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the offense is likely to be a significant factor at trial.’... Manning did not present any evidence which called into question his mental condition.” Guillen v. State, 258 Ga.App. 465, 574 S.E.2d 598 (November 19, 2002). “Insanity is an affirmative defense and the burden of proof on one asserting such a defense is proof by a preponderance of the evidence. The appropriate standard of appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence with regard to a jury’s finding of sanity in a criminal case is whether after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, a rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was insane at the time of the crime… Unless proof of insanity is overwhelming, a jury is entitled to rely on the presumption of sanity found in OCGA § 16-2-3.” Jackson v. State, 256 Ga.App. 829, 570 S.E.2d 40 (July 30, 2002). Trial court properly refused to allow defendant to raise defense of insanity or mental illness on day of trial as untimely pursuant to USCR 31.1. Although defendant’s original counsel had filed timely notice of the defense, defendant did not want to pursue the defense and his counsel was allowed to withdraw over the issue. A new attorney was appointed for defendant, and defendant advised him he did not want to pursue the defense. The defense was essentially abandoned until the day of trial. Thus, defendant’s request for a psychiatric evaluation after jury selection was essentially a new motion, and untimely. Note, USCR 31.1 only applies if the defendant seeks to introduce expert testimony; it does not bar lay testimony. See Abernathy v. State , 265 Ga. 754 (1995). Accord, Gardner v. State , 261 Ga.App. 188, 582 S.E.2d 167 (May 7, 2003). Vanderpool v. State, 244 Ga.App. 804, 536 S.E.2d 821 (July 6, 2000). Convictions for aggravated assault on a police officer and related offenses affirmed. 1. Trial court properly denied directed verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, as evidence authorized finding of sanity. “Contrary to Vanderpool's arguments, the fact that two specialists opined that Vanderpool was under delusional impulses at the time of the crimes does not change this result. ‘[J]urors are not bound by the opinions of expert witnesses regarding a defendant's sanity; instead, they may rely on the presumption of sanity in OCGA § 16-2-3 unless the proof of insanity is overwhelming. Keener v. State, 254 Ga. 699, 701(1), 334 S.E.2d 175 (1985).’ (Emphasis in original.) Rodriguez [ v. State, 271 Ga. 40, 42-43, 518 S.E.2d 131 (1999)]. Although there was evidence supporting Vanderpool's claim that he was insane, there was also direct testimony from [Officer] Patterson that Vanderpool acted normally at the time that Patterson was kidnapped. Moreover, the experts in this case indicated that it was possible for Vanderpool to phase in and out of delusional episodes. The trial court appropriately denied Vanderpool's motion for a directed verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.” 2. Vanderpool’s offenses started in Banks County and ended in Gwinnett County. He was tried first in Gwinnett, where he was found not guilty by reason of insanity. Contrary to defendant’s argument, he isn’t entitled to a presumption of insanity as to his earlier actions in Banks County. “[A] mental condition, once proved to exist, is presumed to continue. OCGA § 24-4-21. See also Nagel v. State, 262 Ga. 888, 889(1), 427 S.E.2d 490 (1993). For example, an individual who has been proven to be insane is presumed to remain so in the future.” But the presumption doesn’t apply retroactively. “This argument, however, directly contradicts OCGA § 24-4-21 which indicates that the mental state of insanity, once proven, continues to cover actions of the defendant occurring after the behavior which resulted in a finding of insanity. A presumption of continuing insanity applies prospectively to future acts of the defendant, not retroactively to past behavior. The adjudication of insanity in Gwinnett County would raise a presumption that crimes committed by Vanderpool subsequent to those occurring in Gwinnett County were the result of his insanity. It would not, however, raise such a presumption regarding crimes committed prior to those committed in Gwinnett County. Therefore, Vanderpool was not entitled to a presumption of insanity in Banks County.” 3. State wasn’t collaterally estopped from asserting defendant’s sanity in Banks County by the insanity adjudication in Gwinnett County . “At the outset, it must be noted that sanity may ebb and wane like a mental tide. A defendant who is perfectly lucid at one moment may be maniacal at the next. This fact is borne out by the Banks County jury's verdict in this case in which it was found that Vanderpool was guilty but mentally ill as to one count and guilty to the others. Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court in Gwinnett County necessarily considered Vanderpool's mental state at the time he initiated the kidnapping of Patterson in Banks County in reaching his decision.” Lebbage v. State, 244 Ga.App. 596, 536 S.E.2d 282 (June 23, 2000). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; evidence didn’t demand a verdict of guilty but mentally ill. “For the jury to return a verdict of guilty but mentally ill, it had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Lebbage was mentally ill at the time he committed the crimes. See OCGA § 17-7-131(c)(2). Here, there was evidence that Lebbage's mental illness was characterized by periods of normalcy, and that his criminal acts on the day in question were not motivated by the delusions from which he suffered. Moreover, ‘[j]urors are not bound by the opinions of either lay witnesses or expert witnesses as to the question of sanity and they may rely on the basic presumption [of sanity] existing under our law. The jury is free to reject expert testimony as to sanity and may find an accused sane even without positive testimony as to sanity.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Brooks v. State,