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17-7-95(a). [Cit.] However, the acceptance of a nolo contendere plea under these circumstances is, at most, harmless error. A defendant will not be heard to complain on appeal that he was ‘accorded an unmerited privilege with beneficent results.’ [Cit.]” Blackmon v. State, 266 Ga.App. 877, 598 S.E.2d 542 (April 8, 2004). Strictly construing OCGA § 16-11-131(b), prior plea of nolo contendere (to burglary) could not be used to support a conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Bolden v. State, 275 Ga. 180, 563 S.E.2d 858 (May 13, 2002). “[U]nder the plain and unambiguous language of OCGA § 17-7-95(c) a nolo contendere plea cannot be used to establish a probation violation.” Reverses 250 Ga.App. 825, 552 S.E.2d 533 (2001). Forrest v. State, 251 Ga.App. 487, 554 S.E.2d 735 (September 7, 2001). Judgment reversed as trial court implicitly rejected Defendant’s nolo plea by stating that it would “accept your guilty plea,” but the court did not explicitly tell Defendant that the court was rejecting her offer to plead nolo contendere and that as a result she could withdraw her negotiated plea as required by State v. Germany , 246 Ga. 455, 456, 271 S.E.2d 851 (1980) and Lawrence v. State , 234 Ga.App. 603, 605, 507 S.E.2d 490 (1998). Additionally, a defendant’s failure to object does not waive the trial court’s failure to comply with the mandates of Germany and Lawrence . The Court further ruled that although Germany and Uniform Superior Court Rule 33.10 and 33.11(A) and (D) refer to “guilty plea,” this analysis should also apply to a nolo contendere plea. Vanegas v. State, 249 Ga.App. 76, 547 S.E.2d 718 (April 10, 2001). A court’s blanket policy foreclosing any consideration of a nolo plea violates statutory privileges of Uniform Superior Court Rule 33. I. PLEA AGREEMENTS See SENTENCING – SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION/AGREEMENT WITH STATE, below J. STANDING SILENT/REFUSING TO PLEAD Jones v. State, 304 Ga.App. 445, 696 S.E.2d 346 (May 27, 2010). Defendant’s DUI conviction affirmed; trial court properly entered not guilty plea for defendant who refused to plead. “Jones refused to enter a plea to the charges, and the trial court entered a not guilty plea on his behalf, which it was authorized to do, given Jones's silence. See OCGA § 17-7- 94 (‘If the person accused of committing a crime, upon being arraigned, ... stands mute, the clerk shall immediately record upon the minutes of the court the plea of “not guilty,” together with the arraignment; and the arraignment and plea shall constitute the issue between the accused and the [S]tate.’); Reedman v. State, 265 Ga.App. 162, 165(4), n. 4 (593 S.E.2d 46) (2003) (‘Although [the defendant] stood mute and refused to participate in the arraignment process, the trial court was authorized to enter a not guilty plea on his behalf.’).” K. VOLUNTARINESS See also subheading GUILTY PLEA, above, and SENTENCING – AGGRAVATED SENTENCE – PRIOR CONVICTIONS, below New case! Mims v. State, S16A0542, ___ Ga. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 3147569 (June 6, 2016). Twenty-eight years after defendant pled guilty to murder and kidnapping, trial court properly denied his motion for out-of-time appeal. 1. Record affirmative showed that defendant was advised of his privilege against self-incrimination and right to confrontation. Although those rights weren’t discussed in plea colloquy, they were covered in “ a written plea and acknowledgment-and-waiver-of-rights form — bearing the signatures of Mims and his lawyer.” Mims acknowledged the rights he was waiving, counsel certified that he had reviewed the rights with Mims and believed that Mims understood them, and in a separate, contemporaneous order, the plea judge “pointed to the acknowledgment-and-waiver-of-rights form and found that Mims understood and voluntarily had waived his privilege against self-incrimination and right of confrontation. We previously have held that such a record is sufficient to show that an accused properly was advised of the essential constitutional protections that he would waive by his entry of a guilty plea. See Burch [ v. State , 293 Ga. 816, 816-817 (750 S.E.2d 141) (2013)] (relying on acknowledgment-and-waiver-of-rights form, certification of counsel, and contemporaneous order of plea judge).” 2. Plea form was sufficient to advise defendant of his privilege against self- incrimination by asking: “ Do you know and understand that you don’t have to say, sign, or do anything that will show or tend to show you are guilty unless you want to?” Accord, Brown (November 7, 2011), below. 3. Plea form was sufficient to advise defendant of his right to confrontation by asking: “ “Do you know and understand that you have the right to make the State or District Attorney bring in witnesses to testify against you under oath at a Court trial, and that you and your lawyer have the right to question and cross-question these witnesses under oath?” 4. Factual basis was