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voluntary.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Stephens v. State, 235 Ga.App. 756, 758 (510 S.E.2d 575) (1998). See also Wiggins v. State, 245 Ga.App. 527, 528 (538 S.E.2d 180) (2000). And, we have previously held that a plea statement form signed by a defendant – such as the Petition and Plea Statement signed by David – can be used to show that a guilty plea is knowingly and voluntarily entered, when the plea statement is placed into the record and combined with a colloquy like the one that occurred between the trial court and David in this case. See Gainer v. State, 267 Ga.App. 408, 409 (599 S.E.2d 359) (2004); Wiggins, 245 Ga.App. at 528-529; Stephens, 235 Ga.App. at 758; Tahamtani v. State, 177 Ga.App. 52, 53 (338 S.E.2d 488) (1985).” See also Winkles (September 1, 2005), below. Accord, Henry v. State , 284 Ga.App. 439, 644 S.E.2d 191 (March 22, 2007); Moon (July 6, 2007), above; Sweeting v. State , 291 Ga.App. 693, 662 S.E.2d 785 (May 28, 2008) (motion for out-of-time appeal properly denied where plea petition and transcript showed Boykin waiver); Tomlin v. State , 295 Ga.App. 369, 671 S.E.2d 865 (December 19, 2008); Shuler v. State , 306 Ga.App. 820, 703 S.E.2d 382 (November 16, 2010). Distinguishing King v. State, 270 Ga. 367, 509 S.E.2d 32 (1998): “In King, the only evidence of the defendant’s voluntariness was a plea statement form filled out by the prosecutor. There was no plea hearing transcript, and thus no evidence of a colloquy between the defendant and trial court concerning the defendant’s understanding of the form or whether he had freely and voluntarily signed it.” Baisden v. State, 279 Ga. 702, 620 S.E.2d 369 (October 3, 2005). Habeas court erred in denying defendant’s habeas corpus petition; record did not affirmatively show that defendant was advised of his right to confront accusers and his privilege against self-incrimination. “[T]he District Attorney’s affidavit merely states that the trial judge would have asked questions ‘similar’ to a list which included inquiries regarding the Boykin rights, but which also addressed other matters. The prosecutor did not specifically remember Baisden’s particular cases, and the affidavit does not affirmatively show that, when accepting guilty pleas, the trial judge’s routine or standard practice was to inform every defendant of all three Boykin rights.” Accord, Denson v. Frazier , 284 Ga. 858, 672 S.E.2d 625 (January 26, 2009) (habeas petition should have been granted where neither plea transcript nor extrinsic evidence showed advisement of right against self- incrimination). Green v. State, 279 Ga. 687, 620 S.E.2d 788 (October 3, 2005). Trial attorney’s affidavit was insufficient to prove that he advised defendant of rights waived by guilty plea; record of proceedings showed no advisement of right against self- incrimination or right to confront accusers; attorney offered no specific recollection, but stated, “I know that I would have personally advised ... Green that he had the right to a trial by jury, that he had the right not to testify against himself at ... trial and that I, as his attorney, would have the right to confront the witnesses brought against him by the prosecution during the trial.” Held, trial court erred in finding this evidence sufficient to prove knowing waiver of rights. “[The attorney] offers not one word about his usual and customary practice at guilty plea hearings; he says nothing about his routine or standard procedure. In short, he provides no indication that his conduct at guilty plea hearings was so fixed and customary as to be habitual. [Cits.]” Three justices dissent. Based on Foskey v. Battle (January 12 2004), below. Winkles v. State, 275 Ga.App. 351, 620 S.E.2d 594 (September 1, 2005). “Winkels contends that the trial court erred because it failed to inform him that he was waiving the presumption of innocence, as required by Uniform Superior Court Rule 33.8(B)(2). … It appears from the record that the trial court did not advise Winkels that he was presumed innocent. However, ‘the question is not whether the trial court followed the letter of USCR 33 but whether the record, as a whole, affirmatively shows the plea was knowing and voluntary.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Wiggins v. State, 245 Ga.App. 527, 528 (538 S.E.2d 180) (2000), citing Johns v. State, 223 Ga.App. 553, 554(1) (479 S.E.2d 388) (1996). See also Stephens v. State, 235 Ga.App. 756, 758 (510 S.E.2d 575) (1998). … [T]he trial judge engaged Winkels in a lengthy discussion about his rights, his state of mind, his comprehension of the process and his satisfaction with his counsel. Based on our review of the transcript, we conclude that the record as a whole affirmatively shows that Winkels’s plea was knowing and voluntary.” Defendant’s name is spelled differently in the style and the text of the opinion. Accord, David (May 8, 2006), above. State v. Futch, 279 Ga. 300, 612 S.E.2d 796 (May 9, 2005). Habeas court could find that plea was not supported by voluntary waiver of rights: “The State … offered the plea form contained on the back of the indictment and which is signed by Futch. The form consists of one typed paragraph that states that the defendant pleads guilty and waives several rights, including the right to trial by jury, the right to confront witnesses against oneself, and the right not to incriminate oneself. [Cit.] Plea counsel testified that she was not sure that the document was provided to Futch before he entered his plea, that she doubted that he read the document, that she did not go over the rights with him, and that he was simply presented the document after the entry of his plea and told ‘to sign here.’ This evidence amply supports the habeas court’s finding that the State failed to meet its burden to affirmatively show that Futch was aware of his constitutional rights and knowingly and voluntarily waived those rights.”