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adequately laid upon the record by reference to the indictment. “The transcript of the plea colloquy shows that the plea judge recited the relevant allegations of the indictment,[fn] confirmed with Mims that he understood the charges to which he intended to plead guilty, and confirmed that Mims, in fact, intended to plead guilty. Reference to the factual allegations of an indictment may be sufficient to lay a factual basis for a plea, and in this case, we conclude that an adequate factual basis was established on the record.[fn] Cf. Green v. State , 265 Ga. 263, 265 (2) (454 S.E.2d 466) (1995) (‘[W]e find that the indictment provided ample information from which the trial court could discern that the facts alleged by the state actually satisfied the elements of the charges to which Green was pleading guilty.’). See also Lewis v. State , 293 Ga. 544, 548 (1) (748 S.E.2d 414) (2013); Henderson [ v. State , 293 Ga. 6, 7, n. 2 (1) (743 S.E.2d 19) (2013)].” Boccia v. State, 335 Ga.App. 687, 782 S.E.2d 792 (February 12, 2016). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; trial judge didn’t “‘improperly encourage[ ] [him] to proceed to trial’ rather than ‘entertaining any plea discussions with the prosecution’ because the trial court led him to believe that he would not receive a sentence of greater than 10 years.” Trial judge made comments mid-trial suggesting that the State consider a lesser plea offer: “In one set of comments that Boccia complains of, the trial court told the State that it had a ‘you’ve-got-to-be-kidding-me feeling about this case right now, that what I’m seeing right now by virtue of just your opening statements is y’all are pursuing armed robbery against these two defendants based on a PVC pipe that somebody picked up in a frat fight and a pocket knife that maybe has a 2–inch long blade on it. I have seen the State come off armed robbery charges for a lot more egregious conduct than this. I’m not prejudging anything ... I haven’t heard your case. ... I don’t pick the charges, but I do sentence. You’re going to have to get an armed robbery conviction to get a whole lot of time from what I’m seeing right now. ’ (emphasis supplied.) The trial court, as Boccia acknowledges, did not explicitly state, ‘I will not sentence the defendant to more than ten years no matter what.’ Still, he argues that ‘when the [S]tate offered to allow [him] to plead guilty and receive a sentence of ten years, there was no reason to accept this offer, because a conviction following trial would have no worse consequence.’ First, according to the trial court, the State’s ‘best last offer’ was not a 10–year sentence, but rather a ‘15 years[’] sentence to serve 10 years in jail, balance probated[.]’ Second, the record shows that the trial court’s complained-of comments occurred after Boccia had rejected this offer and after he told the court he wanted to go to trial despite understanding that he could be sentenced to a maximum of life plus 51 years if convicted on all counts. As Boccia points us to no other evidence of another actual plea offer, we can find no merit in his contention that he rejected an offer because of the trial court’s after-the-fact comments.” Nor did the trial court improperly inject itself into plea negotiations. “Uniform Superior Court Rule 33.5(B) expressly allows a trial court to indicate whether it is likely to agree in a proposed plea. Compare Skomer v. State, 183 Ga.App. 308, 309–310, 358 S.E.2d 886 (1987) (finding that while a court may communicate its willingness or lack thereof to accept an independently negotiated plea, the trial court may not participate by indicating that ‘rejection of a plea proposal will result in greater punishment in the event of a conviction by a jury’) (emphasis omitted). The instant case does not come within Skomer ‘s purview because the trial court did not enter into plea negotiations and neither promised nor implied that it would only give Boccia a 10–year sentence, or that it would give him a higher sentence if he did not plead. The trial court also clearly stated that it was not prejudging the case. See Baptiste v. State, 229 Ga.App. 691, 699(3), 494 S.E.2d 530 (1997).” McCranie v. State, 335 Ga.App. 548, 782 S.E.2d 453 (February 2, 2016). Following pleas to child molestation and related offenses, trial court erred by denying motion for out-of-time appeal; record shows improper involvement in plea negotiations by trial judge. “Here, the trial court not only rejected the negotiated plea, but repeatedly indicated that it wished to sentence McCranie to a longer sentence. The trial court also stated that it would be happy for McCranie to withdraw his plea so that the trial court could preside over his trial. McCranie ultimately agreed to enter a guilty plea with less favorable terms than those which he had originally negotiated. Thus, the judicial participation in the plea negotiations in this case was so great as to render McCranie’s resulting guilty plea involuntary. See Pride v. Kemp, 259 Ga. 353, 354– 355, 711 S.E.2d 653 (2011) (guilty plea was involuntary where trial court repeatedly indicated that it would impose a longer sentence if defendant went to trial and would prefer for defendant to go to trial so that the court could impose a longer sentence). Accordingly, McCranie had a possible ground for direct appeal based on the trial court’s interference in the plea negotiations. See McDaniel [ v. State, 271 Ga. 552, 554(2), 522 S.E.2d 648 (1999)] (reversing defendant’s conviction where trial court interfered with plea negotiations).” McGuyton v. State, 298 Ga. 351, 782 S.E.2d 21 (January 19, 2016). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to withdraw negotiated guilty pleas to murder and firearm possession by a convicted felon. 1. Contrary to defendant’s argument, an Alford plea need not be “premised upon his acknowledgment of the sufficiency of the State’s evidence to convict him. … [A] defendant’s acknowledgment of the sufficiency of the evidence to convict is not a prerequisite for the trial court to accept a guilty plea. So long as ‘a defendant intelligently concludes that his interests require entry of a guilty plea and the record before the judge contains strong evidence of actual guilt,’ the trial court may accept a guilty