☢ test - Í

judge is an interlocutory matter that can never dispose of a criminal case,” as the trial court has rendered no decision that ‘either expressly or implicitly resolves the case by preventing further prosecution of the criminal charge in superior court.’” Also citing Ware (November 5, 2007), below (“The [Criminal Justice Act of 2005] plainly provides that an appeal may be taken by the State from the grant of a new trial or the denial of a motion to recuse, but just as clearly refrains from adding any new exception whatsoever to the requirement for a certificate of immediate review in OCGA § 5–7–2.”). 2. State couldn’t avoid need for certificate based on the collateral order doctrine.” “See State v. Gober, 229 Ga.App. 700 (494 S.E.2d 724) (1997) (‘[T]he “collateral order” doctrine ... permits direct review of an order even though an action remains pending below.’) (punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied), citing Scroggins v. Edmondson, 250 Ga. 430, 431(1)(c) (297 S.E.2d 469) (1982).” “The state does not cite any Georgia case whereby jurisdiction has been conferred upon either this court or the Supreme Court in a state's appeal of a criminal case pursuant to the collateral order doctrine, [fn: See Murphy v. Murphy, 322 Ga.App. 829, 831 (747 S.E.2d 21) (2013) (‘[T]he collateral order doctrine applies if the order (1) completely and conclusively decides the issue on appeal such that nothing in the underlying action can affect it; (2) resolves an issue that is substantially separate from the basic issues in the complaint; and (3) might result in the loss of an important right if review had to await final judgment, making the order effectively unreviewable on appeal.’) (citations omitted). ] and we found none. [fn: Compare Braddy v. State, 316 Ga.App. 292–293(1) (729 S.E.2d 461) (2012) (concluding that pursuant to the collateral order doctrine appellate court had jurisdiction to consider criminal defendant's appeal from the denial of his motion to recuse the trial judge), overruled by Murphy, supra at 832 (holding that the collateral order exception to the final judgment rule does not encompass an order denying a motion to recuse the trial court judge); Fulton County v. State, 282 Ga. 570–571(1) (651 S.E.2d 679) (2007) (county could file a direct appeal from an order requiring it to pay a defendant's expenses in a murder case under the collateral order exception to the final judgment rule in OCGA § 5–6–34(a)(1)). ]” State v. Andrade, 330 Ga.App. 549, 768 S.E.2d 525 (January 23, 2015). Following trial court’s grant of motion to suppress defendant’s statement, State’s appeal dismissed as untimely. Appeal was filed 17 days after suppression order, but “pursuant to a recent amendment to OCGA § 5–7–1(a)(5)(A), which became effective on July 1, 2013, the State was required to file its notice of appeal within two days of the trial court's ruling. [FN1. The two-day requirement does not apply to pretrial orders excluding evidence on the basis that it was illegally seized, nor orders excluding the results of drug or alcohol tests. See OCGA § 5–7–1(a)(4). Here, however, the appeal excludes ‘other evidence’ and, therefore, comes within the ambit of OCGA § 5–7–1(a)(5).] The proper and timely filing of a notice of appeal is an absolute requirement to confer jurisdiction on this Court.” Cert. granted on this issue, case no. S15G0866, May 11, 2015. State v. Owens, 296 Ga. 205, 766 S.E.2d 66 (November 17, 2014). Following mutually exclusive verdicts of guilty to both felony murder and involuntary manslaughter, trial court erred by sentencing defendant on the involuntary manslaughter. Verdict of guilty on charges was mutually exclusive, meaning that the sentence was void. State thus had right to appeal pursuant to OCGA § 5-7-1(a)(6) , which “provides that in a criminal case, the State is entitled to appeal from ‘an order, decision, or judgment of a court where the court does not have jurisdiction or the order is otherwise void under the Constitution or laws of this state....’” State v. Hood, 295 Ga. 664, 763 S.E.2d 487 (September 22, 2014). Following defendant’s convictions for murder and related offenses, State’s notice of appeal (contending that defendant should have been sentenced to life without parole), filed during pendency of defendant’s motion for new trial, was premature. State v. King, 325 Ga.App. 445, 750 S.E.2d 756 (November 14, 2013). Following defendant’s guilty plea to robbery and aggravated assault, trial court entered sentence less than recommended by State. “The state moved to set aside the guilty plea and sentence, claiming that the trial court was required to follow the state's recommended sentence or to give the state a chance to withdraw from the negotiated plea. The trial court denied the motion, noting, among other things, that all plea bargains are mere recommendations subject to the trial court's approval and that sentencing is within the complete purview of the court as long as it is within statutory limits. The state directly appealed, claiming it is entitled to appeal from allegedly void sentences. But because the state's claims do not actually amount to allegations that the sentences are void, the state cannot directly appeal. Accordingly, this court lacks jurisdiction and the appeal must be dismissed.” Overruling State v. Harper , 279 Ga.App. 620, 631 S.E.2d 820 (2006), “[t]o the extent that Harper conflicts with the instant opinion and holds that the state may directly appeal from a sentence on the ground that the trial court allegedly erred in disregarding a recommended sentence pursuant to a plea agreement, without first notifying the state and giving it the opportunity to withdraw.”