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17-7-131(b)(2) requires examination from either psychologist or psychiatrist, but not both. Perry v. State, 269 Ga.App. 178, 603 S.E.2d 526 (August 18, 2004). “‘ In Georgia, a person is not legally insane simply because [h]e suffers from schizophrenia or a psychosis. Rather, a defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity if, at the time of the criminal act, the defendant did not have the mental capacity to distinguish between right and wrong in relation to such act or a mental disease caused a delusional compulsion that overmastered h[is] will to resist committing the crime. A defendant who is not insane may nonetheless be found guilty but mentally ill if, at the time of the crime, the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] committed the crime and had a disorder of thought or mood which significantly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of life.’ Boswell v. State, 275 Ga. 689, 690(1) (572 S.E.2d 565) (2002) (footnotes and punctuation omitted). ‘A plea of mental incompetency to stand trial raises a set of issues different from those raised by a defense of legal insanity at the time of the offense. Echols v. State, 149 Ga.App. 620(2) (255 S.E.2d 92) (1979). The former plea raises questions of whether the defendant is capable, at the time of the trial, of understanding the nature and object of the proceedings against him, rightly comprehends his own condition in reference to such proceedings, and is capable of rendering his attorneys such assistance as would be necessary for a proper defense.’ Id. ” Lamar v. State, 278 Ga. 150, 598 S.E.2d 488 (June 28, 2004). “OCGA § 17-7-130.1 does not require a defendant to cooperate with the court’s expert [in sanity evaluation] and provides no sanctions against a defendant who refuses to so cooperate, Motes v. State, 256 Ga. 831, 832 (353 S.E.2d 348) (1987).” Hancock v. State, 277 Ga. 835, 596 S.E.2d 127 (April 27, 2004). “[Defendant] contends the trial court erred by allowing the State’s expert to evaluate [defendant] after she had previously been evaluated by three other mental health experts, in the absence of any evidence adduced by the State to establish that the earlier evaluations were inadequate or erroneous. The record reveals that [defendant] was first seen by a psychologist who performed no forensic evaluation; she received her first forensic evaluations by two mental health professionals appointed by the trial court pursuant to OCGA § 17-7- 130.1. [Cit.] The State thereafter moved for additional evaluation of [defendant] by an expert chosen by the State pursuant to Tolbert v. State, 260 Ga. 527 (397 S.E.2d 439) (1990). The trial court granted the motion and additionally provided [defendant] with the opportunity to be evaluated again by an expert of her own choosing, an opportunity of which [defendant] took advantage. All five experts testified at trial. While we agree with [defendant] that a trial court’s discretion in ordering multiple psychological evaluations is not unlimited, we find no abuse of discretion under the facts present here. We recognized in Tolbert, supra, 260 Ga. at 528(2)(b), that a court-appointed medical expert ‘cannot be classified as an agent of the state, but must be considered as an independent and impartial witness.’ Accordingly, we held that consistent with the clear legislative intent of OCGA § 17-7-130.1, the State should have an equal opportunity with the defense to obtain the opinion of an independent and impartial mental health expert regarding the issues raised by an insanity defense. Tolbert, supra, at 528(2)(b) and (3). Contrary to [defendant’s] argument, nothing in Smith v. State, 245 Ga. 44(2) (262 S.E.2d 806) (1980) or Finney v. State, 253 Ga. 346(1) (320 S.E.2d 147) (1984) requires the State to establish that a court-ordered evaluation was inadequate or erroneous in order to justify a request under Tolbert for a first forensic evaluation of a defendant by a State-selected expert.” Fox v. State, 266 Ga.App. 307, 596 S.E.2d 773 (March 17, 2004). “‘The requirement that a defendant be given a psychiatric examination … may be satisfied by an evaluation by a doctor qualified to give such an opinion who may not be a board-certified psychiatrist,’ [cit.]” such as, here, the senior psychologist in the forensic services division of Central State Hospital. Murphy v. State, 263 Ga.App. 62, 587 S.E.2d 223 (September 4, 2003). Even though only expert testimony as to defendant’s sanity came from his witness who said he was insane at time of crime, jury was “not bound by the opinions of the expert” and could conclude from other evidence that defendant was mentally ill, but knew right from wrong. Crossley v. State, 261 Ga.App. 250, 582 S.E.2d 204 (May 13, 2003). “‘[E]vidence that the defendant does not remember, or was in a ‘blanked out’ state of mind during the commission of the acts charged, is insufficient to raise the issue of insanity.’” Manning v. State, 259 Ga.App. 794, 578 S.E.2d 494 (February 20, 2003). Having been found competent to stand trial by a psychiatrist in a court-ordered evaluation, defendant filed a motion for funds for an independent evaluation. However, defendant “failed to make the threshold showing at his ex-parte hearing for funds that his mental state would be a significant factor at trial. ‘The mere filing of a motion does not constitute a preliminary showing that sanity at the time of