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his guilty plea was adequate to advise of that right. 2. “ Foster also claims that he was not informed of his right to counsel or to the presumption of innocence during the plea proceeding, but he was represented by counsel and has cited no authority supporting his position that a guilty plea is invalid if matters other than the Boykin rights are not specifically explained. See generally Britt v. Smith, 274 Ga. 611, 614, 556 S.E.2d 435 (2001) (‘decisions [of the Georgia Supreme Court] dealing with the validity of a guilty plea are generally couched in terms of the defendant's waiver of the three Boykin rights’) (citation omitted).” Kennedy v. State, 319 Ga.App. 498, 735 S.E.2d 819 (December 21, 2012). Trial court properly accepted negotiated pleas on drug charges, despite defendant’s contention on appeal “that his due process rights were trampled when the trial court ‘browbeat’ him into pleading guilty. The transcript from the guilty plea hearing discloses that Kennedy was faced with a choice between accepting the negotiated plea offer or foregoing his opportunity to plead guilty so he could file his motion to suppress. Although this was not the option Kennedy wanted,[fn] the transcript does not disclose that the trial court coerced him into entering his guilty plea. Further, because Kennedy did not file a motion to withdraw his plea and there was no post plea hearing in which the merits of an ineffectiveness claim, including his contention that counsel should have filed a motion to suppress,[fn] were tested, we cannot assume that a motion to suppress might have succeeded in this case.” Burns v. State, 291 Ga. 547, 731 S.E.2d 681 (September 10, 2012). Trial court properly denied out-of-time appeal from guilty plea to murder. Boykin requirement that defendant be advised of the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination was satisfied by telling him that he had “[the] right [to] remain silent.” “Nothing in the Boykin decision requires ‘magic words’ to convey the defendant's rights during a guilty plea proceeding. Adams v. State, 285 Ga. 744, 745 (683 S.E.2d 586) (2009). The terms ‘right to remain silent’ and ‘right against self-incrimination’ are interchangeable as long as there is understanding that the rights apply at trial. Id. at 746, n. 3.” USCR 33.8, which lists the right to remain silent and the right against self-incrimination separately, doesn’t demand a different result. Accord, Moon (July 6, 2007), below; Merritt v. State , 329 Ga.App. 871, 766 S.E.2d 217 (November 20, 2014). In re: S.F., 312 Ga.App. 671, 719 S.E.2d 558 (November 17, 2011). Delinquency adjudication affirmed; although juvenile court improperly participated in ‘plea negotiations,’ “the court's participation in this case was not so great as to make S.F.'s admission involuntary,” given full colloquy regarding juvenile’s rights and fact that “the juvenile court did not make any threats of a longer term of confinement if S.F. chose to go to trial, nor did it offer S.F. any benefit for making an admission,” distinguishing Pride v. Kemp, 289 Ga. 353 (711 S.E.2d 653) (2011). Improper participation here: “trial counsel announced twice that S.F. was ready to proceed with the bench trial, after which the juvenile court stated: ‘The judge's indication that he would plea to three years, which this other gentleman got, would be similar to a plea offer as opposed to anything else.’ Because the juvenile court presented S.F. with a ‘plea offer’ of three years of confinement if he made an admission rather than proceeding with the adjudication, the court inappropriately participated in the ‘plea negotiation.’” Brown v. State, 290 Ga. 50, 718 S.E.2d 1 (November 7, 2011). Habeas court properly denied petition; record showed that defendant was adequately advised of his Boykin rights upon entry of his guilty plea to financial transaction card fraud. 1. Although there was no colloquy about defendant’s Boykin rights other than right to trial by jury, those rights were covered in the written waiver of rights signed by defendant and counsel. “[C]ontrary to Brown's contention, the habeas court did not err by relying on the waiver of rights form signed by Brown. Unlike in State v. Hemdani, 282 Ga. 511 (651 S.E.2d 734) (2007), in which we upheld the grant of habeas relief because the State adduced no transcript of the guilty plea hearing and instead relied solely on a plea form that lacked any affirmative evidence that the defendant's attorney had any interaction with him regarding his Boykin rights, there was clear evidence here beyond the mere execution of a waiver form that proved Brown had been apprised of his Boykin rights. Specifically, the guilty plea hearing transcript affirmatively reflects ‘that the trial court entered into [a] colloquy with [Brown] to ensure that he read and fully understood the [waiver of rights] agreement which he signed,’ State v. Hemdani, supra at 512, and the signed ‘certificate of lawyer’ at the conclusion of the waiver of rights form together with Brown's own acknowledgment at the guilty plea hearing serve to prove ‘that trial counsel actually went over the [waiver of rights form] with [his] client [and] ... the information that it contained.’ Id. We thus reject Brown's argument that the waiver of rights form he signed cannot serve as ‘some affirmative evidence that either the trial court or trial counsel entered into a colloquy with defendant and explained all three of his Boykin rights. [Cit.]’ Id. ” Accord, Dillard v. State , 327 Ga.App. 262, 758 S.E.2d 158 (May 1, 2014) (motion to withdraw plea properly denied; right to confrontation wasn’t covered in colloquy, but was in waiver of rights statement signed and acknowledged in colloquy by defendant); Mims (June 6, 2016), above. 2. Waiver form adequately advised of right against self-incrimination at trial, though it didn’t use the word “self-incrimination.”