☢ test - Í

Distinguished, Brown (November 7, 2011), above. Teemer v. State, 304 Ga.App. 874, 697 S.E.2d 919 (July 7, 2010). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to withdraw his negotiated plea to aggravated sodomy. “Teemer … contends that the state failed to show that he was aware of the consequences of his plea because he was not advised on the record that he would serve his ten-year prison term without the possibility of parole. [Cit.] This argument fails, because our Supreme Court has held that ‘eligibility or ineligibility for parole is not a consequence of a plea of guilty, but a matter of legislative grace or a consequence of the withholding of legislative grace.... There is no constitutional requirement that a defendant be advised of such collateral consequences in order for his guilty plea to be valid.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Williams v. Duffy, 270 Ga. 580, 581(1) (513 S.E.2d 212) (1999) (citing OCGA § 17-10-6.1(c)(3)). Indeed, this Court has held that ‘[p]arole eligibility may be a factor which the defendant should consider in bargaining for a recommended sentence, but the trial court is entitled to presume that a defendant has apprised himself of such collateral consequences before agreeing to accept a certain sentence in exchange for his guilty plea.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Bess v. State, 235 Ga.App. 372, 373(1) (508 S.E.2d 664) (1998).” Cert. granted on whether Williams v. Duffy is still good law in light of Padilla v. Kentucky (see ATTORNEYS – INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL - ADVICE ON IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES, above), Alexander v. State, case no. S14G1762, September 22, 2014. Sentinel Offender Services, LLC v. Harrelson, 286 Ga. 665, 690 S.E.2d 831 (March 15, 2010). Habeas court properly found that written plea sheet was insufficient to establish valid waiver of rights by pro se DUI defendant, as ““the record must contain some affirmative evidence that either the trial court or trial counsel entered into a colloquy with defendant and explained all three of [her] Boykin rights. [Cit.]’ [ State v. Hemdani , 282 Ga. 511, 512, 651 S.E.2d 734 (October 9, 2007), below ].” “Compare Moore v. State, 285 Ga. 855(1) (684 S.E.2d 605) (2009) (plea form signed by defendant and certified by defense counsel and trial court is sufficient to establish voluntariness of plea where form also contains affirmative evidence that counsel had interaction with defendant and that responses on form are consistent with those given in open court). To the extent Obi v. State, 230 Ga.App. 476(1) (496 S.E.2d 556) (1998) can be read to indicate that a completed form alone is necessarily sufficient to establish the voluntariness of a plea, it is hereby overruled.” Rogers v. State, 286 Ga. 55, 685 S.E.2d 281 (November 2, 2009). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to withdraw guilty plea to murder; pro se defendant was adequately advised of his privilege against self-incrimination when the trial court told him, “you also have the right not to testify, and if you choose not to testify, it cannot be held against you in any way.” Court was not required to use the words “privilege against self-incrimination” or any other “magic words.” Accord, Childs v. State , 311 Ga.App. 891, 717 S.E.2d 509 (October 7, 2011). Distinguishing Hawes (February 26, 2007), below (defendant was advised of right to testify, but not privilege against self-incrimination). Sanders v. Holder, 285 Ga. 760, 684 S.E.2d 239 (September 28, 2009). Habeas court erred by denying defendant’s petition for relief from his guilty plea to VGCSA, as record shows that defendant “was not informed of his right against compulsory self-incrimination prior to entering his plea.” Hayes v. State, 298 Ga.App. 419, 680 S.E.2d 508 (June 17, 2009). Physical precedent only. 1. No abuse of discretion where trial court vacated defendant’s guilty plea to DUI upon receiving information that defendant was possibly under the influence at time of plea entry. After entry of defendant’s plea, “[t]he trial court later stated on the record that someone in the probation office had reported that alcohol was detected on Hayes' breath and Hayes was asked to submit to an AlcoSensor test, which came back positive. Hayes admitted that he had two drinks at a bachelor party the night before, but said he had not had anything to drink that morning before coming to court. The State asked that Hayes be held in contempt. The trial judge, after expressing concern that Hayes' plea may not have been acceptable due to the influence of alcohol, remanded Hayes to the sheriff's custody for an Intoxilyzer test. Hayes was not represented by counsel during this exchange as the court had been unsuccessful in reaching his attorney. … Hayes' Intoxilyzer test, administered at 12:28 p.m. … resulted in a reading of .035. The trial judge concluded that Hayes was not under the influence of alcohol at that time, but stated that he ‘could very well have been at the time he entered [his] plea.’ Consequently, the judge rejected Hayes' plea, vacated his sentence and ruled his bond insufficient. The judge also ruled that Hayes was in contempt and remanded him into custody. The trial court made a handwritten entry on Hayes' accusation stating, ‘“Plea rejected by Court. Defendant under influence of alcohol at time of plea.’” Held , trial court’s reliance on the AlcoSensor and Intoxilyzer results, for purposes of determining the voluntariness of defendant’s plea, was not improper, although defense counsel was not present and no formal foundation was laid for either one. “[A] trial court may … rely upon evidence outside of that presented at the plea hearing in determining whether to accept a plea. See Bowers v. State, 267 Ga.App. 260, 261(1), 599 S.E.2d 249 (2004) (trial court authorized to consider sentence report when determining whether