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withdraw guilty plea to burglary, notwithstanding fact that defendant “was taking psychotropic medication for schizophrenia at the time the plea was entered.” “Because the record affirmatively shows that Reese was not incapacitated by the medications, evidence supported the trial court's finding that the guilty plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily, see Mathis v. State, 199 Ga.App. 538, 539, 405 S.E.2d 528 (1991), and not as the product of a will overborne by the influence of psychotropics. Compare Weddington v. State, 191 Ga.App. 738, 740(7), 382 S.E.2d 661 (1989) (waiver of constitutional right to remain silent and to presence of attorney not rendered involuntary or unknowing due to influence of cocaine). Thus, there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of Reese's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.” Johnson v. State, 242 Ga.App. 89, 528 S.E.2d 861 (January 27, 2000). Trial court properly denied motion to withdraw defendant’s non-negotiated guilty plea to burglary; contrary to defendant’s argument, there is no requirement that the court advise a defendant “that he does not have a right to withdraw his guilty plea after his sentence is pronounced.” “USCR 33.10 and 33.11(D) both relate to the requirement that the trial court inform a defendant that he has a right to withdraw his guilty plea before sentence is pronounced if the trial court intends to reject a negotiated plea agreement. This rule reflects the recognized right of all defendants to withdraw guilty pleas at any time before the sentence is pronounced. See OCGA § 17-7-93(b); see also Isaac [ v. State, 237 Ga.App. 723, 516 S.E.2d 575 (1999)]. Unless he has made a showing that it is necessary for the court to allow him to withdraw his plea to correct a manifest injustice, a defendant may not withdraw his plea as a matter of right after his sentence is pronounced. See Stevens v. State, 202 Ga.App. 473, 414 S.E.2d 702(1992); see also USCR 33.12(A), (B).” Raley v. State, 241 Ga.App. 713, 527 S.E.2d 590 (January 5, 2000). Trial court properly denied motion to withdraw guilty plea to aggravated assault and related charge; plea colloquy was sufficient to show voluntariness even if defendant “was not told he was waiving his presumption of innocence and his right to testify and offer evidence or that he could possibly receive consecutive sentences on the two charges to which he pled guilty. … While the requirements of USCR 33 are mandatory, id. at 333-334(1), 454 S.E.2d 468, the court need not specifically address each issue found in USCR 33.8. McClendon v. State, 256 Ga. 480, 481(2), 350 S.E.2d 235 (1986); Johns v. State, 223 Ga.App. 553(1), 479 S.E.2d 388 (1996). Instead, the State must show that the record as a whole demonstrates that Raley's plea was knowing and voluntary. King v. State, 215 Ga.App. 139, 140(1), 449 S.E.2d 870 (1994). It can meet that burden either by ‘(1) showing on the record of the guilty plea hearing that the defendant realized all the rights he was waiving and the possible consequences of his plea, or (2) using extrinsic evidence that shows that the guilty plea was knowing and voluntary.’ Id. Here, ‘although the court did not specifically address each issue found in [USCR] 33.8, we find the court's determination of voluntariness clearly supported by the record,’ and find no error. (Citation and punctuation omitted.) King v. State , supra at 141, 449 S.E.2d 870.” Accord, United States v. Vonn , 535 U.S. 55, 122 S.Ct. 1043, 152 L.Ed.2d 90 (March 4, 2002) (plea valid absent “plain error” in plea colloquy, not present here despite failure to advise of right to counsel; validity of plea should be determined from entire record, not limited to plea colloquy). Byrd v. Shaffer, 271 Ga. 691, 523 S.E.2d 875 (November 15, 1999). Habeas court properly granted petition, finding that “the state failed to establish that Shaffer waived his constitutional rights in pleading guilty” to possession of a pipe bomb in a bar. Affirming that “the state bears the burden in a habeas proceeding of establishing that the plea was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made.” Carley, writing for Hines, dissents, would place the burden on the petitioner in a habeas proceeding, noting that “[t]he State is not a party to this, or any other, habeas case. A petition for habeas relief institutes a civil, not a criminal, action.” Thompson v. State, 240 Ga.App. 539, 524 S.E.2d 239 (October 27, 1999). Defendant’s guilty pleas to possession of cocaine and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon affirmed; “‘[T]he law does not require the trial court to personally inform the accused of the elements of the crime to which he is pleading guilty. [Cit.] ... ‘“(I)t may be appropriate to presume that in most cases defense counsel routinely explain the nature of the offense in sufficient detail to give the accused notice of what he is being asked to admit.’ (Cit.) ...” [Cits.]’ Mock v. State, 218 Ga.App. 514, 517(2), 462 S.E.2d 429 (1995). In Thompson's signed guilty plea, he acknowledged that his attorney had explained the nature of the charges to him. The trial court was not required to explain the elements of the offenses, which were self-evident from their nomenclature. ” Accord, Bryant v. State , 245 Ga.App. 892, 539 S.E.2d 523 (September 14, 2000) (elements of selling cocaine are “self-evidence from its nomenclature.”). McDaniel v. State, 271 Ga. 552, 522 S.E.2d 648 (October 18, 1999). Trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to withdraw guilty pleas to murder; pleas were involuntary due to trial court’s improper involvement in plea negotiations. “The record shows that during the trial, after the preliminary voir dire of the jurors, the trial court called for