☢ test - Í

247 Ga. 744, 745, 279 S.E.2d 649 (1981); see also Kirkland v. State, 166 Ga.App. 478, 481(1), 304 S.E.2d 561 (1983). Accordingly, we cannot say that the jury was required to return a verdict of guilty but mentally ill.” Porter v. State , 243 Ga.App. 498, 532 S.E.2d 407 (March 24, 2000). Convictions for child cruelty and contributing to deprivation of a minor reversed; trial court erred in excluding defendant’s expert evidence that defendant had a psychological condition that caused her to “‘to be able to block out things that she doesn't want to see’ and that ‘her whole psychological makeup is almost designed to not see things that are too painful to see.’” “Porter's counsel then argued that Porter's defense was that she had no knowledge of the abuse her husband was inflicting on her son. He argued that the psychologist's testimony and report were admissible to show that in her expert opinion Porter was not aware of the signs and symptoms of the abuse, even though a normally perceptive person would have been aware.” Contrary to State’s argument, t he defense presented was not an insanity defense. Rather, the defense went to the defendant’s knowledge, not her intent or ability to form the intent to commit the offenses. Rattansay v. State, 240 Ga.App. 165, 523 S.E.2d 36 (September 28, 1999). At defendant’s rape trial, no error in trial court’s refusal to obtain a second psych eval for defendant. “A defendant must be given access to a psychiatrist for an examination and assistance in his defense when the defendant demonstrates to the trial court that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial. Perkins v. State, 215 Ga.App. 296, 450 S.E.2d 324 (1994). Although the trial court is authorized to order a mental health expert to examine the defendant in order to determine whether his sanity is likely to be a significant factor at trial, it is the defendant who bears the burden of making that preliminary showing. See Bright v. State, 265 Ga. 265, 271(2)(d), 455 S.E.2d 37 (1995); Perkins, supra. The mere filing of a motion does not constitute a preliminary showing that sanity at the time of the offense is likely to be a significant factor at trial. Id. Rattansay did not present any evidence which called into question his mental condition and, therefore, has failed to make the preliminary showing that his sanity would be a significant factor at trial. The trial court was not required to provide psychiatric assistance. See Brown v. State, 260 Ga. 153, 391 S.E.2d 108 (1990); Callaway v. State, 208 Ga.App. 508, 510(1), 431 S.E.2d 143 (1993).” Barber v. State, 240 Ga.App. 156, 522 S.E.2d 528 (September 14, 1999). After entry of defendant’s plea of guilty but mentally ill on child molestation charges, trial court properly denied defendant’s out-of-term “petition to correct a void judgment, claiming that, at the time he entered his plea, the sentencing court failed to adhere to the procedural requirements of OCGA § 17-7-131(b)(2).” Procedures here satisfied the code section, but even if they didn’t, “the ‘guilty but mentally ill’ plea is for the benefit of the defendant, because (1) it provides for mental health treatment during the sentence, and (2) it recognizes a reduced level of culpability. Therefore, if the sentencing court failed to strictly comply with OCGA § 17-7-131(b)(2), such failure inured to Barber's benefit and was harmless error. See Kirkland v. State, 166 Ga.App. 478, 482(2), 304 S.E.2d 561 (1983).” Fuss v. State, 271 Ga. 319, 519 S.E.2d 446 (July 6, 1999). Evidence supported trial court’s finding that defendant was not insane at time he killed his mother with an ax, despite evidence of mental illness. “‘[T]he fact that a person is schizophrenic or suffers from a psychosis does not mean he meets the test of insanity requiring a verdict of not guilty on the basis of insanity. [Cit.]’ Nelms v. State, 255 Ga. 473, 475(2), 340 S.E.2d 1 (1986). The trial court, sitting as the trier of fact, was not compelled to accept the testimony of Fuss's psychologist, but was authorized to find proof of Fuss's criminal intent based upon the testimony of the State's expert, as well as the words, conduct, demeanor, motive and other circumstances connected with Fuss's acts. Pittman v. State, 269 Ga. 419, 420, 499 S.E.2d 62 (1998); Foote v. State, 265 Ga. 58, 59(1), 455 S.E.2d 579 (1995).” Rodriguez v. State, 271 Ga. 40, 518 S.E.2d 131 (May 3, 1999). 1. Evidence, though in conflict, was sufficient to authorize jury to reject defendant’s insanity claim. “[J]urors are not bound by the opinions of expert witnesses regarding a defendant’s sanity; instead, they may rely on the presumption of sanity in OCGA § 16-2-3 unless the proof of insanity is overwhelming. Keener v. State, 254 Ga. 699, 701(1), 334 S.E.2d 175 (1985).” Accord, Vanderpool (July 6, 2000), above. 2. [L]egal justification for an otherwise criminal act is the ‘essential element’ of a defense of delusional insanity. See Salter v. State, 257 Ga. 88, 89, n. 2, 356 S.E.2d 196 (1987), and cases cited therein. Therefore, the court properly instructed that the evidence had to demonstrate that the delusion ‘was as to a fact which, if true, would have justified the [alleged] act [by the accused].’ Id.; Lawrence [ v. State, 265 Ga. 310, 454 S.E.2d 446 (1995)].” Accord, Stanley v. State , 242 Ga.App. 597, 530 S.E.2d 506 (March 3, 2000) (presumption of sanity and State’s expert supported trial court’s finding of sanity, despite defense expert’s testimony). Pruitt v. State, 270 Ga. 745, 514 S.E.2d 639 (March 19, 1999). No error where trial court denied defendant’s motion for