competent to stand trial if he is capable of understanding the nature and object of the proceedings and is capable of assisting his attorney with his defense.’ Stripling v. State, 261 Ga. 1, 2(3) (401 S.E.2d 500) (1991).” “The trial court held a competency hearing and the evidence showed that Isaac was competent to stand trial. At trial, Isaac testified that he was under the influence of alcohol and drugs during the incident, but he also testified specifically concerning what happened and why he acted as he did. We therefore find no error by the trial court.” White v. State, 278 Ga. 355, 602 S.E.2d 594 (September 13, 2004). 1. “[A] trial court is justified in using lay testimony on the issue of competency where sufficient facts are shown to support that witness’s testimony and conclusions.” 2. Trial court’s acceptance of plea of guilty but mentally ill was properly supported by reports from psychologists; OCGA §