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have received a different sentence. Thompson v. State, 276 Ga. 701, 704, 583 S.E.2d 14 (2003) (trial court erred in relying on uncounseled guilty plea to enhance sentence). Accordingly, Grant's sentence is vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.” Phelps v. State, 293 Ga. 873, 750 S.E.2d 340 (October 21, 2013). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to withdraw guilty plea to murder. 1. Despite one unanswered question on waiver of rights form, the form and the record as a whole support finding of knowing and voluntary plea. 2. No error in advising defendant “ that counsel would ‘assist’ him at any trial if he chose not to plead guilty, and that the court should have instead used the word ‘represent.’ … [N]o specific ‘magic words’ are required to be used during a guilty plea proceeding to inform a defendant about his rights. Adams [ v. State, 285 Ga. 744, 745, (1) (683 S.E.2d 586) (2009)].” In any event, waiver of rights form specifically advised defendant that counsel would “represent” him at trial. “Phelps also couches the above arguments as a failure to meet the requirements of USCR 33.8. As to such, ‘the salient inquiry is ... whether the record, as a whole, affirmatively shows that the plea in question was knowing and voluntary. [Cit.] And, the record shows that the guilty plea substantially complied with the applicable uniform rules. [Cit.] Indeed, a defendant need not be expressly advised of each and every right set forth in USCR 33.8. [Cit.] Although in this case [Phelps] was so advised.’ Lewis [ v. State , 293 Ga. 544, 748 S.E.2d 414 (September 9, 2013)].” 3. Contrary to defendant’s argument, advisement on waiver of rights wasn’t deficient for failure to specify that the rights applied “at trial.” “Phelps urges that this Court established in Wilson v. Kemp, 288 Ga. 779 (729 S.E.2d 90) (2011), a requirement that the trial court use the term ‘at trial’ when discussing the waiver of each of these rights. But, Wilson did not impose such a requirement, and none would have been appropriate in that case; there the trial court ‘specifically limited its discussion of Wilson's “right to remain silent” to the guilty plea hearing itself, without ever informing him that, by pleading guilty, he would waive that right at trial.” Id. at 779–780. That is not the situation at bar. Rather, during the plea hearing, the trial court repeatedly spoke of Phelps's right to a jury trial; the court enumerated his rights in the context of such a trial, and stated: “if you wish to have a trial by a jury or exercise any of these rights, all you have to do is enter a plea of not guilty and a jury trial will be held for you in the case.’ The court further informed Phelps that if he pled guilty, ‘you'll be giving up all these rights [and] you'll be giving up the presumption of innocence.’ Thus, even though each sentence the court spoke to inform Phelps of his rights did not use the words “at trial,” the court adequately advised Phelps of the rights he was forgoing by choosing not to go to trial.” Walker v. State, 323 Ga.App. 857, 748 S.E.2d 496 (September 12, 2013). Trial court properly denied motion to withdraw guilty plea to meth possession. Plea wasn’t made involuntary “because plea counsel informed Walker that unless he pleaded guilty, his pregnant girlfriend would likely give birth to his child in prison, and the two likely would lose custody of the child permanently. … ‘ Entering a guilty plea as a result of advice received does not amount to coercion .’ Walden [ v. State, 291 Ga. 260, 261(1) (728 S.E.2d 186) (2012)], citing Ivey v. State, 230 Ga. 407(1) (197 S.E.2d 366) (1973) (claims of coercion by prosecutor and plea attorney were belied by record, which established that defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered his plea, and were therefore insufficient to establish that trial court erred by denying motion to withdraw guilty plea). Simply because this ancillary consequence of going to trial may have influenced him, Walker ‘cannot now claim that his decision was not voluntary simply because he regrets the choice that he made.’ Walden, 291 Ga. at 261(1).” Lewis v. State, 293 Ga. 544, 748 S.E.2d 414 (September 9, 2013). Trial court properly denied out-of-time appeal from guilty plea to felony murder. Despite inability to provide transcript of guilty plea hearing, “other evidence of record may establish that the plea was entered into knowingly and voluntarily. See Moore v. State, 285 Ga. 855 (684 S.E.2d 605) (2009).” “The record contains a three-page plea questionnaire, executed on the same day as the plea, which was sworn to and signed by Lewis as well as his attorney, witnessed by a deputy court clerk and certified to and signed by the judge presiding at the plea.” The plea form contained a thorough waiver of rights. “The presiding judge then signed a written certification that while under oath and in open court Lewis was asked the aforementioned questions, pled guilty to the charge at issue while represented by counsel, and had been fully advised of his rights and the charges against him; the presiding judge then made the express determination that Lewis's plea was made freely, knowingly, and voluntarily, and without ‘undue influence, compulsion or duress, and without promise of leniency.’” “In denying Lewis's motion for an out-of-time appeal, the trial court expressly found that it was aware of the factual basis for Lewis's guilty plea because, inter alia, Lewis's co-indictee had pled guilty the month before Lewis's plea and a factual basis for the plea, including Lewis's culpability, was presented to the trial court. What is more, the indictment detailing the felony murder to which Lewis pled was before the trial court. Adams v. State, 285 Ga. 744, 747(4) (683 S.E.2d 586) (2009).” Foster v. State, 319 Ga.App. 815, 738 S.E.2d 651 (February 20, 2013). Recidivist sentence for felony shoplifting affirmed; voluntariness of prior plea was shown by record. 1. Reference to right to jury trial if he decided to withdraw