☢ test - Í

where, due to his escape, the defendant is unable to file a timely notice of appeal in the first place. Accordingly, ... the defendant waive[s] his right to appeal by remaining a fugitive during the period when he was authorized by statute to file a motion for a new trial or a notice of appeal.’ (Citations omitted.) Saleem v. State, 152 Ga.App. 552, 263 S.E.2d 490 (1979).” Result is not changed by claiming ineffective assistance from failing to file appeal in defendant’s absence. “Sanders' lengthy delay in filing an appeal results solely from his own conduct.” Keller v. State, 242 Ga.App. 150, 529 S.E.2d 167 (January 31, 2000). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for out-of-time appeal from his DUI conviction. Defendant’s timely appeal was dismissed after defendant “took no steps toward ensuring the preparation of his trial transcript to perfect the appeal,” then failed to appear at rule nisi hearing on the subject. Defendant also failed to serve his sentence, absconded in the middle of another DUI trial in another court, and disappeared for two years. “[A]n out-of-time appeal is appropriate where a timely direct appeal was not taken because of ineffective assistance of counsel. Gibbs v. State, 239 Ga.App. 249(1)(a), 519 S.E.2d 511 (1999). However, ‘[a] convicted party can, by his own conduct or by his conduct in concert with that of his attorney, forfeit his appeal. If a convicted party by his own conduct, or by his conduct in concert with that of his attorney, purposefully delays the appeal of his conviction to his own advantage, he forfeits appeal and review of his conviction on the merits by an appellate court. An out-of-time appeal is not authorized if the loss of the right to appeal is not attributable to ineffective assistance of counsel but to the fact that the defendant himself slept on his rights.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Cannon v. State, 175 Ga.App. 741, 742, 334 S.E.2d 342 (1985); Haynes v. State, 227 Ga.App. 64, 65, 488 S.E.2d 119 (1997).” Accord, Barnes v. State, 243 Ga.App. 703, 534 S.E.2d 440 (April 25, 2000) (remanded for determination by trial court whether delay was caused by counsel or defendant). Davis v. State, 242 Ga.App. 101, 527 S.E.2d 602 (January 7, 2000). After defendant’s robbery conviction, trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for out-of-time appeal, based on trial counsel’s testimony that defendant discharged him when counsel asked defendant if he wanted to appeal. “‘An out-of-time appeal is appropriate where due to the ineffective assistance of counsel, no appeal has been taken. However, an attorney renders effective assistance of counsel with regard to the decision whether to appeal when he advises his client of the appellate rights, and does not preempt his client's decision to appeal. Neither the sixth amendment nor the fourteenth amendment requires that the record reflect that the defendant made a knowing and intelligent decision not to appeal before he can be precluded from appellate review. The grant or denial of a motion for an out-of-time appeal is within the discretion of the trial court, and its decision will not be reversed absent abuse of such discretion.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Lunsford v. State, 237 Ga.App. 696-697, 515 S.E.2d 198 (1999). See also Penrod v. State, 233 Ga.App. 532-533, 504 S.E.2d 757 (1998).” Brown v. State, 241 Ga.App. 359, 526 S.E.2d 873 (December 8, 1999). After defendant pled guilty to aggravated assault and cocaine possession with intent to distribute, trial court properly denied his motion for out-of-time appeal. “When a defendant pleads guilty and then seeks an out-of-time appeal from that plea, he must make the threshold showing that he would have been entitled to file a timely direct appeal from the plea because the issues he is raising can be decided from facts appearing in the record. [Cit.] If the defendant makes that showing, he must then show that he did not timely file a direct appeal because he received ineffective assistance of counsel. [Cit.] In the instant case, Brown has made the threshold showing, but not the second, so he is not entitled to an out-of-time appeal.” Defendant’s claim – that trial court failed to ascertain a factual basis for the plea – is resolvable by the record (against him); but he has failed to show ineffectiveness of counsel in failing to file a timely appeal, so trial court properly denied the motion. Accord, Dennis v. State , 292 Ga. 303, 736 S.E.2d 428 (January 7, 2013) (appeal after guilty only if resolvable by facts appearing in the record). Syms v. State, 240 Ga.App. 440, 523 S.E.2d 42 (September 28, 1999). Defendant wasn’t entitled to out-of-time appeal based on trial court’s failure “to inform him that he had 30 days in which to appeal the entry of his guilty plea.” “The superior court's duty was to ensure that Syms understood the constitutional rights he was waiving by entering a guilty plea and to confirm that he had a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequences. Knight v. Sikes, 269 Ga. 814, 816(1), 504 S.E.2d 686 (1998). We find no case or statutory law imposing upon the superior court a duty to advise a defendant that he may have a right to directly appeal the convictions which result from the entry of his guilty plea. See id.; Uniform Superior Court Rules 33.5, 33.8-33.12.” Burroughs v. State, 239 Ga.App. 600, 521 S.E.2d 652 (August 12, 1999). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for out-of-time appeal where evidence showed that delay in filing appeal was fault of defendant, not counsel.