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appeal, the trial court erred by considering the petition for mandamus and prohibition, id., and its ruling thereon must be reversed. [fn]” Sears, Carley and Melton dissent. Carley: “the absence of an adequate remedy by appeal is actually a prerequisite to the viability of an action for mandamus or prohibition.” State v. Shabazz, 291 Ga.App. 751, 662 S.E.2d 828 (June 3, 2008). State was entitled to appeal trial court’s grant of demurrer, citing State v. Swinti, 284 Ga.App. 343(1), 643 S.E.2d 840 (2007)( “when the ruling of the trial court is in substance a dismissal of the indictment, the State may appeal an order dismissing an indictment under OCGA § 5-7- 1(a)(1), even if the order is entered during the course of the trial ”) (citation and punctuation omitted). State v. Stanfield, 290 Ga.App. 62, 658 S.E.2d 837 (March 5, 2008). “‘Even under a strict construction of OCGA § 5-7- 1(a)(4), the State has a direct right of appeal where the trial court grants a pre-trial motion to exclude evidence on the ground that it was obtained illegally.’ Anderson v. State, 267 Ga. 116, 117(1) (475 S.E.2d 629) (1996). An appeal involving the exclusion of a statement on voluntariness grounds is no exception to this rule. See, e.g., State v. Morrell, 281 Ga. 152(2) (635 S.E.2d 716) (2006).” State v. Ware, 282 Ga. 676, 653 S.E.2d 21 (November 5, 2007). State’s appeal of grant of new trial must be by interlocutory appeal accompanied by certificate of immediate review. “The grant of a motion for new trial in a civil case is not ‘final’ for appeal purposes because it results in the continuing pendency of the case in the lower court. Days Inn of America v. Sharkey, 178 Ga.App. 718 (344 S.E.2d 518) (1986). For the same reason, the grant of a new trial in favor of a criminal defendant is not final. State v. Strain, 177 Ga.App. 874, 875 (341 S.E.2d 481) (1986).” Appeal of order granting new trial was authorized by Criminal Justice Act of 2005, new OCGA § 5-7-1(a)(7), but the Act makes no exception from the interlocutory appeal procedures for these appeals. “The Act plainly provides that an appeal may be taken by the State from the grant of a new trial or the denial of a motion to recuse, but just as clearly refrains from adding any new exception whatsoever to the requirement for a certificate of immediate review in OCGA § 5-7-2.” Accord, State v. Caffee , 291 Ga. 31, 728 S.E.2d 171 (April 11, 2012). Statutorily superseded as to grant of new trial, Ga.L.2011, p. 612 ( codified at OCGA § 5–7–2(b)(2) & (c)) (effective May 12, 2011). State v. Evans, 282 Ga. 63, 646 S.E.2d 77 (June 4, 2007). State’s appeal of defendant’s acquittal (of murder) at bench trial dismissed; State has no right to appeal from such a judgment, even though State objected to bench trial and demanded jury trial. “‘In OCGA § 5-7-1(a), the General Assembly has set forth only a limited right of appeal for the State in criminal cases. [Cits.]’ Howard v. Lane, 276 Ga. 688 (581 S.E.2d 1) (2003). If the State attempts an appeal outside the ambit of OCGA § 5-7-1(a), the appellate courts do not have jurisdiction to entertain it. Id. OCGA § 5-7-1(a) does not purport to authorize the State to appeal a judgment of acquittal, nor is a trial court’s decision to proceed with a bench trial over the State’s objection one of the statutorily-enumerated rulings that the State can appeal. [footnote quoting code section] In fact, in Howard, id., the State wished to prevent a bench trial in lieu of a jury trial, and this Court specifically noted that, under OCGA § 5-7-1(a), the State has ‘no right’ to directly appeal the trial court’s ruling that a bench trial would occur. Id. at 689. While OCGA § 5-7-1(a) has been amended since this Court’s decision in Howard, the General Assembly did not include any provision that would embrace this situation.” OCGA § 5-7-1(a)(5), authorizing State’s appeal from a void judgment, affords the State no right to appeal here, as the trial court’s judgment, although an “improper exercise of a trial court’s authority,” is not a void judgment. See also note on Howard (May 19, 2003), below. State v. Glover, 281 Ga. 633, 641 S.E.2d 543 (February 26, 2007). The State cannot appeal from an order of the trial court dismissing an appeal by the State, even if the dismissal is erroneous. “Although the State has a right to appeal from void orders, OCGA § 5-7-1(a)(5), the order dismissing the State’s appeal, even if erroneous, is not void. A judgment ‘is not void so long as it was entered by a court of competent jurisdiction.’ See Smith v. Smith, 281 Ga. 204, 207 (636 S.E.2d 519) (2006); Collins v. Billow, 277 Ga. 604, 605 (592 S.E.2d 843) (2004).” Overrules Stone v. George F. Richardson, Inc., 169 Ga.App. 232, 233 (312 S.E.2d 232) (1983) “to the extent Stone can be read to hold that an erroneous judgment is void.” Two justices dissent. State v. Henderson, 283 Ga.App. 111, 640 S.E.2d 686 (December 19, 2006). State was authorized to appeal from trial court’s (erroneous) ruling dismissing accusation for possession of firearm by a convicted felon. Trial court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss on grounds that he thought his right to possess a firearm had been restored when he was granted a hunting license; but dismissal was entered without a trial or evidentiary hearing. “‘Under OCGA § 5-7-1(a), the State may appeal from orders or judgments ... setting aside or dismissing accusations or indictments.’ (Punctuation omitted.) State v. Barker, 277 Ga.App. 84, 85 (625 S.E.2d 500) (2005). When a criminal defendant obtains a ruling terminating the case against him by means of the dismissal of an accusation or indictment, before there has been a