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direct appeal by State, by its express terms is only applicable to offenses committed on and after July 1, 2012). Britt v. State, 282 Ga. 746, 653 S.E.2d 713 (November 21, 2007). Seeking additional compensation for representation of a capital murder defendant, attorneys subpoenaed information on compensation paid on other capital cases, some still pending, from the Office of the Georgia Capital Defender. The Capital Defender sought to quash the subpoena out of concern that release of the information would disclose trial strategy of the defendants in those cases. Held, order denying Capital Defender’s motion to quash was directly appealable. “As this Court recently reiterated in Fulton County v. State, 282 Ga. 570, 651 S.E.2d 679 (September 24, 2007), the collateral order exception is to be applied if the order being appealed ‘(1) resolves an issue that is “substantially separate” from the basic issues to be decided at trial, (2) would result in the loss of an important right if review had to await final judgment, and (3) completely and conclusively decides the issue on appeal such that nothing in the underlying action can affect it.’ The order being appealed here involves matters that are ‘wholly unrelated to the basic issues to be decided in [Sanders’] criminal case.’ Id. Further, an appeal would conclusively resolve the discovery issue here ‘such that nothing in the underlying action c[ould] affect it.’ Id. Finally, the important rights of a number of indigent capital defendants would be compromised if the Council had to await final judgment before seeking review of the discovery order.” State v. Ware, 282 Ga. 676, 653 S.E.2d 21 (November 5, 2007). State’s appeal of grant of new trial must be by interlocutory appeal accompanied by certificate of immediate review. “The grant of a motion for new trial in a civil case is not ‘final’ for appeal purposes because it results in the continuing pendency of the case in the lower court. Days Inn of America v. Sharkey, 178 Ga.App. 718 (344 S.E.2d 518) (1986). For the same reason, the grant of a new trial in favor of a criminal defendant is not final. State v. Strain, 177 Ga.App. 874, 875 (341 S.E.2d 481) (1986).” Appeal of order granting new trial was authorized by Criminal Justice Act of 2005, new OCGA § 5-7-1(a)(7), but the Act makes no exception from the interlocutory appeal procedures for these appeals. “The Act plainly provides that an appeal may be taken by the State from the grant of a new trial or the denial of a motion to recuse, but just as clearly refrains from adding any new exception whatsoever to the requirement for a certificate of immediate review in OCGA § 5-7-2.” Langlands v. State, 282 Ga. 103, 646 S.E.2d 253 (June 4, 2007). “‘The denial of a plea in bar on double jeopardy grounds is directly appealable. Patterson v. State, 248 Ga. 875 (287 S.E.2d 7) (1982).’ Allen v. State, 262 Ga. 240, 241, fn. 1 (416 S.E.2d 290) (1992). Where, as here, the plea is based on OCGA § 17-7-53.1, ‘we deal not with double jeopardy, as in Patterson, but judicial economy is best served by holding that the order complained of is subject to direct appeal as a final order.’ Isaacs v. State, 257 Ga. 798-799 (364 S.E.2d 567) (1988). Under Patterson, Isaacs, and their progeny, an order overruling a plea in bar based on either double jeopardy or OCGA § 17-7-53.1 is directly appealable even if the plea was directed to fewer than all the counts of an indictment. Phillips v. State, 272 Ga. 840 (537 S.E.2d 63) (2000); Young v. State, 251 Ga. 153, 155(1) (303 S.E.2d 431) (1983); Redding v. State, 205 Ga.App. 613, 614(1) (423 S.E.2d 10) (1992).” Crane v. State, 281 Ga. 635, 641 S.E.2d 795 (February 26, 2007). “After Steven Bradley Crane was indicted for offenses arising from his conduct in fatally shooting Patrick DeCesaro, he filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground he was immune from prosecution under OCGA § 16-3-24.2 [relating to immunity from prosecution based on defense of self, defense of others, defense of property or habitation]. The trial court denied the motion and denied Crane’s request for a certificate of immediate review. This is a direct appeal from the denial of the motion.” Held, denial of a motion to dismiss based on justification immunity is not directly appealable. Distinguished from cases dealing with speedy trial and double jeopardy : “‘the very nature of a double jeopardy claim is such that it is collateral to, and separable from the principal issue at the accused’s impending criminal trial, i.e., whether or not the accused is guilty of the offense charged,’” quoting Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 659 (97 S.Ct. 2034, 52 L.Ed.2d 651) (1977). Here, however, “the ultimate issue in Crane’s motion to dismiss pursuant to OCGA § 16-3-24.2 is the same as the ultimate issue at trial, whether he was justified in killing [victim] or is guilty of the offense charged.” State v. Morrell, 281 Ga. 152, 635 S.E.2d 716 (October 2, 2006). Trial court granted defendant’s motion to suppress but never put the order in writing. “[I]t has been the rule of this State that an order is not appealable unless it is in writing. [Cits.] The circumstances of the present case, however, compel us to recognize that the foregoing rule cannot be absolute. … Given that the State cannot appeal after an acquittal and thus can never seek to rectify an incorrect suppression order if a defendant is acquitted, a trial court’s refusal to put an order suppressing evidence into writing defeats the heart of the legislature’s intent of granting the State a limited right of appeal and has the potential to exact grave injustices. In order to effectuate the legislative intent expressed in § 5-7-1, we conclude that the State must have a right of appeal when a trial court orally grants a motion to suppress evidence yet refuses to put that order in writing. See United States v. Presser, 844 F.2d 1275, 1280 (6 th Cir., 1988) (permitting the government to appeal an oral order suppressing the use of