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intimidating witnesses, and whether the appeal was frivolous or intended solely for delay. See Birge v. State, 238 Ga. 88, 89 (230 S.E.2d 895) (1976).” No abuse of discretion here; evidence on motion showed defendant had traveled internationally while indicted, and continued his criminal enterprise (selling unregistered securities). Morgan v. State, 285 Ga.App. 254, 645 S.E.2d 745 (May 8, 2007). Defendant was convicted of eight counts of cruelty to animals. As a condition of his supersedeas bond, the trial court ordered him not to “own, possess, or care for any animal.” Held, no abuse of discretion. “‘[I]n lieu of setting a higher bond, which may preclude a defendant from being released at all pending appeal, a trial court may choose to impose reasonable restrictions on a defendant’s behavior.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Dudley v. State, 230 Ga.App. 339, 341 (496 S.E.2d 341) (1998). See also Clarke v. State, 228 Ga.App. 219, 220(1) (491 S.E.2d 450) (1997). As long as the conditions placed on the bond are reasonable under the facts and circumstances of the case, they will be upheld on appeal. Dudley, 230 Ga.App. at 341. See also Camphor v. State, 272 Ga. 408, 410-411(2)(b) (529 S.E.2d 121) (2000).” Luke v. State, 282 Ga.App. 749, 639 S.E.2d 645 (December 7, 2006). No abuse of discretion in denying defendant’s motion for bond pending appeal. “There is no constitutional right to bond pending appeal. Wade v. State, 218 Ga.App. 377, 378(2) (461 S.E.2d 314) (1995). Whether to grant an appeal bond to eligible felony defendants [footnote on “eligible felony defendants” under OCGA § 17-6-1(g),] lies within the sound discretion of the convicting court, and we will not disturb the court’s decision absent a flagrant abuse of discretion. Abernathy v. State, 245 Ga.App. 857 (539 S.E.2d 203) (2000); Williams v. State, 228 Ga.App. 289, 290(2) (491 S.E.2d 500) (1997).” Record supports trial court’s finding of risk of further felonies or harm to others, and minimal likelihood of success on appeal. “Luke had the burden of showing that his claims on appeal ‘might arguably have merit,’ Abernathy, supra at 858(1) (footnote omitted), but he failed even to outline what his appellate claims are, much less to show that they might have merit. He argues that the trial court did not specifically find that his appeal is ‘frivolous’ or ‘taken only for the purpose of delay,’ but we will not fault the trial court for failing to use magic words. It is clear from the court’s statements at the hearing, as well as its written order, that the court believed that there was no basis for appeal. Luke failed to carry his burden of demonstrating otherwise. [Cits.]” Dorsey v. State, 279 Ga. 534, 615 S.E.2d 512 (June 30, 2005). “After conviction, defense counsel requested that Dorsey remain housed in a county facility so as to give counsel access to defendant for purposes of prosecuting his appeal under OCGA § 42-5-50(c). While that statute is couched in mandatory language, see Helmeci v. State, 230 Ga.App. 866(5) (498 S.E.2d 326) (1998), the trial court is empowered to order otherwise ‘where an issue is properly raised before the trial court regarding jail security or other matters involving administration of the jail.’ In re: Irvin, 254 Ga. 251, 252 (328 S.E.2d 215) (1985). Here, the trial court initially granted the request and then reconsidered after an evidentiary hearing. The court found that Dorsey’s status as a former law enforcement officer ‘created an extraordinary situation that required ... a complex and secretive procedure rotating his placement in metropolitan jails. That procedure is dangerous, difficult to coordinate, and a burden on county resources.’ The parties stipulated to the foregoing as well as to the fact that Dorsey was a high security risk. There was no error. Id.” Getkate v. State, 278 Ga. 585, 604 S.E.2d 838 (November 8, 2004). “[T]here is no constitutional right to bond pending appeal, but that a state may create a system for prisoners to be released on bail pending appeal. Browning v. State, 254 Ga. 478, 479(2), 330 S.E.2d 879 (1985). Creation of such a system is a legislative function. Id. at 480(2)(a), 330 S.E.2d 879. In fulfilling that legislative function, the General Assembly has not invaded the province of the judiciary. Compare Calhoun v. State Hwy. Dept., 223 Ga. 65, 67-68(2), 153 S.E.2d 418 (1967).” Legislature could thus prohibit appeal bonds in types of cases enumerated in OCGA § 17-6-1(g). Abernathy v. State, 245 Ga.App. 857, 539 S.E.2d 203 (September 12, 2000). Following defendant’s convictions for theft by taking and related offenses, no abuse of discretion by trial court in denying bond pending appeal. 1. “There is no constitutional right to bond pending appeal. Wade v. State, 218 Ga.App. 377, 378(2), 461 S.E.2d 314 (1995). The decision to grant or refuse to grant bail in noncapital felony cases after conviction is a matter which lies within the sound discretion of the trial court; we will not control that discretion unless it has been flagrantly abused. Williams v. State, 228 Ga.App. 289, 290(2), 491 S.E.2d 500 (1997). In exercising its discretion, the trial court must answer four questions: (1) whether there is a substantial risk the defendant will flee; (2) whether there is a substantial risk the defendant will pose a danger to others in the community; (3) whether there is a substantial risk the defendant will intimidate witnesses or otherwise interfere with the administration of justice; and (4) whether it appears the appeal is frivolous or taken only for the purpose of delay. Knapp v. State, 223 Ga.App. 267, 268-269, 477 S.E.2d 621 (1996).” 2. No abuse of discretion in trial court’s determination that “any appeal would be frivolous and intended only for delay.” “It was Abernathy’s burden to show that an appeal would not be frivolous. Given the absence of a trial transcript