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Pullium v. State, 278 Ga. 354, 602 S.E.2d 833 (September 13, 2004). Writ of habeas corpus should have been granted as to 1971 felony conviction used to enhance sentence where record of guilty plea did not show “that he was advised of, and waived, the three constitutional rights required for a valid guilty plea: the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a trial by jury, and the right to confront his accusers. Boykin v. Alabama , 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969).” Foskey v. Battle, 277 Ga. 480, 591 S.E.2d 802 (January 12, 2004). “It is error for a trial court to accept a guilty plea without an affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary since a guilty plea which is not voluntary and knowing is ‘obtained in violation of due process and is therefore void.’ Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). The entry of a guilty plea involves the waiver of three federal constitutional rights: the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one’s accusers (id.), and the trial court has a duty to ensure that the defendant understands the constitutional rights being waived. Knight v. Sikes, 269 Ga. 814(1), 504 S.E.2d 686 (1998); Bowers v. Moore, 266 Ga. 893(1), 471 S.E.2d 869 (1996). The record must disclose the accused’s voluntary waiver of those constitutional rights since waiver will not be presumed from a silent record. Boykin v. Alabama, supra, 395 U.S. at 243; State v. Germany, 245 Ga. 326, 327, 265 S.E.2d 13 (1980)…. The guilty plea transcript in the case at bar reveals that the trial court did not inform petitioner of any of the rights being waived by pleading guilty, and the ‘transcript of proceedings’ notified petitioner only that he had the right to plead not guilty and be tried by a jury.” Extrinsic evidence, such as defense attorney’s normal practice of advising clients of rights, can fill a silent record, but in this case only covered “one of the three constitutional rights mentioned in Boykin , and ‘fell well short of demonstrating that [defendant] was fully informed of the constitutional rights he was waiving by pleading guilty.’” Also, fact that defendant “had recently entered guilty pleas in other jurisdictions and may have been informed of his constitutional rights in those proceedings does not serve as a substitute for the failure to advise him of the constitutional rights he was relinquishing” by pleading guilty to the charges before the court. Habeas court should have granted petition. Accord , Green v. State , 279 Ga. 687, 620 S.E.2d 788 (October 3, 2005). Bazemore v. State, 273 Ga. 160, 535 S.E.2d 760 (October 10, 2000). Following guilty pleas on theft charges, habeas court erred by denying relief; State failed to carry burden at habeas hearing of proving voluntariness of pleas. Habeas court correctly found that plea colloquy failed to “pose the mandatory questions and advisements required before a court may accept a guilty plea. There was merely a brief factual statement and a form given to Bazemore acknowledging that the probation would be unsupervised.” But habeas court erred by finding that extrinsic evidence showed knowing and voluntary waiver of defendant’s rights. 1. Plea counsel’s testimony was inadequate. Plea counsel testified that he didn’t remember defendant’s cases or pleas, but testified to a general practice where he “advised clients of what the sentence could be; that they had a right to a jury trial; and the consequences of a plea.” But counsel “did not know about asking ‘the statutory questions,’ such as satisfaction with his services or the right against self-incrimination.” “Certainly, evidence of a routine or standard practice or procedure can be used in demonstrating compliance with constitutional standards. Jackson v. Hopper, 243 Ga. 41, 42, 252 S.E.2d 467 (1979). However, here Calhoun's testimony about his usual handling of criminal defendants fell well short of demonstrating that Bazemore was fully informed of the constitutional rights he was waiving by pleading guilty. Knight v. Sikes, [269 Ga. 814, 817(2), 504 S.E.2d 686 (1998)]. What is more, Calhoun's undisputed failure to remember anything about the pleas renders merely speculative his conclusion that Bazemore certainly knew what he was doing.” Accord, Williams (November 2, 2015), above (counsel’s testimony as to routine practice may establish compliance with constitutional standards, citing Bazemore). 2. Defendant’s intelligence and other experiences with the legal system didn’t show knowing and voluntary plea. “Certainly a defendant's intelligence and cognitive ability may be relevant in assessing the voluntary and knowing nature of a plea. See Bowers v. Moore, [266 Ga. 893, 471 S.E.2d 869 (1996)]. But Bazemore's intelligence cannot substitute for the failure to advise him of the important rights he was relinquishing. Nor can the fact that Bazemore may have been informed of those rights at prior criminal proceedings. … The constitutional rights articulated in Boykin are implicated when a recidivist defendant enters a plea of guilty. Larry v. Hicks, 268 Ga. 487, 491 S.E.2d 373 (1997). Otherwise the concerns of Boykin would address solely the first time offender.” Brassfield v. State, 242 Ga.App. 747, 531 S.E.2d 148 (March 13, 2000). Trial court properly denied motion to withdraw defendant’s non-negotiated guilty plea to child cruelty. After plea negotiations failed, trial court didn’t improperly inject itself into plea negotiations by telling defendant “that he could go to trial or enter a nonnegotiated plea.” It is clear from the comment itself, … that plea discussions were no longer pending.” Reese v. State, 242 Ga.App. 204, 529 S.E.2d 196 (February 2, 2000). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to