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psychological examination during trial. “At the beginning of the sentencing phase, Pruitt’s counsel requested a psychological examination for their client. They stated that Pruitt was acting irrationally, but the trial court determined that the sole basis for this claim was that Pruitt told his counsel after conviction that he preferred a death sentence and would not testify in mitigation. Upon questioning by the trial court, Pruitt stated that he understood his decision, and knew his right to testify and present mitigation evidence. The trial court noted there had never been any indication that Pruitt was incompetent or had mental problems, and it found that Pruitt’s decision was made knowingly and intelligently. After having been informed, a competent defendant, and not his counsel, makes the ultimate decision about whether to testify or present mitigation evidence. Morrison v. State, 258 Ga. 683, 686(3), 373 S.E.2d 506 (1988). We conclude that the trial court did not err by denying the motion for a psychological examination during the trial. [fn]” Webb v. State, 270 Ga. 556, 512 S.E.2d 633 (February 22, 1999). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction of guilty but mentally ill. “In reviewing a verdict of guilty but mentally ill in a case where the defense is not guilty by reason of insanity, this Court determines whether, construing the evidence in favor of the verdict, a rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was insane at the time of the crime. Caldwell v. State, 257 Ga. 10(1), 354 S.E.2d 124 (1987). An individual can establish insanity when he proves by a preponderance of evidence that at the time the criminal act was committed, he suffered from a ‘delusional compulsion as to such act which overmastered his will to resist committing the crime.’ OCGA § 16-3-3. A finding of insanity based upon OCGA § 16-3-3 requires proof that (1) the accused acted under a delusional compulsion; (2) the criminal act was connected with the delusion; and (3) the delusion related to a fact which, if true, would have justified the act. Lawrence v. State, 265 Ga. 310(2), 454 S.E.2d 446 (1995). As to the third requirement, it has long been recognized that ‘if the delusion is as to a fact which would not excuse the act with which the prisoner is charged, the delusion does not authorize an acquittal of the defendant.’ Mars v. State, 163 Ga. 43, 60(4), 135 S.E. 410 (1926).” Evidence here did not demand a finding “that the killing of [defendant’s father] occurred as a result of a delusional compulsion that overmastered Webb’s will. See Eason v. State, 256 Ga. 701(1), 353 S.E.2d 188 (1987); Dutton v. State, 225 Ga.App. 67, 483 S.E.2d 305 (1997).” Barber v. State, 236 Ga.App. 294, 512 S.E.2d 48 (February 8, 1999). No ineffective assistance where counsel failed to seek a psychiatric evaluation of defendant: “Although Barber contends that counsel should have undertaken a more thorough inquiry into his mental state, Barber failed to present any evidence at the hearing indicating that such an evaluation was appropriate or would have benefited him at trial. The only relevant facts testified to by Barber at the hearing were that (1) he was knocked unconscious in a car accident in 1995, (2) he has had ‘seizures’ since he was 12 years old, twice causing him to ‘black out’ while driving, and (3) when he was incarcerated previously, he was sent to Augusta Hospital ‘to get my head examined because they wanted to know what was wrong.’ Barber did not testify that he had ever been hospitalized for any type of mental disorder, nor did he introduce any hospital records relating to his alleged admission to Augusta Hospital. … Although Barber’s testimony shows that he may have occasionally had seizures of some sort, been injured in a car accident a year or two before the robbery, and been sent to a hospital at some point for an unexplained reason, there is nothing to suggest that he has any history of mental disorders that would have been relevant to the trial of this case.” G. MASS ARRAIGNMENTS See subheading GUILTY PLEA – MASS PLEA HEARING, above H. NOLO CONTENDERE Johnson v. State, 282 Ga.App. 464, 638 S.E.2d 873 (November 17, 2006). Subsequent claim of defense or controverting evidence unavailing to overturn nolo plea, citing authority as to guilty pleas, e.g., Butler v. State, 212 Ga.App. 698, 699- 700 (443 S.E.2d 11) (1994). Bryson v. State, 282 Ga.App. 36, 638 S.E.2d 181 (October 20, 2006). In defendant’s prosecution for child molestation, failure to register as a sex offender, and related offenses, trial court properly admitted evidence of defendant’s nolo plea to prior sex offenses, not as a similar transaction, but to prove his status as a sex offender require to register. “[T]here is no prohibition on the use of a no contest plea if ‘otherwise provided by law.’ Former OCGA § 42-1-12(a)(3) (2003) provided that a plea of nolo contendre is deemed a conviction for purposes of the registration requirements. [fn] The plea therefore was admissible to show a conviction for purposes of Bryson’s alleged failure to register as a sex offender.” Woodson v. State, 267 Ga.App. 636, 600 S.E.2d 717 (June 2, 2004). Trial court improperly allowed defendant to plead nolo contendere to rape; OCGA § 17-7-95(a) authorizes nolo pleas “in all criminal cases other than capital felonies ;” “[a]lthough rape is no longer punishable by death, [cit.] the offense remains a capital felony for the purpose of OCGA §