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untimely. Held, Court of Appeals erred by dismissing the application; “[b]ecause of the pending first appeal, the application for discretionary appeal, and the order authorizing it, were nullities. Elrod v. State, 222 Ga.App. 704(1) (475 S.E.2d 710) (1996).” Filing of notice of direct appeal, even though improper, “acted as supersedeas and deprived the trial court ‘of the power to affect the judgment appealed,’” by, among other things, granting defendant’s application for direct appeal. “However, the State's motion to dismiss cannot be granted. ‘When a trial court enters a judgment where it does not have jurisdiction, such judgment is a mere nullity; but an appeal from such an illegal judgment will not be dismissed but instead, the void judgment will be reversed. [Cits.]’ Darden v. Ravan, 232 Ga. 756, 758(1) (208 S.E.2d 846) (1974). See also Weatherbed v. State, 271 Ga. 736, 738 (524 S.E.2d 452) (1999).” In other words, Court of Appeals, instead of dismissing the application for discretionary appeal, should have reversed the trial court’s order authorizing the application. Accord, Wetherington v. State , 295 Ga. 172, 758 S.E.2d 299 (May 5, 2014); Ware v. State , 327 Ga.App. 672, 761 S.E.2d 89 (June 20, 2014) (physical precedent only). Oliver v. State, 305 Ga.App. 779, 700 S.E.2d 861 (August 31, 2010). Evidence supported revocation of defendant’s suspended sentence and probation, but direct appeal from revocation of suspended sentence was authorized. “An order revoking a suspended sentence is directly appealable. See White v. State, 233 Ga.App. 873, 875 (505 S.E.2d 228) (1998) (noting that OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(5) ‘on its face applies only to “orders revoking probation.”’).” D. APPEAL, INTERLOCUTORY See also SPEEDY TRIAL, below In re: W.L., 335 Ga.App. 561, 782 S.E.2d 464 (February 2, 2016). Following couldn’t directly appeal order adjudicating him “delinquent of various offenses, ordering him to pay restitution, and transferring the case to the Juvenile Court of Peach County for final disposition. “Georgia courts have repeatedly held that transfer orders are not appealable orders under OCGA § 5–6–34(a)(1) because a case transferred from one trial court to another trial court is still ‘pending in the court below.’ [Cits.]” Juvenile should have sought discretionary interlocutory appeal instead. Warren v. State, 297 Ga. 810, 778 S.E.2d 749 (October 19, 2015). In capital murder prosecution, trial court erred by ordering involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs for sole purpose of making defendant competent to stand trial. Direct appeal appropriate “ under the collateral order doctrine. Under that doctrine, an order that does not resolve the entire case in the trial court may be appealed immediately if it ‘(1) resolves an issue that is ‘substantially separate’ from the basic issues to be decided at trial, (2) would result in the loss of an important right if review had to await final judgment, and (3) completely and conclusively decides the issue on appeal such that nothing in the underlying action can affect it.’ Fulton County v. State, 282 Ga. 570, 571, 651 S.E.2d 679 (2007) (citations omitted). The U.S. Supreme Court has held that a pretrial order to involuntarily medicate a criminal defendant in an effort to render him competent to stand trial is immediately appealable under the federal collateral order doctrine. See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 175– 177, 123 S.Ct. 2174, 156 L.Ed.2d 197 (2003). We follow that Court’s lead, as we have in most of our previous decisions on Georgia’s version of the doctrine.” Malloy v. State, 293 Ga. 350, 744 S.E.2d 778 (June 17, 2013). Interim appeal in prosecution for Medicaid fraud. 1. “[T]he trial court's denial of appellant's plea in abatement based on collateral estoppel, a motion which in essence constitutes a plea in bar based on double jeopardy, is directly appealable. See Patterson v. State, 248 Ga. 875, 876, 287 S.E.2d 7 (1982) (timely filed plea of double jeopardy is directly appealable).” 2. “Second, given appellant's right to directly appeal the denial of that motion, he was entitled to seek appellate review of the trial court's denial of his other two motions [challenging the constitutionality of the Medicaid fraud statute and seeking to strike surplusage in the indictment]. See OCGA 5–6–34(d).” Edenfield v. State, 293 Ga. 370, 744 S.E.2d 738 (June 17, 2013). Capital murder conviction and death sentence affirmed; “[t]he denial of [a request for interim review] cannot be appealed. See OCGA § 17–10–35.2 (‘An order obviating interim appellate review shall not be appealable.’).” State v. Outen, 289 Ga. 579, 714 S.E.2d 581 (June 27, 2011). Reversing 304 Ga.App. 203 (695 S.E.2d 654) (2010), Court of Appeals erred by taking jurisdiction of appeal by State from trial court’s order granting demurrer on one count of two- count indictment. “The trial court's order dismissing Count One of the indictment is not a final order; Count Two remains in the trial court. Accordingly, by the plain terms of OCGA § 5–7–2, a certificate of immediate review was required.” Disapproves other contrary Court of Appeals decisions: State v. Ramirez–Herrara, 306 Ga.App. 878, 879(1) (703 S.E.2d 429) (2010); State v. Barrett, 215 Ga.App. 401, 402 (n. 1) (451 S.E.2d 82) (1994); and State v. Tuzman, 145 Ga.App. 481, 482(1) (243 S.E.2d 675) (1978). Accord, State v. Ramirez-Herrara , 315 Ga.App. 635, 727 S.E.2d 253 (April 13, 2012); State v. Hill , 321 Ga.App. 679, 742 S.E.2d 497 (April 30, 2013) (2012 amendment to OCGA § 5-7-2(b)(2), authorizing