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“Nothing in Boykin requires the use of any precisely-defined language or ‘magic words’ during a guilty plea proceeding. Adams v. State, [285 Ga. 745(1) (683 S.E.2d 586) (2009)]. The wording in the waiver of rights form adequately conveyed to Brown in a manner reasonably intelligible to him the core principles of the privilege against compulsory self- incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. See id. Unlike in Wilson v. Kemp, [January 24, 2011, below ], where the trial court, in informing Wilson of this Boykin right, erred by ‘specifically limit[ing] its discussion of Wilson's “right to remain silent” to the guilty plea hearing itself, without ever informing him [otherwise],’ nothing in the waiver of rights form language in this case conveyed or even intimated to Brown any comparable limitation on his right against self- incrimination. Rather, in the context of the guilty plea proceedings in which Brown executed the form, it was apparent to any reasonable person that the information conveyed about the right against self-incrimination was pertinent to a knowing and intelligent waiver of that right at trial.” Thompson and Melton dissent. Tyner v. State, 289 Ga. 592, 714 S.E.2d 577 (June 20, 2011). Physical precedent only. Guilty plea to malice murder was invalid based on trial court’s failure to advise defendant of his right against self-incrimination. “[T]his Court has interpreted advice and waiver of the ‘three Boykin rights’ as a strict constitutional requirement. See, e.g., Wilson v. Kemp, 288 Ga. 779, 780–781 (707 S.E.2d 336) (Jan. 24, 2011).” Nahmias suggests “that the Court has interpreted Boykin too formalistically and more strictly than the majority of other courts in the country,” but no other justice joins in this part of the opinion. Pride v. Kemp, 289 Ga. 353, 711 S.E.2d 653 (June 13, 2011). Habeas court erred in denying petition; “the judicial participation in Pride's plea negotiations was so great as to render his guilty plea involuntary.” Trial judge rejected defendant’s plea deal with State on charges of rape, aggravated assault and child cruelty, saying “she did not ‘know why [appellant] should get less than twenty years. I mean, it doesn't sound like anything is wrong with the case as far as the State.... If I tried the case and he was found guilty I would give him the maximum. I would stack the sentences.’ After discussion, including the prosecutor's explanation that the State was seeking to avoid having the children testify, the trial judge stated that she would ‘give him eighteen years—that is rock bottom—and I am happy to try him [in five days] and ready to go and he is going to get a lot more. I would really much rather try him, frankly, so I can give him what I would really like to give him. ’” Court later declared she wouldn’t sentence defendant to less than twenty years to serve, which defendant accepted. “We conclude that this improper judicial participation in the plea negotiations was so great that, as a constitutional matter, it rendered Pride's resulting guilty plea involuntary. See McDaniel [ v. State, 271 Ga. 552, 554(2) (522 S.E.2d 648) (1999)]. Accordingly, we must reverse the habeas court's denial of his petition.” “FN3. Pride also heard the trial judge comment that there did not appear to be ‘anything wrong’ with the State's case against him. In that regard, we note that comments by the trial court regarding the merits of the case in the course of a plea bargain negotiation are not only contrary to Uniform Superior Court Rule 33.5(A) but also create a risk of a coerced guilty plea. See United States v. Barrett, 982 F.2d 193, 195 (6 th Cir., 1992) (holding, in case involving application of Fed.R.Crim.P. 11, that trial judge's statements about the merits of the case were coercive, as they presented defendant with ‘the choice of pleading guilty or taking his chances at trial in front of a judge who seemed already to have made up his mind about the defendant's guilt.’).” See also Ealey v. State , 310 Ga.App. 893, 714 S.E.2d 424 (July 14, 2011) (jury trial waiver was coerced by trial court, which promised defendant a certain sentence and a supersedeas bond if he had a bench trial, but told defendant he could be sentenced to up to 41 years if convicted at jury trial; citing Pride .); McCranie (February 2, 2016), above. Burnett v. State, 309 Ga.App. 422, 710 S.E.2d 624 (April 27, 2011). Motion to withdraw guilty plea to speeding properly denied; evidence supported finding that plea was voluntary. “Burnett was represented by an attorney during the plea hearing and Burnett acknowledged that he had reviewed the ‘Plea of Guilty: Acknowledgment and Waiver of Rights’ form and the ‘Withdrawal of Plea of Not Guilty and Tender of Guilty Plea’ form with his attorney and understood the forms. Each of the 27 questions on the ‘Plea of Guilty: Acknowledgment and Waiver of Rights’ form was responded to by Burnett's initialing his answer in the ‘yes’ or ‘no’ spaces.” Opinion makes no reference to colloquy on record regarding waiver of rights. Wilson v. Kemp, 288 Ga. 779, 707 S.E.2d 336 (January 24, 2011). Habeas court erred by denying petition; “the plea hearing transcript shows that Wilson was not informed that a guilty plea waives his privilege against compulsory self- incrimination.” Testimony of defendant and his counsel that defendant was informed of his “constitutional rights” was insufficient : “there are several ‘constitutional’ rights that may come into play with a guilty plea, see Uniform Superior Court Rule 33.8, but only the failure to inform a defendant of the three particular constitutional rights set forth in Boykin can support an award of habeas relief. See Britt v. Smith, 274 Ga. 611 (556 S.E.2d 435) (2001) (habeas relief granted only for the failure to inform a defendant of the three Boykin rights, not the rights set forth in USCR 33.8).”