☢ test - Í

determination of guilt or innocence, the State may directly appeal such ruling. See id.” As “the trial court heard no evidence at the hearing, only argument by counsel. … the trial court’s order was nothing more than the dismissal of the accusation without an adjudication of guilt, which the State may appeal. See Barker , supra.” State v. Morrell, 281 Ga. 152, 635 S.E.2d 716 (October 2, 2006). Trial court granted defendant’s motion to suppress but never put the order in writing. “[I]t has been the rule of this State that an order is not appealable unless it is in writing. [Cits.] The circumstances of the present case, however, compel us to recognize that the foregoing rule cannot be absolute. … Given that the State cannot appeal after an acquittal and thus can never seek to rectify an incorrect suppression order if a defendant is acquitted, a trial court’s refusal to put an order suppressing evidence into writing defeats the heart of the legislature’s intent of granting the State a limited right of appeal and has the potential to exact grave injustices. In order to effectuate the legislative intent expressed in § 5-7-1, we conclude that the State must have a right of appeal when a trial court orally grants a motion to suppress evidence yet refuses to put that order in writing. See United States v. Presser, 844 F.2d 1275, 1280 (6 th Cir., 1988) (permitting the government to appeal an oral order suppressing the use of evidence under 18 USC § 3731, which grants the federal government a limited right of appeal similar to that granted the State in OCGA § 5-7-1; the court was ‘troubled by the district court’s refusal to enter a written order’ and stated that the district court should not have the right to defeat the government's right of appeal, id., n. 6). However, to ensure that our general rule requiring appealable orders to be in writing is bypassed only when absolutely necessary, we find that the State has the right to appeal oral orders only when the transcript affirmatively shows that the State requested the trial court to put the oral order in written form and that the trial court refused to do so. In the present case, the transcript does not reflect that the State asked the trial court to put the order in question in writing and thus obviously does not reflect that the trial court refused to do so. Under these circumstances, the State did not have a right to appeal from the oral order, and, as the State did not have a right to appeal from the judgment of acquittal, the State’s appeal must be dismissed.” State v. Martin, 278 Ga. 418, 603 S.E.2d 249 (September 27, 2004). State could not appeal from trial court’s denial of motion to recuse because such an order is not listed among the types of orders appealable by the State in OCGA § 5-7-1. “[T]he State may not appeal any issue in a criminal case, whether by direct or discretionary appeal, unless that issue is listed in OCGA § 5-7-1, the statute that sets out the subject matters the State may raise on appeal. See State v. Redd, 248 Ga.App. 312 (546 S.E.2d 68) (2001) (dismissing for lack of jurisdiction, at this Court’s direction, the State’s previously-granted discretionary appeal of an issue not listed in OCGA § 5-7-1). … OCGA § 5-7-2, which authorizes both direct and discretionary appeals by the State, does not expand the list of matters appealable by the State under OCGA § 5- 7-1 but, instead, merely describes which of those matters are appealable by direct appeal and which are appealable by discretionary appeal.” Likewise, “the interim review procedure [applicable to death penalty cases] is no more permissive regarding the subject matters over which the State may appeal than the statutes governing appeals by the State in ordinary criminal cases.” Legislatively superceded, Ga.L. 2005, p. 20, § 3; but see Cash (November 16, 2015), above (under revised OCGA § 5-7-1(a)(9), State can appeal denial of motion to recuse, but only when made “prior to the defendant being put in jeopardy”). Howard v. Lane, 276 Ga. 688, 581 S.E.2d 1 (May 19, 2003). Under OCGA § 5-7-1(a), State could not appeal trial court’s refusal to hold jury trial where defendant waived right to jury trial. Note Zigan v. State , 281 Ga. 415, 638 S.E.2d 322 (November 30, 2006) (Trial court properly ruled that it could not conduct a bench trial instead of a jury trial over the State’s objection, notwithstanding defendant’s waiver of jury trial.). Accord, Evans (June 4, 2007), above. Moody v. State, 272 Ga. 55, 525 S.E.2d 360 (January 18, 2000). Trial court’s grant of State’s “extraordinary motion for new trial” was improper, as “there is no authority for the State to seek a new trial in a criminal case and the trial court was without jurisdiction to entertain the State's motion.” After defendant was convicted of aggravated assault, possession of a firearm in commission of a felony, and related offenses, trial court granted defendant’s motion for directed verdict on the firearm charge. State then filed its motion for new trial, pointing out that trial court couldn’t grant directed verdict following conviction. Supreme Court notes in dicta that grant of defendant’s directed verdict motion was improper, but law provides State no power to move for new trial. Glenn v. State, 271 Ga. 604, 523 S.E.2d 13 (November 1, 1999). State has no right to appeal trial court’s ruling compelling disclosure of confidential informant’s identity. State v. Hamilton, 238 Ga.App. 40, 517 S.E.2d 583 (May 11, 1999). State had right to appeal trial court’s entry of void sentence against defendant (first offender sentence for serious violent felony). Accord, Hulett v. State , 296 Ga.