☢ test - Í

Dover v. State, 237 Ga.App. 797, 516 S.E.2d 839 (April 28, 1999). Trial court did not abuse discretion in denying defendant’s motion for out-of-time appeal from his guilty plea. “The trial court’s order denying the motion stated that the case was controlled by our Supreme Court’s recent decision in Wheeler v. State, 269 Ga. 547, 548, 499 S.E.2d 629 (1998): ‘As the movant for an out-of-time appeal, [defendant] had to establish a good and sufficient reason which entitled him to an out-of-time appeal. Smith v. State, 266 Ga. 687, 470 S.E.2d 436 (1996) . To meet this burden of proof, [defendant] had to set forth the questions he would raise should the appeal be granted, and show that the questions could be resolved by facts appearing in the appellate record. Id. [Defendant] has alleged only that his attorney’s inadequate performance was the reason why no timely appeal was filed; [defendant] has not set forth the questions he would raise in an out-of-time appeal and that the questions could be resolved by facts in the record.’” OVERRULED ON THIS POINT, See White (March 8, 2004), above. Boney v. State, 236 Ga.App. 179, 510 S.E.2d 892 (January 14, 1999). Defendant’s attempted “out-of-time appeal” dismissed by Court of Appeals. Defendant seeks to allege ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in his first (timely) appeal, contending that counsel failed to raise “clearly meritorious issues on appeal.” “‘An out-of-time appeal is appropriate when a direct appeal was not taken .’ (Emphasis supplied.) Grantham v. State, 267 Ga. 635, 481 S.E.2d 219 (1997); Crowder v. State, 265 Ga. 719, 461 S.E.2d 865 (1995); Clayton v. State, 228 Ga.App. 874, 875, 492 S.E.2d 894 (1997). Clearly, a defendant cannot secure a timely direct appeal, wait for years, file a motion raising a new issue separate from the original appeal, and bootstrap such into another direct appeal by styling the motion as one for an ‘out-of-time appeal.’ When the issue is one that could not have been raised in the prior, perfected direct appeal, i.e., ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is the proper vehicle to utilize for the development of a record and subsequent review of the substantive claim. See, e.g., Zant v. Akins, 250 Ga. 5, 295 S.E.2d 313 (1982).” I. APPEALS BOND/INCARCERATION/LOCATION Seminal case: Birge v. State, 238 Ga. 88, 230 S.E.2d 895 (1976). See general rule: See King (July 29, 2004), below. Sneiderman v. State, 329 Ga.App. 359, 765 S.E.2d 43 (October 23, 2014). Physical precedent only; following convictions for perjury and related offenses, trial court properly denied appeal bond. “Here, the trial court specifically found that Sneiderman failed to satisfy the court that there was not a substantial risk of flight or that the appeal was not without merit or not instituted for the purpose of delay. Although Sneiderman presented evidence at the hearing in the form of friends and family members willing to risk their personal wealth so that she could be released on bond and that in their opinions she was not a flight risk, the trial court was also aware of the circumstances regarding Sneiderman's conviction, which included crimes of deceit. Pretermitting the issue of whether the trial court abused its discretion by finding that Sneiderman's appeal of the merits of the case was frivolous, we cannot say as a matter of law that the trial court abused its discretion by denying an appeal bond to Sneiderman on the basis that she failed to carry her burden of establishing that she was not a flight risk.” Malloy v. State, 329 Ga.App. 38, 763 S.E.2d 501 (September 9, 2014). Physical precedent only. Following doctor’s conviction for Medicaid fraud, no abuse of discretion in denying appeal bond. “[T]he court denied Malloy's request for bond by affirmatively finding that there was a substantial risk that Malloy would flee. [fn] Alhough Malloy presented evidence of his community ties, the trial court stated that it was not persuaded by Malloy's assurances. Given that Malloy was convicted of Medicaid fraud, a crime involving deceit and the theft of public funds, the court's distrust of Malloy's assurances is reasonably based in record evidence. Also, at sentencing, Malloy showed no acceptance of the jury's verdict and little understanding that it warranted criminal punishment. … The record also contains evidence that Malloy is older, wealthy, and has family and business connections outside of Georgia, connections that may provide him refuge or aid. Given that some record evidence supports the court's decision to deny Malloy an appeal bond, we cannot say that the trial court manifestly abused its discretion. [Cit.]” Gordy v. State, 287 Ga.App. 459, 651 S.E.2d 471 (August 22, 2007). “Gordy complains that the trial court erred in revoking his supersedeas bond before his right to appeal was terminated. See OCGA § 17-6-1(g). We note that whether to grant an appeal bond in a DUI case is in the discretion of the convicting court. OCGA § 17-6-1(g).” Branan v. State, 285 Ga.App. 717, 647 S.E.2d 606 (June 6, 2007). “The decision whether to grant or deny an appeal bond following a felony conviction lies within the discretion of the trial court, and we will uphold the trial court’s determination absent flagrant abuse of such discretion. See Watts v. Grimes, 224 Ga. 227 (161 S.E.2d 286) (1968). In determining whether to allow an appeal bond, a trial court should consider whether there is a substantial risk that the defendant will flee, pose a danger to individuals or to the community, or interfere with the administration of justice, including