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49, 766 S.E.2d 1 (October 20, 2014) (State could have appealed sentence improperly merging felony murder and underlying felonies with malice murder. “To the extent that Gibbins v. State, 229 Ga.App. 896, 901–902(8), 495 S.E.2d 46 (1997), holds to the contrary, it is overruled.”). C. APPEAL, DISCRETIONARY In re: N.M., 316 Ga.App. 649, 730 S.E.2d 127 (July 5, 2012). Restrictive custody order following delinquency adjudication for designated felony affirmed. For purposes of appellate procedure, “OCGA § 5–6–35(a)(5) and (d) [governing discretionary appeals] do not apply to appeals from orders revoking juveniles' probation. Disobeying the terms of probation is a delinquent act. In re: B.Q.L.E., 297 Ga.App. 273, 274(1)(a), 676 S.E.2d 742 (2009). Once the juvenile court has found a child to be delinquent because of the commission of a delinquent act, it must enter an order of disposition. OCGA § 15–11–65(a). And orders of disposition are final judgments, directly appealable under OCGA § 5– 6–34(a)(1). See M.K.H. v. State, 132 Ga.App. 143, 144, 207 S.E.2d 645 (1974). For these reasons, we conclude that an order of disposition entered upon the revocation of a juvenile's probation is directly appealable.” Gable v. State, 290 Ga. 81, 720 S.E.2d 170 (November 17, 2011). “We granted certiorari in this case to consider whether a trial court has the authority to grant an out-of-time discretionary appeal in a criminal case as a remedy for counsel's failure to timely file a discretionary application. We conclude that Georgia courts do not have such authority where, as here, that remedy is not required by a violation of the appellant's constitutional rights.” No such constitutional violation here, as defendant had already had direct appeal on his convictions for rape, child molestation, and related offenses. Defendant then “filed a pro se extraordinary motion for new trial under OCGA § 5–5– 41 based on the alleged recantation of one of the victims.” A public defender was appointed; the motion was denied; the public defender attempted to file a direct appeal; and the Court of Appeals dismissed the direct appeal, as appeal from denial of an extraordinary motion for new trial requires discretionary appeal under OCGA § 5–6–35. Trial court then erroneously granted a motion for out-of-time discretionary appeal. Held, Court of Appeals correctly “ruled that the trial court did not have the authority to grant an out-of-time discretionary application and dismissed Appellant's application.” Failure to timely file for discretionary appeal is a “jurisdictional defect.” “That holding is consistent with this Court's cases holding that compliance with the 30–day time limit for filing a notice of appeal under OCGA § 5–6–38(a) is an ‘absolute requirement’ to confer jurisdiction on an appellate court. See, e.g., Cody v. State, 277 Ga. 553, 553 (592 S.E.2d 419) (2004); Gulledge v. State, 276 Ga. 740, 741 (583 S.E.2d 862) (2003); Legare v. State, 269 Ga. 468, 469, 499 S.E.2d 640 (1998); Rowland v. State, 264 Ga. 872, 872 (452 S.E.2d 756) (1995).” Contrary to defendant’s argument, the courts have no “inherent, equitable power to excuse the late filing of a discretionary appeal.” “Instead, Georgia courts may excuse compliance with a statutory requirement for appeal only where necessary to avoid or remedy a constitutional violation concerning the appeal.” Such a problem exists, for instance, where ineffective assistance of counsel interferes with defendant’s direct appeal, since a criminal defendant has the constitutional right to counsel on a first, direct appeal; but “[t]here is no constitutional right to counsel, much less the effective assistance of counsel, in filing or litigating a post-conviction extraordinary motion for new trial or a discretionary application to appeal the ruling on such a motion. See Murrell v. Young, 285 Ga. 182, 183 (674 S.E.2d 890) (2009) (holding that a defendant has no constitutional right to counsel to pursue a post-conviction extraordinary motion for new trial); … Gibson v. Turpin, 270 Ga. 855, 859– 860 (513 S.E.2d 186) (1999) (holding that a defendant has a right to counsel at trial and on direct appeal of right ‘but no further’). See also Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 609–618 (94 S.Ct. 2437, 41 L.Ed.2d 341) (1974) (holding that, following a direct appeal of right, a criminal defendant has no constitutional right to counsel to pursue further discretionary state appeals or applications for review by the United States Supreme Court); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753–754 (111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640) (1991) (explaining that, under agency principles, a client bears the risk of attorney error for such matters as filing deadlines unless the error amounts to ineffective assistance in violation of the client's constitutional right to counsel).” Overrules cases that “may be read to allow an out-of-time appeal for reasons of non- constitutional significance” – “ Johnson v. State, 182 Ga.App. 477, 477–478 (356 S.E.2d 101) (1987), and Mitchell v. State, 157 Ga.App. 181, 182 (276 S.E.2d 864) (1981).” Accord, Crosson v. Conway , 291 Ga. 220, 728 S.E.2d 617 (June 18, 2012) (timely filing of appeal is mandatory in habeas petitions, pre- or post-conviction, even if defendant not advised of procedure, overruling Hicks v. Scott , 273 Ga. 358, 541 S.E.2d 27 (2001)). Scroggins v. State, 288 Ga. 346, 703 S.E.2d 622 (November 8, 2010). After revocation of his probation, defendant improperly filed with the trial court a notice of direct appeal to the Court of Appeals. “No action was taken on this notice of appeal by the trial court clerk, and no direct appeal was ever docketed in the Court of Appeals based upon the September 2, 2008 notice of appeal. The notice of appeal was never addressed by either the Court of Appeals or the trial court.” Almost a year later, defendant “moved in the trial court for an out-of-time discretionary appeal, and the trial court granted that motion.” The Court of Appeals dismissed defendant’s subsequent application for discretionary appeal as