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demonstrating that there was no evidence supporting the charge that he influenced a witness as charged in the indictment, Abernathy has not met his burden of showing that his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence even arguably has merit.” Accord, King v. State , 268 Ga.App. 811, 603 S.E.2d 88 (July 29, 2004); White v. State , 269 Ga.App. 113, 603 S.E.2d 686 (August 12, 2004); Malloy v. State , 329 Ga.App. 38, 763 S.E.2d 501 (September 9, 2014). J. ARREST OF JUDGMENT Poole v. State, 326 Ga.App. 243, 756 S.E.2d 322 (March 14, 2014). Following plea of guilty but mentally ill to charges of terroristic threats and stalking, trial court properly denied motion in arrest of judgment. Defendant’s claim that indictment was defective for failing to specify what “crime of violence” defendant threatened to commit doesn’t raise a fatal defect in the indictment. “Instead, as Poole's counsel conceded at the hearing on the motion, the contention that the indictment failed to allege with sufficient particularity the ‘crime of violence’ threatened against the victims was ‘more of a special demurrer issue that was missed.’ … Consequently, by failing to timely file a special demurrer, Poole waived his right to seek greater specificity in the form of the indictment, and he cannot now resurrect his challenge to the indictment in the guise of a motion in arrest of judgment.” Ashmore v. State, 323 Ga.App. 329, 746 S.E.2d 927 (July 19, 2013). Convictions for attempted aggravated child molestation and related charges affirmed; trial court properly denied motion in arrest of judgment. “Here, the indictment charged Ashmore with attempted aggravated child molestation based on his act of asking the victim ‘if she sucked.’ The indictment referred to OCGA §§ 16–4–1 [fn] and 16–6–4(c), [fn] and specifically alleged that the victim was under the age of sixteen, the act was unlawful and contrary to the laws of this State, Ashmore had the intent to commit the crime of aggravated child molestation and the act constituted a substantial step toward the commission of that crime. In the context of aggravated child molestation, the words ‘if she sucked’ would alert a defendant that he was being charged with attempting to commit an immoral or indecent act involving an act of oral sodomy. See OCGA § 16–6–2(a)(1).” “‘A motion in arrest of judgment is an appropriate remedy, [only] when an indictment is absolutely void in that it fails to charge the accused with any act made a crime by the law, and, upon the trial, no demurrer to the indictment is interposed and the accused is convicted under the indictment and judgment is entered on the verdict.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Jones v. State, 240 Ga.App. 484, 485(2), 523 S.E.2d 73 (1999). ‘[An] indictment is not void if it is sufficient to place the defendant on notice of the charges against [him] and enable [him] to prepare an intelligent defense.’ (Citation omitted.) Robles v. State, 277 Ga. 415, 421(10), 589 S.E.2d 566 (2003). ‘In attacking an indictment after the verdict, every presumption and inference is in favor of the verdict. By failing to file a demurrer before trial, [Ashmore] waived his right to a perfect indictment.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Bowman v. State, 227 Ga.App. 598, 599(1), 490 S.E.2d 163 (1997). Moreover, where an indictment alleges an offense, alleges that the act was unlawfully committed and contrary to the laws of the State, and employs language from which it must necessarily be inferred that criminal intent existed, the indictment is not void for failing to expressly allege the requisite criminal intent. Id. at 600– 601(1), 490 S.E.2d 163.” Johnson v. State, 290 Ga. 531, 722 S.E.2d 699 (January 23, 2012). Denial of untimely motion in arrest of judgment, following guilty plea to malice murder, affirmed. 1. “Although Johnson styled his motion in the trial court “Extraordinary Motion in Arrest of Judgment,” there is no such vehicle, and denominating the motion in that manner does not avoid the timely filing requirement of OCGA § 17–9–61(b). See generally Lay [ v. State, 289 Ga. 210, 212(2) (710 S.E.2d 141) (2011)]; Harper v. State, 286 Ga. 216, 217(1) (686 S.E.2d 786) (2009).” Accord, Simpson v. State , 292 Ga. 764, 740 S.E.2d 124 (March 18, 2013). 2. “When a trial court is faced with an untimely motion in arrest of judgment, it may be more appropriate for the trial court to dismiss the motion than to deny it. See Howard v. State, 289 Ga. 207 (710 S.E.2d 761) (2011); Haupt v. State, 290 Ga.App. 616, 619 (n. 1) (660 S.E.2d 383) (2008); Hammock v. State, 201 Ga.App. 614, 615(1) (411 S.E.2d 743) (1991).” Accord, Mullins v. State , 291 Ga. 634, 732 S.E.2d 83 (October 1, 2012); Dixon v. State , 291 Ga. 703, 733 S.E.2d 327 (October 15, 2012). Lay v. State, 289 Ga. 210, 710 S.E.2d 141 (May 16, 2011). Six years after conviction for felony murder and related crimes, trial court properly denied defendant’s untimely motion in arrest of judgment, but Supreme Court notes that “we expressly hold that the untimely filing of a motion in arrest of judgment in the trial court is not a defect in appellate jurisdiction that will subject an appeal from the trial court's ruling on the motion to dismissal, as would an untimely filed notice of appeal. See Ferguson v. Freeman, 282 Ga. 180, 181 (646 S.E.2d 65) (2007) (holding that ‘a proper and timely- filed notice of appeal is an absolute requirement to confer jurisdiction upon an appellate court’). Instead, the untimeliness of the motion is simply a defect that limits the trial court's authority to grant the motion.” Accord, Pilgrim v. State , 316 Ga.App. 435, 729 S.E.2d 586 (June 27, 2012); Dixon v. State , 291 Ga. 703, 733 S.E.2d 327 (October 15, 2012); Hammond v. State , 292 Ga. 237, 734 S.E.2d 396 (November 19, 2012); High v. State , 292 Ga. 544, 739 S.E.2d 388