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appeal hinges on a determination of who bore the ultimate responsibility for the failure to file a timely appeal. Our courts have long recognized the right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal from a criminal conviction, and have permitted out-of-time appeals if the [defendant] was denied his right of appeal through counsel’s negligence or ignorance, or if the [defendant] was not adequately informed of his appeal rights. The right to appeal is violated when the appointed lawyer deliberately forgoes the direct appeal without first obtaining his client’s consent. Such actions constitute ineffectiveness. A criminal defendant who has lost his right to appellate review of his conviction due to error of counsel is entitled to an out-of-time appeal. However, a convicted party may, by his own conduct or in concert with his counsel, forfeit his right to appeal by sleeping on his rights. We apply the ‘any evidence’ standard to findings of the trial court, acting as the trier of fact, with regard to whether counsel informed the defendant of his appeal rights and whether the defendant voluntarily waived those appeal rights. (Citations, punctuation and emphasis omitted.) Glass v. State, 248 Ga.App. 91, 92(1), 545 S.E.2d 360 (2001).” Accord, Howse v. State, 262 Ga.App. 790, 586 S.E.2d 695 (August 18, 2003) (In ruling on motion for out-of-time appeal, trial court needs to make specific finding “as to whether the right to appeal was lost as the result of ineffective assistance of counsel or of [defendant’s] own conduct.”); Wright v. State , 282 Ga.App. 582, 639 S.E.2d 563 (November 28, 2006); Sanders v. State , 282 Ga.App. 834, 640 S.E.2d 353 (December 11, 2006); Ray v. State , 287 Ga.App. 492, 652 S.E.2d 165 (September 11, 2007) (trial court erred in denying motion for out-of-time appeal without conducting hearing to determine who was at fault in failing to timely file appeal); Gould v. State , 315 Ga.App. 733, 726 S.E.2d 432 (March 8, 2012). Bryant v. State, 245 Ga.App. 892, 539 S.E.2d 523 (September 14, 2000). Following guilty plea to selling cocaine, trial court properly denied motion for out-of-time appeal. Contention “that the prosecution presented false evidence to the grand jury in obtaining his indictment” wasn’t supported by the record. “There is a presumption that an indictment was returned on legal evidence, and Bryant bears the burden of proving otherwise. 5 Bryant, however, points to nothing in the record to support his contention that such illegal evidence was tendered.” “See Jackson v. State, 208 Ga.App. 391, 392(1), 430 S.E.2d 781 (1993) (‘[T]he burden is on a defendant seeking to quash an indictment to overcome the presumption that it was returned on legal evidence by showing that there was no other competent evidence upon which it could lawfully have been returned.’).” Rodriguez-Martinez v. State , 243 Ga.App. 409, 533 S.E.2d 443 (April 10, 2000). Following defendant’s plea of guilty to misdemeanor shoplifting, no error in denying defendant’s motion for out-of-time appeal. 1. Trial court could find that issue wasn’t moot although defendant had completely served sentence. “‘Although a court may exercise its discretion to decide a criminal case even after the sentence has been served ( St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U.S. 41, 63 S.Ct. 910, 87 L.Ed. 1199 (1943); Chaplin v. State, 141 Ga.App. 788, 234 S.E.2d 330 (1977)), it is not bound to do so. Jacobs v. New York, 388 U.S. 431, 87 S.Ct. 2098, 18 L.Ed.2d 1294 (1967); Tannenbaum v. New York, 388 U.S. 439, 87 S.Ct. 2107, 18 L.Ed.2d 1300 (1967).’ Baker v. State, 240 Ga. 431-432, 241 S.E.2d 187 (1978). The Supreme Court of Georgia declined to reach the merits of Baker's appeals due to his failure to demonstrate efforts to expedite the appeal, prepare the record, and show adverse collateral consequences. Baker, supra at 432, 241 S.E.2d 187. Adverse collateral consequences have included the inability to engage in certain businesses, to vote, or to serve as a juror. Parris v. State, 232 Ga. 687, 690, 208 S.E.2d 493 (1974). Such consequences have also included potential enhancement of subsequent criminal punishment under second offender statutes. Id . In this case, Rodriguez-Martinez has demonstrated adverse collateral consequences. Rodriguez-Martinez is a citizen of Colombia who could be deported from the United States based on this conviction because of changes in the immigration laws which occurred after his guilty plea. ‘Because of [this burden] which may flow from [Rodriguez-Martinez's] conviction, he has a substantial stake in the judgment of conviction which survives the satisfaction of the sentence imposed on him. On account of these collateral consequences, the case is not moot.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Parris , supra.” 2. Trial court wasn’t required to hold hearing on motion for out-of-time appeal where it conducted hearing on same issue in connection with defendant’s extraordinary motion for new trial. 3. Subsequent change in immigration law is not a basis for grant of out-of-time appeal. “Rodriguez-Martinez complains that he would not have pled guilty had he known his conviction would have immigration consequences. However, a subsequent change in the law which is collateral to the conviction does not entitle a defendant to an out-of-time appeal. To allow an out-of-time appeal because of a subsequent change in the law would open the floodgates for challenges to convictions. No conviction would ever be final under such a scenario. The fact of a change in the immigration laws does not change the fact that Rodriguez-Martinez pled guilty to the criminal act.” Sanders v. State, 242 Ga.App. 743, 531 S.E.2d 170 (March 13, 2000). Robbery and aggravated assault convictions affirmed; “Sanders was not entitled to an out-of-time appeal because he voluntarily waived his rights by fleeing the state [between trial and sentencing, by escaping from custody]. … ‘It is clear that where a defendant escapes after filing a notice of appeal he thereby loses his right of appeal. We know of no logical reason for creating a different rule