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defendant was granted habeas relief from his guilty plea. Remanded to trial court, defendant again pled guilty. “Penney agreed to accept a sentence of five years on intensive probation with no credit for time served instead of pleading to the original ten years imprisonment. The trial court accepted the plea and sentenced Penney accordingly. Penney did not appeal this conviction nor did he file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea.” Two years later, defendant moved to “correct” his sentence, contending that it was void because it did not give him credit for the time previously served. Held, trial court properly denied the motion to correct the sentence. “[I]t was abundantly clear from the record that Penney knowingly and voluntarily exchanged the time he served on his previous ten year sentence for a five year probated sentence. Credit for time served is a personal benefit Penney was authorized to waive by his decision to enter a plea and accept a negotiated sentence. See Powell v. State, 229 Ga.App. 52, 53(2), 494 S.E.2d 200 (1997).” P. JUDGMENT NOT ON VERDICT Masood v. State, 313 Ga.App. 549, 722 S.E.2d 149 (January 12, 2012). DUI conviction affirmed; defendant’s motion for judgment not on verdict properly treated as a motion for new trial. “[D]espite Masood's description of his post-verdict motion as being one for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, ‘[n]o statutory provision for judgment n.o.v. exists in the statutory criminal law of Georgia” and our Supreme Court has “declined to create such a remedy judicially.’ Rhyne v. State, 209 Ga.App. 548, 550(1) (434 S.E.2d 76) (1993); see also Wilson v. State, 215 Ga. 775, 775(1) (113 S.E.2d 607) (1960) (holding that ‘the rule providing for entering a judgment notwithstanding the verdict ... relates solely to pleading, procedure, and practice in the trial of civil actions’). Indeed, OCGA § 17–9–1 permits a defendant ‘to seek a directed verdict of acquittal only during trial.’ Rhyne, 209 Ga.App. at 550(1); see also Wilson, 215 Ga. at 775–76(1) (‘There being no provision of law for the court to entertain a motion of not guilty notwithstanding a judgment of guilty, this assignment is without merit.’). Thus, because JNOV is not a remedy available in a criminal case, ‘a defendant's remedy is a motion for a new trial.’ Stancil v. State, 155 Ga.App. 731, 734(7) (272 S.E.2d 511) (1980); see also Russell v. State, 155 Ga.App. 555, 555(2) (271 S.E.2d 689) (1980) (‘A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is not appropriate in a criminal case and when made in the alternative with a motion for new trial, amounts to no more than the latter.’).” Q. MANDAMUS Gay v. Owens, 292 Ga. 480, 738 S.E.2d 614 (February 18, 2013). Defendant, incarcerated in Tennessee, filed mandamus action in Supreme Court against Commissioner of Georgia Department of Corrections, “to award Gay additional pre-trial sentence credit.” Petition dismissed, because should have been filed in superior court; but opinion notes that OCGA § 9– 10–14(b), requiring inmates filing civil actions “against any agency or officer of state or local government” to use forms approved by the Administrative Office of the Courts, only applies “an inmate of a state or local penal or correctional institution” within Georgia, not an inmate in another state such as Gay. Gilbert v. Pridgen, 291 Ga. 159, 728 S.E.2d 548 (May 29, 2012). Trial court properly denied defendant’s mandamus petition “to compel appellees, judges of that court, to dismiss his citation for speeding, to recuse one of them from reviewing his pleading, and to ‘impeach’ certain of them due to alleged misconduct.” “Extraordinary writs like the writ of mandamus, therefore, ‘are not the proper remedy to seek review of a ruling made by a trial court where there is a right of judicial review of the judge's ruling, because the availability of judicial review is an adequate legal remedy that eliminates the availability of mandamus relief.’ Ford Motor Co. v. Lawrence, 279 Ga. 284, 285 (612 S.E.2d 301) (2005). In the present case, the court entered its final judgment on the traffic citation charging appellant with speeding in violation of OCGA § 40–6–181(b), and reversal of that adverse final judgment must be obtained by one of the available methods of obtaining appellate review and not by writ of mandamus. See id. (mandamus not a vehicle by which party may obtain review of judicial order which is subject to appellate review). See also Smith & Wesson v. City of Atlanta, 273 Ga. 431, 433 (543 S.E.2d 16) (2001); Hayes v. Brown, 205 Ga. 234, 237 (52 S.E.2d 862) (1949). Similarly, writs of mandamus are not the proper remedy to seek recusal of a judge where, as in this case, no motion to recuse has been filed or impeachment of a judicial officer. See OCGA § 9–6–20 (‘no writ of mandamus to compel the removal of a judge shall issue where no motion to recuse has been filed, if such motion is available’); Ga. Const. Art. III, Sec. VII, Par. I (House of Representatives shall have sole power to vote impeachment charges against judicial officers of this state).” Humphrey v. Owens, 289 Ga. 721, 715 S.E.2d 119 (September 12, 2011). Trial court properly dismissed mandamus petition challenging his continuing probation for child molestation. “Humphrey cannot demonstrate a right to mandamus relief, as mandamus is not the proper vehicle for obtaining post-appeal review of a sentence imposed by a state court. Saleem v. Forrester, 262 Ga. 693 (424 S.E.2d 623) (1993). Moreover, Humphrey has access to the remedy of habeas corpus. See OCGA § 9–14–1(c). That the utilization of such remedy may be barred by the statute of limitation, see OCGA § 9–14–42(c)(1) (habeas action as to non-capital felony conviction final as of July 1, 2004 must be filed by July 1, 2008),