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appeal. “Under OCGA § 5-7-1(a)(4), the State may appeal directly ‘from an order, decision, or judgment suppressing or excluding evidence illegally seized or excluding the results of any test for alcohol or drugs in the case of motions made and ruled upon prior to the impaneling of a jury or the defendant being put in jeopardy....’ Addressing this statute [fn] in Strickman v. State, the Supreme Court of Georgia deemed ‘the enactment of the appeal statute to be remedial in nature, so that an error committed by a trial judge, which otherwise might work a miscarriage of justice, can be corrected on appeal, and before attachment of jeopardy,’ and further noted that, ‘[b]eing remedial in nature, it should be construed liberally.’ 253 Ga. 287, 288 (319 S.E.2d 864) (1984). In that same opinion, the Supreme Court held that ‘if a defendant moves before trial to exclude evidence on the ground that it was obtained in violation of law, the grant of such a motion – whatever its name – is subject to direct appeal on the part of the state.’ Id. ” Distinguishing Berky v. State, 266 Ga. 28, 29-30 (463 S.E.2d 891) (1995), “which held that OCGA § 5-7-1(a), generally, should be construed strictly against the State.” “[U]nlike Berky, which specifically involved an interpretation of OCGA § 5-7-1(a)(1), the Supreme Court's opinion in Strickman specifically construes the prior version of OCGA § 5-7-1(a)(4) at issue in this case.” Barnes dissents, would follow Berky as last expression on the subject, and argues that under Berky , “the focus is ‘not upon the terminology used by the court, but upon the substance of the trial court's action.’” Barnes argues that the substance of the order here is a sanction for prosecutorial misconduct, but majority holds that, even under Berky , State has a right to appeal here because the substance of the trial court’s order is a ruling on the merits of the motion. State v. Green, 288 Ga. 1, 701 S.E.2d 151 (October 4, 2010). In defendant’s murder prosecution, State was entitled to appeal trial court’s order finding that defendant’s killing of victim was justified, although order didn’t specifically dismiss the indictment. “OCGA § 5-7-1(a)(1) authorizes an appeal by the State ‘[f]rom an order, decision, or judgment setting aside or dismissing any indictment, accusation, ... or any count thereof[.]’ The trial court's determination that Green was immune from prosecution under OCGA § 16-3-24.2 ‘in effect dismissed the entire indictment’ and authorized the State's appeal of the order under OCGA § 5-7-1(a)(1). State v. Bunn, 288 Ga. 20, 701 S.E.2d 138 (September 20, 2010).” In re: D.L., 302 Ga.App. 234, 690 S.E.2d 522 (February 3, 2010). State wasn’t authorized to appeal juvenile court’s erroneous order denying State’s motion to dismiss delinquency petition (based on State’s decision to indict juvenile for armed robbery with a firearm). “[T]he juvenile court obtained concurrent jurisdiction in this case when the state caused a petition to be filed in juvenile court. Therefore, although the juvenile court entered an erroneous order, the state is not authorized to appeal that erroneous decision pursuant to OCGA § 5-7-1(A)(5) because the order was entered by a court having competent jurisdiction and is not void.” State v. Lynch, 286 Ga. 98, 686 S.E.2d 244 (November 2, 2009). 1. State could not appeal ruling denying admission of similar transaction evidence. “The similar transaction evidence was not excluded on the ground that it was obtained illegally. … ‘OCGA § 5-7-1(a) does not authorize an appeal [where, as here,] the order is the result of the exclusion of evidence based upon some general rule of evidence. [Cit.]’ Berky v. State, 266 Ga. 28, 29 (463 S.E.2d 891) (1995) (‘no basis for the State's appeal of an order granting a defendant's motion in limine on general evidentiary grounds. [Cits.]’). Nor is the denial of the motion for reconsideration directly appealable. State v. White, 282 Ga. 859, 860(1) (655 S.E.2d 575) (2008).” Accord, State v. Caffee , 291 Ga. 31, 728 S.E.2d 171 (April 11, 2012). 2. OCGA § 5-6-34(d), relating to interlocutory appeals generally, does not apply to appeals by the State. “OCGA §§ 5-7-1(a) and 5-7-2 are counterparts of OCGA § 5-6-34(a) and (b), and use similar language to authorize direct and interlocutory appeals, but constitute the only authority for appeals by the State in criminal cases. … We can only conclude that the General Assembly deliberately omitted from OCGA § 5-6-34(d) appeals taken or authorized under OCGA § 5-7-1.” “We therefore cannot review the trial court's denial of the motion to allow similar transaction evidence and the motion for reconsideration” of suppression of custodial statement. Accord, State v. Caffee , 291 Ga. 31, 728 S.E.2d 171 (April 11, 2012). Magistrate Court of Dekalb County v. Fleming, 284 Ga. 457, 667 S.E.2d 356 (September 22, 2008). Trial court erred in considering district attorney’s petition for injunction and mandamus against magistrates, who allegedly had a policy against binding cases over solely on hearsay. “ The dismissal of charges by a magistrate judge at a preliminary hearing is not subject to challenge by the State. [fn] See OCGA § 5-7-1 et seq. (authorizing appeal and certiorari by State in criminal cases only under specified circumstances); State v. Ware, 282 Ga. 676, 677, 653 S.E.2d 21 (2007) (statute must be strictly construed against State). Here, the State, in the person of the District Attorney, has attempted to avoid this restriction by attacking the alleged DCMC policy resulting in such dismissals through the device of a writ of mandamus and prohibition. See Howard v. Lane, 276 Ga. 688, 689, 581 S.E.2d 1 (2003). However, as the underlying subject matter concerns rulings allegedly made in criminal prosecutions, and from which the State has no ability to