☢ test - Í

evidence under 18 USC § 3731, which grants the federal government a limited right of appeal similar to that granted the State in OCGA § 5-7-1; the court was ‘troubled by the district court’s refusal to enter a written order’ and stated that the district court should not have the right to defeat the government's right of appeal, id., n. 6). However, to ensure that our general rule requiring appealable orders to be in writing is bypassed only when absolutely necessary, we find that the State has the right to appeal oral orders only when the transcript affirmatively shows that the State requested the trial court to put the oral order in written form and that the trial court refused to do so. In the present case, the transcript does not reflect that the State asked the trial court to put the order in question in writing and thus obviously does not reflect that the trial court refused to do so. Under these circumstances, the State did not have a right to appeal from the oral order, and, as the State did not have a right to appeal from the judgment of acquittal, the State’s appeal must be dismissed.” Baker v. State, 263 Ga.App. 462, 588 S.E.2d 288 (October 1, 2003). “The denial of a plea of former jeopardy may be directly appealed without resort to the procedures for interlocutory appeal. Patterson v. State, 248 Ga. 875 (287 S.E.2d 7) (1982). If the trial court finds a plea of former jeopardy to be frivolous and dilatory, then the filing of an appeal from the denial of the plea does not divest the trial court of jurisdiction of the case. Rielli v. Oliver, 170 Ga.App. 699, 700 (318 S.E.2d 173) (1984). But even if the trial court does not make such a finding, the trial court does not lose all jurisdiction of the case during an appeal of the denial of the plea, but only the jurisdiction to execute the sentence. Strickland v. State, 258 Ga. 764, 765-766(1) (373 S.E.2d 736) (1988).” In re: Paul, 270 Ga. 680, 513 S.E.2d 219 (March 8, 1999). “[N]on-parties engaged in news gathering may file a direct appeal of an order denying them the statutory reporter’s privilege under the collateral order exception to the final judgment rule. Cf. R.W. Page Corp. v. Lumpkin, 249 Ga. 576, 578, 292 S.E.2d 815 (1982) (providing for a direct appeal of order closing pretrial hearings and trial in criminal case as most effective means for protecting the right of the public and news media to be present).” E. APPEAL, JURISDICTION OF TRIAL COURT DURING PENDENCY See JURISDICTION – APPEAL, PENDENCY OF, above F. APPEAL, NOTICE OF Hann v. State, 292 Ga.App. 719, 665 S.E.2d 731 (July 15, 2008). Notice of appeal was timely: defendant filed motion for new trial between verdict and sentence, then filed notice of appeal immediately after sentencing, then withdrew his motion for new trial 10 months after sentencing. “A notice of appeal filed while a motion for new trial is pending and unaccompanied by a proper certificate of immediate review does not confer jurisdiction in the appellate courts. Drake v. Clutter, 194 Ga.App. 644, 645 (391 S.E.2d 473) (1990). As a consequence, Hann's notice of appeal filed while his motion for new trial was pending did not deprive the trial court of the authority to rule upon his motion for new trial, and his premature notice of appeal would have ripened upon the filing of the trial court's order granting, overruling, or otherwise disposing of the motion for new trial. Heard v. State, [274 Ga. 197 n.2(1) (552 S.E.2d 818) (2001)]; Hearst v. State, 212 Ga.App. 492(2)(a) (441 S.E.2d 914) (1994). An order granting a motion to withdraw a motion for new trial would be an order ‘otherwise finally disposing of the motion’ within the meaning of OCGA § 5-6- 38(a). Ailion v. State, 190 Ga.App. 151, 153(2) (378 S.E.2d 507) (1989); McCulley v. State, 273 Ga. 40, n. 3 (537 S.E.2d 340) (2000) (premature notice of appeal ripened upon filing of sentence). The cases cited above, however, address situations in which the notice of appeal was not filed within 30 days of the judgment, but was filed within 30 days of the withdrawal of a motion for new trial absent a court order. In those cases, the withdrawal without an order did not start the thirty-day time limit within which a notice of appeal had to be filed, and those notices were untimely. Heard v. State, supra, 274 Ga. at 197; see also Marshall v. State, 205 Ga.App. 531 (422 S.E.2d 677) (1992). The case before us is different, because Hann had filed a notice of appeal within 30 days of the judgment, and therefore we conclude that we have jurisdiction to consider the merits of his appeal. OCGA § 5-6-30. In reaching this conclusion we are cognizant of the fact that an out-of-time appeal would be the likely result of any dismissal.” Rocha v. State, 287 Ga.App. 446, 651 S.E.2d 781 (September 7, 2007). Trial court filed order denying defendant’s motion to withdraw guilty plea dated “on September 6, 2006, ‘nunc pro tunc August 16, 2006,’ and the clerk of court filed the order on September 12, 2006. Rocha filed his notice of appeal on September 22, 2006.” Held, time to appeal begins to run from filing of order, regardless of its nunc pro tunc entry. Overruling “ Ross v. State, 259 Ga.App. 246 (576 S.E.2d 633) (2003) (30 day period allowed for filing a motion for a new trial began to run on ‘nunc pro tunc’ date, rather than on date on which the clerk of court filed the order).”