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captured before the court entered its dismissal). Sanders v. State, 242 Ga.App. 743, 531 S.E.2d 170 (March 13, 2000). Robbery and aggravated assault convictions affirmed; “Sanders was not entitled to an out-of-time appeal because he voluntarily waived his rights by fleeing the state [between trial and sentencing, by escaping from custody]. … ‘It is clear that where a defendant escapes after filing a notice of appeal he thereby loses his right of appeal. We know of no logical reason for creating a different rule where, due to his escape, the defendant is unable to file a timely notice of appeal in the first place. Accordingly, ... the defendant waive[s] his right to appeal by remaining a fugitive during the period when he was authorized by statute to file a motion for a new trial or a notice of appeal.’ (Citations omitted.) Saleem v. State, 152 Ga.App. 552, 263 S.E.2d 490 (1979).” Result is not changed by claiming ineffective assistance from failing to file appeal in defendant’s absence. “Sanders' lengthy delay in filing an appeal results solely from his own conduct.” B. APPEAL, BY STATE State v. Andrade, 335 Ga.App. 464, 782 S.E.2d 665 (February 8, 2016). Reversing 330 Ga.App. 549, 768 S.E.2d 525 (2015). In prosecution for rape and burglary, Court of Appeals erred by ruling that State’s appeal of suppression order was untimely. Trial court granted motion to suppress custodial statement; 17 days later, State filed notice of appeal pursuant to OCGA § 5-7-1(a)(4) (State has 30 days to appeal pre-trial “order … suppressing or excluding evidence illegally seized.”). Court of Appeals, however, erroneously held that State’s appeal in this case fell under OCGA § 5-7-1(a)(5) (State has two days to appeal an “order … excluding any other evidence.”). Both appellate courts have recognized the State’s right to appeal from suppression of statements pursuant to OCGA § 5-7-1(a)(4) since State v. Watson, 143 Ga.App. 785, 786787(2), 240 S.E.2d 194 (1977), overruled in part on other grounds, Strickman v. State, 253 Ga. 287, 288, 319 S.E.2d 864 (1984). OCGA § 5-7-1(a)(5) was added in 2013 to allow appeals from order excluding evidence on other grounds “such as evidence excluded pursuant to general rules of evidence,” citing State v. Lynch, 286 Ga. 98, 102(2), 686 S.E.2d 244 (2009) (“OCGA § 5–7–1(a)(4) does not authorize appeal from an order excluding ‘evidence based upon some general rule of evidence,’ citation and punctuation omitted.”). State v. Cash, 298 Ga. 90, 779 S.E.2d 603 (November 16, 2015). Following malice murder and related convictions, no error in granting new trial on general grounds. 1. State couldn’t appeal denial of motion to recuse post-trial; under the plain language of OCGA § 5-7-1(a)(9), the State may only appeal ““from an order, decision, or judgment denying a motion by the state to recuse or disqualify a judge made and ruled upon prior to the defendant being put in jeopardy ” (emphasis added). “Here, because the State did not file its motion to recuse until after appellees’ convictions and shortly before the hearing on their motions for new trial, jeopardy had attached, and the State thus does not have a right to appeal under OCGA § 5–7–1.” 2. “Collateral order doctrine” didn’t apply. “Appeals from orders that satisfy the requirements of the collateral order doctrine are directly appealable because they are considered to come within the terms of a relevant statute that authorizes appeals from final judgments. … Here, OCGA § 5–7–1, which we have repeatedly held lists the types of trial court rulings that the State may appeal, [cit.], does not provide for appeals by the State from final judgments.” State v. Brown, 333 Ga.App. 643, 777 S.E.2d 27 (July 30, 2015). In prosecution for cocaine trafficking and related offenses, directed verdict of acquittal reversed; trial court lacked jurisdiction to proceed to trial where State had filed appeal from grant of motion to suppress. Contrary to trial court’s ruling, OCGA § 5-7-1(a)(5)(B) only requires State’s notice of appeal and related documents to be filed with the “court,” not the trial judge; filing with the clerk of court was sufficient. “When the General Assembly has intended that certain communications be made personally to a judge—as compared to matters that are to be submitted to a trial court as a governmental entity and made part of the official court records by filing in the office of the clerk of court—it has so provided,” citing OCGA §§ 17–7–170 (speedy trial demands to be served on judge) and other examples. State v. Osborne, 330 Ga.App. 688, 769 S.E.2d 115 (February 12, 2015). State’s appeal of denial of motion to recuse judge dismissed. 1. “[P]ursuant to OCGA §§ 5–7–1 and 5–7–2, [State] was required to obtain a certificate of immediate review to appeal the trial court's ruling,” and failed to do so. “Although the denial of a motion by the state to recuse a judge is listed in OCGA § 5–7–1(a)(9) as a decision the state may appeal, the state is not exempt from the requirement of obtaining a certificate of immediate review from the trial court and obtaining permission to file an interlocutory appeal from this court in order to appeal such an order.[fn] OCGA § 5–7–2(b)[fn] exempts several types of orders, decisions, and judgments listed in OCGA § 5–7–1(a) from the requirement of obtaining a certificate of immediate review, but a state's appeal from the denial of a motion to recuse a judge is not one of them.” Citing Ritter v. State , 269 Ga. 884, 885-886(2) (506 S.E.2d 857) (1998), where “the Supreme Court stated that “a decision on the recusal of the trial