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State v. Clark, 273 Ga.App. 411, 615 S.E.2d 143 (May 9, 2005). 1. Grant of post-conviction motion for DNA testing was directly appealable by State where not accompanied by a motion for new trial. “[E]ven though an order does not specify that it is a grant of final judgment, it nevertheless constitutes a final judgment within the meaning of OCGA § 5-6-34(a)(1) where it leaves no issues remaining to be resolved, constitutes the court’s final ruling on the merits of the action, and leaves the parties with no further recourse in the trial court. [Cit.]” Distinguishes Crawford v. State , 278 Ga. 95, 96(1) (597 S.E.2d 403) (2004) (denial of motion for DNA testing in connection with extraordinary motion for new trial requires application for discretionary appeal). 2. Trial court erred in ordering testing by a non-certified laboratory in violation of the plain language of OCGA § 5-5-41(c)(9). 3. Trial court erred in not ordering the collection of a DNA sample for inclusion in the State’s DNA database at the time of testing , in violation of the plain language of OCGA § 5-5-41(c)(9). Johnson v. State, 272 Ga.App. 294, 612 S.E.2d 29 (March 3, 2005). “Johnson … contends the trial court erred by denying his request for DNA testing pursuant to OCGA § 5-5-41(c)(1), by failing to hold a hearing on that request and by failing to enter written findings supporting the denial of his request. Our Supreme Court has held that this ‘statute requires a trial court to conduct a hearing only if a defendant’s motion “complies with the requirements of paragraphs (3) and (4)” of the statute. OCGA § 5-5- 41(c)(6)(A).’ Crawford v. State, 278 Ga. 95, 96(2)(a) (597 S.E.2d 403) (2004). Although Johnson was not entitled to a hearing unless his motion comported with the requirements set forth in paragraphs (3) and (4), subsection (c)(12) provides that ‘[t]he judge shall set forth by written order the rationale for the grant or denial of the motion for new trial filed pursuant to this subsection.’ (Emphasis supplied.) In this case the trial court simply denied the motion without explanation; it did not make a determination concerning whether Johnson was entitled to a hearing on his motion, and it did not otherwise set forth any rationale or basis for denying the motion. We therefore remand this case to the trial court for a determination of whether Johnson is entitled to a hearing on his motion, and for the entry of a written order setting forth the basis for either the grant or denial of the motion. See Crawford v. State, 278 Ga. at 96-98. If the trial court determines that Johnson is not entitled to a hearing because his motion does not meet the statutory prerequisites, then that finding must also be set forth in writing.” Crawford v. State, 278 Ga. 95, 597 S.E.2d 403 (June 7, 2004). Defendant not entitled to evidentiary hearing on whether DNA testing “would raise a reasonable probability that the [defendant] would have been acquitted if the results of DNA testing had been available at the time of conviction, in light of all the evidence in the case,” pursuant to OCGA § 5-5- 41(c)(3)(D), without making a showing in the petition as to “how the possible results of the requested DNA testing would in reasonable probability have led to the petitioner’s acquittal if those hypothetical results had been available at the time of the petitioner’s original trial.” Contrasted with subsection (c)(4), “which requires merely that a petitioner ‘state’ that his or her motion for DNA testing is not being made for the purpose of delay and that the request for DNA testing is either being made for the first time, or , if made previously in another court, has never been granted previously.” Appeal under this code section is by discretionary appeal pursuant to OCGA § 5-5-41(c), but distinguished in Clark, above, where DNA testing motion didn’t accompany extraordinary motion for new trial – order granting motion for DNA testing was there a final judgment, directly appealable. Accord, Battles v. State , 290 Ga. 226, 719 S.E.2d 423 (November 7, 2011). O. ERROR IN DEFENDANT’S FAVOR Barber v. State, 240 Ga.App. 156, 522 S.E.2d 528 (September 14, 1999). After entry of defendant’s plea of guilty but mentally ill on child molestation charges, trial court properly denied defendant’s out-of-term “petition to correct a void judgment, claiming that, at the time he entered his plea, the sentencing court failed to adhere to the procedural requirements of OCGA § 17-7-131(b)(2).” Procedures here satisfied the code section, but even if they didn’t, “the “guilty but mentally ill” plea is for the benefit of the defendant, because (1) it provides for mental health treatment during the sentence, and (2) it recognizes a reduced level of culpability. Therefore, if the sentencing court failed to strictly comply with OCGA § 17-7-131(b)(2), such failure inured to Barber's benefit and was harmless error. See Kirkland v. State, 166 Ga.App. 478, 482(2), 304 S.E.2d 561 (1983).” O’Neal v. State, 238 Ga.App. 446, 519 S.E.2d 244 (June 7, 1999). Defendant can’t complain about “illegal” sentence “because he was sentenced to less than the maximum allowable sentence even though the State indicted him as a recidivist. O'Neal is correct that he was sentenced to a shorter term of confinement than is mandated by OCGA § 17-10- 7(a). … But as recognized by the trial court, the error was a benefit, and he cannot complain. Murphy v. State, 203 Ga.App. 152, 155(3), 416 S.E.2d 376 (1992). (Full concurrence as to Division 3.) The trial court did not err in denying O'Neal's motion to correct an illegal sentence.” Penney v. State, 236 Ga.App. 442, 511 S.E.2d 275 (February 1, 1999). After serving part of a 10-year prison sentence,