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an in-chambers conference for the purpose of further discussion of the possibility of McDaniel entering a guilty plea and allowing the trial court to pass sentence.” In conference, trial judge stated “I'm 90 percent certain that I would impose a life without parole sentence.” After further conversation between the parties and the court, defendant agreed to plead guilty, waiving the right to appeal various rulings, and allow the judge to decide on sentence. After sentencing phase, the judge imposed the death penalty. “ Judicial participation in the plea negotiation process is prohibited by court rule in this state and in the federal system. USCR 33.5(A); F.R.Crim.P. Rule 11(e)(1). USCR 33.5(A) provides that ‘[t]he trial judge should not participate in plea discussions.’ If the parties negotiate a tentative plea agreement, the trial court may indicate whether it will concur with the agreement, but that review is separate from the plea negotiation process itself. USCR 33.5(B). In addition to the restrictions imposed by procedural rules, ‘“[j]udicial participation in plea negotiations is prohibited as a constitutional matter when it is so great as to render a guilty plea involuntary.” [Cits.]’ Skomer v. State, 183 Ga.App. 308, 310, 358 S.E.2d 886 (1987), quoting United States v. Adams, 634 F.2d 830, 839 (5 th Cir., 1981). … Due to the force and majesty of the judiciary, a trial court's participation in the plea negotiation may skew the defendant's decision-making and render the plea involuntary because a defendant may disregard proper considerations and waive rights based solely on the trial court's stated inclination as to sentence. See Skomer, 183 Ga.App. at 310, 358 S.E.2d 886. In this case, McDaniel heard the trial court repeatedly state its reluctance to impose a death sentence and give 90 percent odds on a sentence of life without parole if permitted to impose sentence. That participation by the trial court in the plea negotiation process rendered the resulting guilty plea involuntary. See Goodman, supra; Skomer, supra; USCR 33.5(A). Accordingly, we must reverse McDaniel's convictions.” Accord, Gibson (September 20, 2006), Pride (June 13, 2011), and McCranie (February 2, 2016), all above. Brown v. State, 271 Ga. 550, 522 S.E.2d 230 (October 18, 1999). Trial court properly denied motion to withdraw guilty pleas to murder and related charges. Defendant could challenge the voluntariness of his plea despite express waiver of that right in plea agreement. “The State agrees that a plea can always be challenged on grounds of voluntariness. See Allen v. Thomas, 265 Ga. 518, 458 S.E.2d 107 (1995) (right to challenge the knowing and voluntary nature of a guilty plea is not defeated by waiver of right to appeal).” No harm in that language here – trial court considered defendant’s motion to withdraw plea and properly denied it on its merits. Postell v. State, 238 Ga.App. 79, 517 S.E.2d 789 (May 12, 1999). Trial court properly considered defendant’s prior guilty pleas in recidivist shoplifting sentencing, as record demonstrated their voluntariness: “the State introduced waiver of rights forms in connection with each prior guilty plea. On the forms, Postell indicated that he was represented by a lawyer. He also indicated that he understood that he was waiving: (1) his privilege against compulsory self- incrimination, (2) his right to a trial by jury, and (3) the right to confront his accusers and to cross-examine them. Postell further responded negatively when asked whether his attorney, the district attorney, or anyone else had promised him anything or threatened him in any way in return for the guilty plea. He also testified at the hearing that he understood he was waiving his rights. Therefore, the trial court did not err in finding that Postell's previous guilty pleas were given freely and voluntarily. See Jones v. State, 161 Ga.App. 620, 623(4), 288 S.E.2d 795 (1982) (showing by State sufficient where guilty plea documents affirmatively state defendant was represented by counsel and was advised of constitutional rights).” Graham v. State, 236 Ga.App. 673, 512 S.E.2d 921 (February 26, 1999). Record supported finding that guilty plea to firearms charge was voluntary. “So long as the substantive requirements of Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), concerning the defendant’s guilty plea are met, there is no procedural requirement that the trial judge personally make all the inquiries established by [Uniform Superior Court Rules] 33.7 through 33.9. See State v. Germany, 245 Ga. 326, 328, 265 S.E.2d 13 (1980). ‘It is presumed that counsel will fulfill the role in the adversary process that the Sixth Amendment envisions, and has rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). … ‘ An accused, having participated in the court’s inquiry into the voluntariness of a guilty plea and having approved “‘in the presence of the court while his attorney entered a plea of guilty in his behalf and the court acting thereon imposed the sentence, (is not permitted) to deny thereafter the authority of his attorney to enter the plea or to deny his approval of such action by his attorney. Had he had any objection, he should have made it known at the time and before the court acted thereon.’ (Cits.)”’ Paino v. State, 209 Ga.App. 87, 88, 432 S.E.2d 599.” Accord, Martinez v. State , 258 Ga.App. 102, 572 S.E.2d 748 (October 21, 2002). Wilcox v. State, 236 Ga.App. 235, 511 S.E.2d 597 (February 4, 1999). Trial court properly denied motion to withdraw guilty pleas to armed robbery and kidnapping. 1. “‘Although criminal defendants are entitled to be informed of the consequences of their pleas, parole eligibility is not so much a direct consequence of a trial court’s acceptance of a bargained plea of guilty, as it is a collateral legislative consequence of the defendant’s own decision to accept a certain